Competition and loss of efficiency : from electricity markets to pollution control by Kluberg, Lionel J. (Lionel Jonathan)
Competition and Loss of Efficiency: From
Electricity Markets to Pollution Control
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTEby OF TECHNOLOGY
Lionel J. Kluberg 6AU 0 12011
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management LIBRARIES
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Operations Research
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2011
@ Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011. All rights reserved.
Author...............................................
Sloan School of Management
May 20, 2011
Certified by ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
Georgia Perakis
William F. Pounds Professor of Operations Research
Sloan School of Management
sis Supervisor
Accepted by................ ................... /.1. d o . .. j .. .. . . .
Sitris Bertsimas
Boeing Professor of Operations Research
Co-Director, Operations Research Center
2
Competition and Loss of Efficiency: From Electricity
Markets to Pollution Control
by
Lionel J. Kluberg
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management
on May 20, 2011, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Operations Research
Abstract
The thesis investigates the costs and benefits of free competition as opposed to central
regulation to coordinate the incentives of various participants in a market. The over-
arching goal of the thesis is to decide whether deregulated competition is beneficial
for society, or more precisely, in which context and under what market structure and
what conditions deregulation is beneficial. We consider oligopolistic markets in which
a few suppliers with significant market power compete to supply differentiated sub-
stitute goods. In such markets, competition is modeled through the game theoretic
concept of Nash equilibrium. The thesis compares the Nash equilibrium competitive
outcome of these markets with the regulated situation in which a central authority
coordinates the decision of the market participants to optimize social welfare. The
thesis analyzes the impact of deregulation for producers, for consumers and for society
as a whole. The thesis begins with a general quantity (Cournot) oligopolistic market
where each producer faces independent production constraints. We then study how
a company with multiple subsidiaries can reduce its global energy consumption in a
decentralized manner while ensuring that the subsidiaries adopt a globally optimal
behavior. We finally propose a new model of supply function competition for elec-
tricity markets and show how the number of competing generators and the electrical
network constraints affect the performance of deregulation.
Thesis Supervisor: Georgia Perakis
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This thesis investigates the costs and benefits of free competition as opposed to central
regulation to coordinate the incentives of various participants in a market. The
overarching goal of the thesis is to decide whether deregulated competition is beneficial
for society, or more precisely, in which context and under what market structure
and what conditions deregulation is beneficial. The market setting we study in this
thesis consists of i) a small number of producers whose goal is to optimize their own
profit and ii) price taking consumers. The thesis considers oligopolistic markets, i.e.
only a few producers participate in the market and the decisions of each producer
affect the overall market price. Since each producer's decisions affect the profit of its
competitors, the market outcome is modeled through the game theoretic concept of
Nash equilibrium. That is, a market equilibrium is a set of producers' choices such
that no producer wants to modify its choice unilaterally. The thesis analyzes how
the prices set in the market and the quantities sold are affected by competition. We
also look at the impact of free competition on producers' profit, consumers surplus
(benefit) and the welfare of society as a whole. For each of these measures, the thesis
estimates the ratio of the performance of free competition over that of a regulated
market where prices and quantities are fixed by a central authority which seeks to
maximize social welfare. The thesis evaluates this ratio, often referred to as the price
of anarchy in the economics literature, as a function of market characteristics such as
the number of competing generators, the number of products sold and the intensity
of competition.
We look at the impact of deregulation in three contexts. We begin in Chapter
2 with a general quantity (Cournot) oligopolistic market. A few firms sell multiple
differentiated products and face production constraints. This setting models com-
petition between the US wireless carriers for example. Each carrier offers multiple
products in the form of different phone plans. Each carrier faces service constraints
due to the capacity of the wireless network. In this market, carriers compete for
market share (quantity) much more than they compete through prices.
Chapter 3 considers a company with multiple subsidiaries acting independently
which attempts to reduce its global energy consumption level. Each subsidiary still
seeks to maximize its selfish profit but the parent company cares about the global
profit as well. Whereas in Chapter 3, each producer faces independent constraints on
its production set, the energy target of the parent company is a constraint that ties
the subsidiaries together. This adds another level of complexity to the analysis and
radically changes the performance of free competition.
Chapter 4 proposes a new model of supply function competition for electricity
markets. Several generators bid electricity to a system operator by submitting a sup-
ply function, i.e. the quantity they are willing to produce as a function of electricity
price. After receiving these bids, the system operator dispatches production among
the generators to obtain the best solution for society that respects the generators'
bids. We compare the performance of such a deregulated market with that of a
traditional regulated utility system where the system controls the generators, knows
their production costs, and optimizes social welfare (without receiving bids from the
generators). The chapter studies the performance of deregulation as a function of the
number of generators participating in the market and the constraints imposed by the
electrical network.
Finally, the last Chapter provides some conclusions.
Chapter 2
Generalized quantity competition




Traditional economic theory states that in a "perfect" market, free competition be-
tween firms is optimal for society. One key assumption behind a perfect market, is
that the number of competing firms is very large and that each firm is individually
too small to affect the market. Since the papers of Cournot [33] and Bertrand [17],
economists have studied imperfect markets where only "a few" firms compete. The
outcome of these so-called oligopoly markets is represented as the Nash equilibrium
[92] of a single shot static game between the firms. While some papers focus ex-
clusively on establishing existence and/or uniqueness of an equilibrium ([124], [111],
[89], [8], [37], [93], [134]), most papers are also interested in the performance of these
markets. Literature on the subject is too vast to be extensively listed, but a few
main approaches emerge. Some papers study directly the relation between market
structure and equilibrium price, production cost, or profit ([86], [34], [117], [120],
[40], [118], [49]). However, these papers do not study social welfare. Other papers
introduce concentration indices, one-dimensional measures aimed at summarizing the
market structure, and show the relation between these indices and profit or welfare
([5], [122], [36], [44], [35]). As Tirole argues though, in Chap 5 of [128], no index is
perfectly correlated with either profit or welfare when firms are asymmetric. Very
few papers, on the other hand, study directly the relation between market structure
and social welfare. From a policy perspective, social welfare is arguably the quantity
that matters most: a policy should be judged on its ability to improve welfare. The
goal of this chapter is to study the relation between market structure and the loss of
welfare in an oligopoly market.
In other contexts, there is a large literature studying the loss of efficiency result-
ing from competition. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [77] introduced the concept
of price of anarchy to denote the ratio between the worst case Nash equilibrium
resulting from competition (see [92]) and the coordinated solution. In the field of
transportation, many papers study the loss of efficiency (e.g. [31], [102], [115], [114]).
The game there involves non-atomic (infinitely small) players. Applications to supply
chain management have also been studied recently ([28], [38], [103], [26]). While in
these settings the goal of players is to minimize costs, our research focuses on profit
maximization. Results do not transfer as some assumptions differ.
In the context of oligopolistic competition, two models of markets have emerged:
price (Bertrand) competition and quantity (Cournot) competition. In the former,
firms compete by setting prices letting consumers decide what quantity they buy,
while in the latter, firms decide production quantities and set prices to clear the mar-
ket. The loss of efficiency under price competition has been extensively studied by
Farahat and Perakis ([46], [47], [48]). This chapter, in contrast, deals with quantity
competition. Unfortunately, the results and insights they obtain as well as the proof
techniques they employ do not transfer from the price to the quantity competition set-
ting (see [46] for a discussion on how the two settings differ). In addition the presence
of constraints introduces additional difficulties in our setting. While price competi-
tion makes sense in industries where quantities produced can be easily adjusted to
realized demand (such as the software industry or financial services), it may not be
as realistic in industries where production capacities must be planned in advance. In
these industries (such as electricity markets), quantity competition prevails (see [46]
for a comparison between the two settings). Moreover, some two-stage competition
games where capacity decisions are made first, followed by price competition can
be recast as a one stage quantity competition' ([80], [52]). Kreps and Scheinkman
[80] demonstrate that Bertrand competition requires a careful timing where firms
decide their production quantity only after competing through prices and observing
demand. For situations, where firms have to pre-commit their production capacity
before competing through prices, Cournot is a better suited model.
In [60], Guo and Yang study the loss of social surplus for quantity competition.
They consider unconstrained firms (firms face no production constraints) selling a
homogenous good and their bound is in terms of market shares at the oligopoly
equilibrium. In contrast, firms in our model sell differentiated products and face
production constraints. Moreover, our surplus and profit bounds only depend on
the number of firms, the number of products sold and the intensity of competition
(defined in Section 2.2) which are intrinsic characteristics of the market.
The quantity competition model adopted in this chapter is drawn from [135]
(Chap. 4). Our goal is to understand how competition affects social surplus and
firms' profit. We adopt affine demand and cost functions. The affine demand model
is widely employed in the economics literature to represent oligopoly markets ([119],
[117], [120], [40], [125], [13], [48]). Yet, most of our results extend to non-linear
demand as well and we point out these extensions where appropriate. Since most
insights are the same in the linear and non-linear case, the chapter focuses on the
linear setting to keep proofs simple.
'Whether or not such a two-stage game can be recast as a one-stage quantity competition depends
on the rationing rule used to allocate spill-over demand of one firm which has reached capacity to
the competitors.
2.1.2 Contributions
We consider a quantity (Cournot) competition model where firms sell differentiated
substitute products (as opposed to a homogeneous good). This means that customers
may have a preference for certain products, that they may be more price sensitive for
some products than for others, and that the degree of substitution between products
need not be identical for different pair of products. Each firm can sell multiple
products.'
Our model includes a variety of constraints, decided or faced by the firms, on
their levels of production. In the context of oligopolistic competition, this work is,
to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to analyze the effect of production
constraints.
As an example of the practical relevance of our setting, take the US wireless
providers market. The four biggest carriers, namely Verizon, AT&T, Sprint and T-
Mobile control together 89% of the cellphone market [133]. They provide substitutable
differentiated products as customers may prefer one carrier over the others. Each
carrier offers multiple products in the form of different phone plans: a customer must
choose one of the phone plans and he might decide on the phone plan depending
on prices. Each carrier faces service constraints as the wireless network can only
handle so many users, talking and exchanging data, at a time. And, as carriers'
advertisements often show, they compete for market share (competition in quantity)
even more than they compete on prices. This is just one example of industry where
the insights of this chapter could be applied towards better regulations.
We quantify both the loss of surplus and loss of profit induced by competition. We
provide guarantees for the worst-case losses as a function of the number of firms, the
number of products and competition intensity. In particular, the chapter establishes
that none of these parameters influence the worst-case loss of surplus. In contrast,
the loss of firms' total profit increases as more firms or more products are intro-
duced in the market. Similarly, the more intense competition is, the more profit firms
lose. If instead of independent firms, this model represents independent branches of
a larger firm, the loss of total profit indicates how much the parent firm loses by not
coordinating its branches. In that context, the loss of profit quantifies cannibalization.
Structure of the chapter
In Section 2.2, we describe the model and assumptions we impose. We then analyze
the loss of surplus and the loss of profit for the case of single-product firms facing
capacity constraints (see Section 2.3). We finally extend our model to study general
convex production sets (see Section 2.4).
2.2 Model and assumptions
We consider a market of n firms competing through quantities d = (di, ., d). We
denote the quantities produced by firm i = 1, ... , n by di. Each firm is assumed to sell
multiple products, namely m products and hence for each firm di = (dil, - , dim).
As is traditional in the literature (see [135] Chap. 6), we model customers of
this market via a representative consumer. This consumer values the possession of
quantities d of products according to the quadratic utility function:
U(d) = (j)T d - 1/2 dTB d
For now, j and B are just parameters of the utility function.
The consumer has to balance the utility he gets from owning these products against
the money he spends to buy them. Therefore, for a fixed price vector p, we define
the consumer surplus as:
CS(d) = U(d) - p - d
To decide the quantities to buy, the consumer maximizes his surplus: maxd CS(d).
Hence for a fixed p, this consumer buys quantities d of products satisfying: p =
- B -d. This, in turn, gives rise to the affine, invertible demand function:
d ... Ml{" ... M"P
d(p)= d - M p= dim - Mi Pim
d'nm Mn . nm... Mn Pnm
where M = B- 1 and d M P. In the rest of the chapter, we use notations M' and
B'3. Top indices refer to columns of the matrices while bottom indices refer to rows.
For rows and columns, the first index (i or k) designates a firm and the second index
(j or 1) designates a product.
Anticipating the above behavior of customers, firms first decide production quanti-
ties, and then set prices to clear the market. The resulting vector of prices pi(di, d-j),
which depends on the quantities of firm i and its competitors -i, is simply:
p(d) = P - B - d
Hence, P can be interpreted as the prices consumers are willing to pay for their first
unit of each product (assuming they own none of these products d = 0). B represents
the decrease in willingness to pay per unit as consumers buy more products.
We denote by ci(di) the vector of unit production costs for firm i and we as-
sume that it only depends on the firms' own production. The profit of a firm
Hi is the difference between sales revenue and productions costs: r1T(d 2 , d_) =
di [pi(di, d-j) - ci(di)]. We define total profit as the sum of the firms' profit: 11(d) =
1 Hi7(d).
Another quantity of interest is total surplus which measures the benefit of a market
for society as a whole. Total surplus is defined by aggregating consumer surplus and
firms' profit:
TS(d) =CS(d) + 1(d) = U(d) - p(d) -d + [p(d) - c(d)] - d
= [P - c(d)]T . d - 1/2 dTB d
Throughout the chapter we will compare three market setups. In the Oligopoly
Problem (OP), each firm maximizes its own profit selfishly by deciding its production
quantities. Firm i may face production constraints and we denote by Ki its feasible
production set. The result of this game is a Nash equilibrium where no firm has an
incentive to change its production quantities assuming other firms will not deviate.




s.t. di E Ki
We compare this profit to the profit firms could get by colluding. Acting as a
monopoly, these firms would optimize their total profit, giving rise to the Monopoly
Problem (MP):
MP: d"' = argmax H(d)
d
s.t. d E K.
Set K is simply the product space of Ki's.
Finally, when looking at total surplus, we will benchmark these two setups against
the fully coordinated situation. A central planner regulating production and con-
sumption to maximize the surplus of society solves the Society Problem (SP):
SP: dS = argmax TS(d)
d
s.t. d E K.
The goal of this chapter is to compare the three setups above in terms of total
surplus and firms' profit. We will often refer to these five quantities of interest:
17(OP) = U(dop), H(MP) = fl(d M P), TS(OP) OP TS(do), TS(MP) = TS(dm )
and TS(SP) = TS(dsP).
Assumption 1. The strategy space of seller i, Ki is a convex, compact set such that
0 E K,, and K, C R'. This assumption allows for example constraints of the form
0 < di < C2 , for all i, or in the multi-product case (each seller sells several products
j) E dij < Ci.
Assumption 2. The demand function is affine: d(p) = d - M p, with M positive
definite, diag(M) > 0, and offdiag(M) < 0.
We will assume, as is typical in the literature, that U(d) is a strictly concave
function, which translates into its Hessian matrix B being positive definite. This
implies that diag(M) > 0, that is, demand dij(p) is a strictly decreasing function of
Pij.
This chapter focuses on markets of gross substitute products. The products are
not identical, as customers may prefer to buy a certain product or to buy a given
product from a specific firm. But they are gross substitutes to each other because
customers will buy at most one of these products. Their decision for which product
to buy will depend both on their initial preference and on the prices of the different
products. For example, one can think of a market of gross substitute products as the
market of midsize family cars. A given customer will most probably buy only one car
and although he may have an initial preference for which car to get, he is likely to
study many models and prices and to make a decision based on all the parameters
at the end. In this case, we will therefore assume that offdiag(M) < 0, i.e., if a
firm increases its price for a certain product, some of its demand transfers to other
products sold by the same firm and some of it transfers to competitors.
Assumption 3. M is a symmetric, diagonally-dominant M-matrix.
Symmetry is a consequence of the representative consumer utility assumption.
Indeed, in this framework, Vd p(d) = -B = Hu, the Hessian of utility function U,
which is a symmetric matrix.
M is strictly diagonally-dominant means: M! > ZkIij |Mkjl. This assumption is
applicable to markets where total demand is decreasing with prices. More explicitly,
consider the change in total market demand as a result of a unit increase in the price
charged by firm i for product j, holding all other prices constant. This change is equal
to -Mi + EkliiI Mil. Column diagonal dominance indicates a negative change.
Under these assumptions, matrix M belongs to the class of M-matrices, also referred
to as Stieltjes matrices, which have several useful properties and are in particular
positive definite and hence invertible. We refer the reader to Horn and Johnson [68]
for definition and properties of M-matrices.
Market Power:
We define market power rij of firm i for product j, and the maximum market power
r as:
rij and r = max rij
k Ipij I ij
Assumption 13, guarantees that r E [0,1). Market power measures the intensity of
competition in a market. The concept was first introduced in the context of oligopoly
pricing by Farahat and Perakis (see [46]) for a market with price competition and gross
substitute products. r represents the fraction of customers lost by a specific firm for
a given product (following an increase of its price) that will stay in the market (by
buying another product from the same firm or a product from another firm). When r
is close to 0, decisions of a firm have very little influence on the demand seen by other
firms. In the extreme case r = 0, matrix M is diagonal and the market behaves like
several (nm) separate monopolies. In this case, the objectives of the oligopoly and the
monopoly are identical and therefore there is no loss of profit due to competition. On
the other hand, when rij = 1, Vij the total demand in the market remains constant,
independent of the prices charged by the firms. The oligopoly problem in this setting
will probably not be very efficient since it does not account at all for externalities.
Assumption 4. We restrict attention to constant per unit production costs c.
Modulo some small technical assumptions, the results of the chapter still hold true
for linear per unit costs but it makes notations more complex. We simplify notations
by combining unit prices and unit production costs into a unit profit. We denote by
j the constant term of the price function p(d) - B d and by p = p - c the
constant term of the per-unit profit function ir(d) = p - B d. Similarly, we introduce
d = M -j and d = M. p.
Assumption 5. We assume d = d(c) > 0.
This assumption means that every firm can make a non-negative profit when all
the firms charge a "sufficiently small"' price. When all the firms set their unit profit to
zero (price at c), every firm observes some positive demand d. This, in turn, implies
that the per-unit profit for a demand of zero is positive for all the firms: p = B -d > 0
since B is the inverse of an M-matrix (M) and is hence componentwise non-negative.
Non-linear demand: We summarize below the set of assumptions needed to extend
our results to the non-linear case.
Assumption 6. We assume d(0) > 0 and d(c) > 0.
Assumption 7. Each demand function di is a continuous, twice differentiable function
with respect to the prices p and i < 0, i > 0 for j h i. The products are hence
gross-substitutes.
Assumption 8. Demand arises from a representative consumer utility framework with
concave utility U(d). The negative of the Jacobian matrix of the demand -Jd(p) is
a symmetric and strictly diagonally dominant matrix for all price vectors p.
Assumption 9. The price function pi is a concave function of the demand vector d.
As a result of the previous assumptions, the negative of the Jacobian matrix of the
demand -Jd(p) is positive definite for all p. It hence satisfies the matrix similarity
property (see [123] for more information). There exist a constant A > 1 such that for
all w and p, p':
1
A wT (-Jd(p)) w > wT (-Jd(p')) w> I wT (-Jd(p)) w
The same property holds for the inverse -JP(d).
Notation:
" BBdiag is the block diagonal matrix of matrix B, each block corresponding to
a firm i.
" r is the diagonal matrix made of the diagonal of B (the equivalent of BBdiag
for a single product per firm).
" BOffdiag is the off block diagonal matrix: B - Bdiag
" M" and B'. Top indices refer to columns. Bottom indices refer to rows. First
index (i or k) designates a firm. Second index (j or 1) designates a product.
Existence and Uniqueness: Since B is positive definite, the Monopoly and Society
problems are simple optimization problems with quadratic strictly-concave objective
functions. Since constraint set K is a product space of Ki's (each firm faces an
independent constraint set), the Oligopoly problem can also be reformulated as an
optimization problem on K. It can be checked that this new optimization problem
also has a quadratic strictly-concave objective function. Constraint set K being
compact and convex, we are guaranteed existence and uniqueness of d"P, d", and
dS". Conditions for existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium such as the one
resulting from the Oligopoly problem are studied by Rosen in [113].
2.3 Loss of total surplus and profit under produc-
tion capacities
In this section, we specialize the constraints to model production capacities. Hence,
sets Ki take the form 0 < di C, < di where Ci represent the capacities. The
Lagrange multipliers associated with these upper capacity constraints will be denoted
by A ", AMP and ASP for the oligopoly, monopoly and society problems respectively.
We also restrict the analysis to the single-product per firm case. We will mention
conditions under which our results extend to multi-product firms.
2.3.1 Loss of total surplus
We study first the loss of total surplus for the entire society composed by the firms
and the consumers. We remind here the expression of the total surplus:
TS(d) = (p)T d - 1/2 dTB d
We would like to compare the surplus of society when firms compete against each
other (oligopoly problem) versus when they are colluding (monopoly problem) but not
coordinating with consumers. We benchmark these two cases against the maximum
attainable surplus of society reached when both, firms and consumers are controlled
by a central planner (society problem).
Since SP is, by definition, the optimal solution for the total surplus problem, we
of course have that the ratios TS(OP)/TS(SP), TS(MP)/TS(SP) are less than or
equal to 1. We wish to establish a lower bound for these ratios that will allow us to
see how TS(OP) and TS(MP) relate to TS(SP) as well as with each other.
Lemma 2.1. In a market with differentiated substitute products, a single product per
firm and separate capacity constraints for each product, colluding firms always sell
less quantity of each product than if they compete freely: d m < d0 p.
The proof is left in appendix A.1.
Theorem 2.1. For differentiated substitute products, with a single product per firm
and separate capacity constraints for each product, free competition between firms is
always better for consumers (in terms of consumer surplus) than allowing the firms
to collude: CS(OP) > CS(MP).
Proof. The consumer surplus can simply be written as:








CS(OP) - CS(MP) = - d 0 Bd0 p - - d m Bdm
2 2
1 (dop + d A) B (d - dM )2
>0 >0 >0
CS(OP) - CS(MP) > 0
Theorem 2.2. For differentiated substitute products, with a single product per firm
and separate capacity constraints for each product, free competition between firms al-
ways achieves greater total surplus for society than allowing them to collude: TS(OP) >
TS(MP).
Theorem 2.3. In a market with differentiated substitute products, a single product
per firm and separate capacity constraints for each product, allowing firms to collude
reduces total surplus for society by at most 25%: TS(MP) > 3/4 TS(SP).
Tightness in Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 is trivially achieved when matrix M is diagonal.
In this case, firms do not impact each other and oligopoly and monopoly solutions
are the same.
In Theorem 2.3, tightness is achieved by removing the capacity constraints. With-
out constraints d m" = 1/2 d and d3' = d, leading to TS(MP)/TS(SP) = 3/4.
It is interesting to note that the bounds obtained in Theorem 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3,
are the same as in the unconstrained case. This means that adding simple capacity
constraints to the production set of each firm does not worsen efficiency. This is to
be contrasted with the results of the next section where adding more general convex
constraints lowers the bounds.
Proof. (Theorem 2.2)
1 1
TS(OP) - TS(MP) = p dop - -d 0 pBd' - p dm + -d"PBdm p2 2
1
= d B (dop - d"") - -(d + d m ) B (dop - d m )
2
- - dp + dp B (dp - d m p)
>0 >0
>0
TS(OP) - TS(MP) > 0
The last inequality comes from the result d"' < dop that we just established
above.
Proof. (Theorem 2.3)





The corresponding KKT conditions for problem (SP) are:
(A SP)T(C - dsP) = 0 (Sp)T dsp = 0
p - B dsp - ASP + pSP =0 Asp > 0 { P > 0
dsp < C < d dsP > 0
Step 1: ptP = 0 and dsp = C
The proof is left in appendix A.2.
Step 2: Constraints Splitting and Initial Calculations (A" is defined in appendix
A.1)
Let K 2 = {Set of active constraints for the monopoly problem} = {i = 1. n,
0}. We denote by Kc the complement set of K 2 and by HAB and uA the restrictions
of matrix H and vector u to rows indexed by A and columns indexed by B. Since
K 2 is the
d" -(
set of active capacity constraints for problem (MP),
K2_ cK2
dmp dmp































The last inequality comes from the fact that cKc < d1K and that:




Back to our calculations:
TS(MP) - 33 TS(SP)4 > dK 2 BK 2 K 2 CK 2 + dK 2 BK 2 K, d + dK, BK'K 2 CK 2
1








BKyK 2 Cd d K2 BK 2 K 2 CK2 -K 2 BK 2KK;
BK'K 2 CK 2
BK 2Kc dKc +
3- 3
4K2 BKcKc dKc + -CK 2 BK 2 K 2 CK2
3 K
dK BK2Kc dK




> 4K2BK 2 K 2 CK 2
-CK 2 BK 2 K'2
±dK, BKcKc
1
CK 2 BK 2K 2 CK 2 + dK 2 BK 2K- dm'8 K2 2
3-dmr + CK2 BK 2Kc dKc -- dK 2 BK 2K! dKc
1 3-dm'4 2 d 1- BKcKc d 2 -- dK, BKcK dKc22Kc2 2 8
Step 3: Using monopoly (MP) KKT conditions in inequality
As shown in appendix A.1, the monopoly KKT conditions imply that:
p - 2 B d M P - A MP 0
Restricting attention to the set K2 of inactive constraints (Ar= =0):
PK - 2 BK'(
CK2
dm)
-> dj= (BKyKc) PKc
1






- BK'K 2 CK 2
*21
Now, replacing the expression of d" in the rest of the KKT conditions (set K 2):
CK2 >0
dig
PK2 - 2 BK2 (
[BK 2K2 - BK 2 K' (BKcKc) BKK 2 (dK 2 - 2cK 2 ) > 0 (2.2)
Using expression (2.1), we simplify the relation between TS(MP) and TS(SP):
3
TS(MP) - 3 TS(SP)
4
3 -
> dK2 BK 2Kc (BKcKc)- BK-K 2 dK 2
1-
+ jK 2 BK 2 K 2 CK 2 - dK 2 BK2Kc (BKcK-)- BKcK 2 CK 2
1 1
- CK 2 BK2K 2 CK 2 + ICK 2 BK 2 K2
Regrouping terms to make expression (2.2) appear:
3







dK 2 BK 2 K_ (BKcK) BKK 2 dK 2
dK2 BK 2 K'
3
(BK-Kc)l BK'K2 CK 2 + CK 2 BK 2 K 2 CK 2
CK 2 [BK 2 K 2 - BK 2 K' (BKcK') 1 BKjK 2] (K 2 -2CK 2 )
> 0
Finally:





(dK2 - CK 2 ) BK 2 KI (BKcKc) BKcK 2 K 2 - CK 2
CK2 [BK 2 K 2 - BK 2K- (BKcKc)- BKK 21 CK2
> 0
>0
The top term is non-negative simply because BKcKc is still an inverse M-matrix
(see [72]) and as such its inverse is positive semi-definite. The second term is non-
(BKKc)- BKK2 CK 2
negative because:
BK 2 K 2 - BK 2K' (BK'K)' BK-K 2 = (MK 2 K 2 j1
is also positive semi-definite.
Hence, it follows that: TS(MP) '> TS(SP). E
Extension 1: Multi-product firms
We restricted our analysis above to markets with a single product per firm. In fact,
our analysis extends mutatis mutandis to markets with multi-product firms as long
as B + B Bdiag stays an inverse M-matrix. Starting with M being an M-matrix it is
not always true that B + BBdiag will be an inverse M-matrix.
Counterexample: We take 2 firms selling 2 products. Matrix B below is an inverse
M but B+BBdiag is not an inverse M-matrix (here BBdiag is the block-diagonal matrix
with 2 by 2 diagonal blocks).
40 3 18 8
3 9 1.75 2
B-
18 1.75 52 9
8 2 9 23
But under some additional assumptions, it is possible to guarantee this property.
In particular, if B is a semi-uniform (off-diagonal coefficients all the same) inverse
M-matrix, using properties of strict ultrametricity (see [110]) it can be shown that
B + BBdiag will be an inverse M-matrix. In that case, all our results hold.
Extension 2: General polyhedral constraints
We only analyzed here the effect of separate upper capacity constraints on each prod-
uct. We believe our proofs can be easily extended to include separate minimum
production constraints for each product. All our results should still hold true. More-
over, extensive random numerical simulations suggest that our results are still true
under general polyhedral set.
In conclusion, this implies that the traditional economic result that competition
benefits society holds true no matter how many firms compete and under very general
constraint sets.
2.3.2 Loss of firms profit
Our goal in this subsection is to study the drivers of the loss of total profit in the
market due to competition between firms. Hence., we use as a benchmark the total
profit in the market when firms are colluding. That is, we compare total profit
under the oligopoly solution versus the monopoly solution, i.e., H(OP)/H(MP) =
EZ Hi (d 0')/ E Hi(d"p) < 1. This section establishes a lower bound for this ratio.
We first consider a uniform market with identical firms. M is assumed to be a
uniform matrix: its diagonal coefficients are all equal to 1 (after normalization) and
its off-diagonal coefficients are all equal (to -a). Firms differ only through their
initial demand di. We also get rid of production constraints as we believe capacity
constraints can only increase the ratio F(OP)/LI(MP). After studying the uniform
unconstrained case, we will show numerically that the bound extends to the general
case.
Theorem 2.4. In a uniform market with differentiated substitute products, a single
product per firm and no production constraints, forcing firms to compete reduces their




fl(OP)/FJ(MP) > min [ ( 2 +2n 1Weoudike to emaiz 4 n-1+r t b  (n shown-afte r )n (n-1)(2-r)+2r 2(n-1)(1-r)+r
We would like to emphasize here that this bound which is tight (as shown after the
proof) gives us an exact characterization of the maximum loss of profit as a function
of the number of firms n in the market and the intensity of competition (measured by
the market power r). This is significant as both n and r can be "easily" determined
from the market characteristics. If instead of independent firms, we think of each firm
above as a branch of a decentralized larger firm taking independent decisions, the ratio
above measures how much profit the firm is losing as a result of not coordinating its
branches. In some sense, it is a measure of cannibalization.
Proof. Without production constraints, the KKT conditions of Appendix A.1 simplify
to do' = (B + F)~'p and d" = 1/2 M p. Substituting Bd for p and computing
H(d) = d - {p - B -d}, we get:
H(OP) 4 '(I + FM)- 1 ] (I + M )- 1d
H(MP) d B d
In the uniform case, skipping some calculations (provided in appendix A.3), the nu-
merator and denominator above can be diagonalized with only two eigenvalues. Let's
call d the vector whose components are the eigenvectors of M, and [#I, 2] the two





The ratio of profits becomes:
H(OP) 4 (' 1 d2 + P2 Z 2 dZ)
1(MP) 1 i g2dI + , En d21+a-no 1 1+a z=
To normalize this ratio, let's define:
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P2 (2+3a-2na)2
By hypothesis, we have a 2 0 and (n - 1) a < 1. Using these assumptions, it can
then easily be shown that: P1, P2 > 0 (and that both their numerator and denominator
are non-negative). Moreover, by developing the numerator and the numerator of these
eigenvalues and using the assumptions above, we can also show that:
* PI 2 P2
* P2 > PI
when r = a(n - 1) 2 (n- )(n2)(n-1)(ri-2)+1
otherwise.
We are looking for the worst possible d of ratio (2.3), satisfying d > 0.
















This problem can be reformulated:
min
a











In order to analyze this optimization problem, we need to spell out matrix A. By
d = A
construction, A is a unimodular matrix made of the eigenvectors of M. It is:
1 1 1
1 n(n-1) 1(n-1)(n-2)
1 1 - 1










If #2 > #1, the above minimum can be achieved by choosing {dj = 0 i
2, , n}. Since d = (1, 0, ... , 0) is a feasible solution (it corresponds to d
1 + -- na//n e > 0), it is an optimal solution and the optimal value is j1. In
this case, II(OP)/I(MP) > #1.


















where o- - 1_a will be used in the remainder of the proof.
We now write the first order KKT conditions of optimization problem (2.5). These




VaL(d, A., p) = 2 + ATA
A T = 0
Multiplying the KKT equation above by A, we get:
AVaL(d, A,p ) = 0








From which we get:
di
0
This combined with complementary slackness results in an explicit expression of
* either Aj d > 0 in which case Ai = 0.
" or Aj d = 0, in which case Ai = 2 (1 + p(- - 1))d
On the other hand, multiplying the KKT equation by d and using the initial
constraints of problem (2.5), we get:
d VaC(d, A, p) = 0
d22 - 2 p (1+)= 0
y=1/(1 + a) E '2 i = -2 i
So our goal is to maximize the value of p.
Finally, let's denote by A the set of active constraints of equation d = Ad > 0 in
problem (2.5). Multiplying the KKT equation by ei = (1, 0, ... ,0), we get:




Since we are maximizing p, we want the number of active constraints (I A ) as large
as possible. Because A is invertible, the only vector satisfying n active constraints is
d = 0 which violates the other constraint a d + En 2 dl = 1 + a.
It is however possible to satisfy n - 1 constraints in A and the constraint U di +
nU2 d_ = 1 + a. One such feasible solution is d = (u, -v/n -- 1 u, 0, ... , 0).
(with u = +a-na1+a)Vn(1+2a-na)
Hence, we choose |AI = n -l and y =E d? = n- . The corresponding objective
value is i + ( 2 - p1) 2 di.
So when >1 2 replacing for 'i, '2, and u, we obtain:
17(OP)/Ul(MP) 4 L(1+ a) 2  + (n-i) (1+ a - na)2 -
-n _(2 + 3a - na)2 (2 + 3ae -- 2nae)2.
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Tightness of the bound is again easily shown. Following the proof above, we pick
M uniform and d = e achieves the top part of the bound in Theorem 2.4 while
d = (0, ... , 0, 1) achieves the bottom part.
We now show numerically that the bound above holds true for non-uniform un-
constrained markets. We simulate random non-uniform markets for different values
of r and n and we compare with the bound. We tried to be as general as possible in
our simulation method. Here are the steps we followed:
" We simulate separately for different number of firms n = 2... 10.
" For each n, we vary the market power r from 0 to 1 by 0.1 increments.
" For each pair (n,r) we repeat the experiment 50n 2 times. We pick the number
of simulations proportional to n2 because we simulate each coefficient of matrix
M randomly (leading to Q(in2 ) random coefficients). We consider the oligopoly
vs monopoly profit ratio and we pick the lowest ratio of these 50n 2 experiments.
" For each experiment, we simulate d and M randomly.
- Each coefficient of d is random in [0,1].
- Each off-diagonal coefficient of M is random between [-1,0]. We keep
symmetry by taking the symmetric part of M here.
- The first diagonal coefficient MI" is equal to Ek1g11 Mig/r to guarantee
a market power of r
- The other diagonal coefficients M' are equal to the absolute value of the
sum of the corresponding off-diagonal column coefficients divided by r
times some random number randij in [0,1]: Ekigi |Mk /(r * randij). This
guarantees that r 3 < r.
- p = Bd by definition and these parameters entirely determine the uncon-
strained solution.
Each plot in the figure below corresponds to a value of n = 2 ... 10 (increasing
from left to right and top to bottom). The plots represent the ratio li(OP)/17(MP)
as a function of the market power r. The red curve is the theoretical bound, the blue
one (with the square) corresponds to our simulation. Our bound seems to still hold
in all cases. Tightness has already been shown above.
Finally, we analyze the effect of capacity constraints. We repeat the previous
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Figure 2-1: Numerical simulation of the profit ratio I(OP)/II(MP) for general
unconstrained markets (in blue) and theoretical bound for uniform markets (in red).
many experiments. We compute the profit ratio for the unconstrained case. We then
randomly generate separate upper capacities Cij for each product (product j from
firm i) and we compute the profit ratio with capacities. The purple curve (top one)
includes upper capacities, the blue one corresponds to the unconstrained case. We
represent here the lowest value of the profit ratio across experiments. It appears that
the worst unconstrained case is lower than the worst constrained case. Our theoretical
bound should then hold true even with production capacities.
2.4 Loss of total surplus and profit under general
constraint sets
In this section, we extend our analysis to multi-product firms facing general pro-
duction constraints. Each firm sells m products. Ki only satisfies the conditions of

















Figure 2-2: Numerical simulation of U(OP)/F(MP) for general constrained (in
purple) and unconstrained (in blue) markets.
of total surplus, then at the loss of profit. Our bounds are looser than in the previous
section and we do not show tightness since they apply for very general constraints.
Still, they provide us with significant guarantees for the loss of surplus and profit.
Moreover, as functions of n and r, these bounds follow similar trends than the bounds
in the previous section.
2.4.1 Loss of total surplus
Theorem 2.5. Under Assumptions 1 - 15 for gross substitute products we have:
5
TS(OP) > - TS(MP) (2.6)6
2




As in the case of Section 2.3, where constraints were production capacities, also
in the presence of general constraints total surplus bounds are independent of the
number of firms n or the market power of the firms r. Even in a market when firms
are competing and are faced with various convex constraints, the loss of surplus for
society is never more than 44% (= 1 - ). For all values of n and r, tightness in
Theorem 2.2 and 2.3 shows that a loss of surplus of 25% can be reached (independent
firms, unconstrained market) and Theorem 2.5 guarantees that this loss of surplus
can never exceed 44%.
Moreover, the oligopoly versus monopoly bound above suggests that under some
constraints on the production quantities, allowing firms to compete decreases total
surplus. The bound shows that even if competition can in some case hurt the surplus
of society, it will at most reduce it by 1/6. We provide below an example where
TS(OP) < TS(MP). Our example is the result of random simulations, it is not a
parametric example. Also, we relaxed the assumption d > 0 to p > 0 since the proof
below doesn't use this assumption. The example we provide still makes sense as d",
dMP, pOP and pMP are all non-negative. Our example is defined by:
" 2 firms, each selling 2 products (i = 2, m = 2)
1.1565 -0.4947 -0.1672 -0.3790
-0.4947 2.2010 -0.4954 -0.7078
Sr =0.9, M =
-0.1672 -0.4954 3.0273 -0.4844
-0.3790 -0.7078 -0.4844 4.6615
e P = (0.2187, 0.1831, 0.3280, 0. 3 36 6 )T and d = Mp
" Polyhedral production constraints Ad < b where
A = 0.1956 -0.4221 0 0 and b = (0.7214,0.9625)T
0 0 -0.8521 -0.1000 b
" The solutions dop and dMP are computed using constrained quadratic program-
ming (the monopoly problem is a direct quadratic program, and the oligopoly
problem can be reformulated into one)
* In this market, TS(OP) = 0.2258 which is less than TS(MP) = 0.2261
Proof. (Theorem 2.5)
At a Nash equilibrium solution, the optimization problem that a single firm faces is:








where (Bij) j1 denotes the rows of matrix B corresponding to the different prod-
ucts sold by firm i.
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where B' denotes the m * m square-matrix for all products of firm i.
The variational inequality 2 satisfied at the oligopoly solution is:
{-p + B - d0 + BBdiag . dOP (d - dOP) > 0
Since by definition the monopoly solution must be feasible as well (i.e. d" E K),
we have:
{-p + B -dop + BBdiag Pdop} (dm p - dOP) > 0
Developing all the terms and extracting TS(OP) = (Bd)T do - 1/2 (do )TB d0 p
2A variational inequality VI(F,K) is the problem of finding:
{ E K, F(x*)T(X - x*) > 0, Vx E K}. We explain the derivation of this variational inequality
in Appendix A.5.
Vd E K
and TS(MP) = (Bd)T dm - 1/2 (dMP)TB dm , we obtain:
TS(OP) - TS(MP) - 1/2 (do )TBdop - (do )TBBdiagdOP
-- 1/2 (dMP)TBdMP + (dmP)TBdOP + (dMP )TBBdiagdp > 0
Using positive definiteness of matrix B, we have:
* (dMP)TBdOP < 1/2(do )TBdOP + 1/2(dM )TBdMP
(1/2 (dop - dMP)T B(dop - dm ) > 0)
* (dmP)TBBdiagdoP < (doP)TBBdiagdoP + 1 4(dMP )TBBdiagdMP
((do - ldmp)T BBdiag(doP - ldMP) > 0)
Hence, using these two inequalities in (B.16), we get:
TS(OP) - TS(MP) + 1/4(dMP )TBBdiagdMP > 0
On the other hand, the variational inequality for the monopoly is:




Evaluating this variational inequality at the feasible vector 0 E K , we have:
pd" - 1/2 (dMP)TBdmP - 3/2 (dMP)TBdMP > 0
This leads to:
TS(MP) 3/2 (dMP)T BdMP 4 1/6 TS(MP) > 1/4 (dMP)T BdMP
For gross substitute products, matrix B is an inverse M-matrix with all coefficients
(dmP)TBBdiagdMP < (dMP )TBdmPnon negative so that: Using (B.18) and this
inequality, (B.17) becomes:
TS(OP) - TS(MP) + 1/6 TS(MP) > 0
-> TS(OP) > 5/6 TS(MP)
This establishes the desired relation between TS(OP) and TS(MP). Let us now
turn to the study of TS(SP). The optimization of the total surplus corresponds to
the problem:
max p -d - 1/2 dTB dd
The optimal solution of this problem satisfies the variational inequality:
{-p + B. ds}T (d - dsp) > 0
Evaluating this variational inequality at the feasible point 0, we have:
TS(SP) > 1/2 (dsp )T Bdsp (2.11)
On the other hand, the monopoly variational inequality evaluated at the feasible
solution dS gives:
{-P + B d"P+ B dmP}T (dsp - d"p) > 0
This leads to:
TS(MP) - 3/2 (dMP )TBdMP - TS(SP) - 1/2 (dsp )T Bdsp + 2 (dsp )TBdMP > 0
(2.12)
By positive definiteness of matrix B, we have:
2 (ds P)T BdMP < 3/2 (dmP)T BdMP + 2/3 (dsp )TBdsp
Vd E K
Making use of this property in (B.19), we finally obtain:
TS(MP) - TS(SP) + 1/6 (dsp)T BdsP > 0
=# TS(MP) - TS(SP)+1/3TS(SP) > 0 (by (B.18))
#= TS(MP) > 2/3 TS(SP)
Finally, combining TS(OP) > 5/6 TS(MP) and TS(MP) > 2/3 TS(SP), we
obtain the desired property:
TS(OP) > 5/9TS(SP)
Similar results hold true for non-linear demand case.
Theorem 2.6. Under Assumptions 1, 14, 6 - 9 for gross substitute products and with
similarity coefficient A we have:
TS(OP) 1/A+ 1 - 3A/4 TS(MP) (2.13)1/2+A
TS(MP) > - A 2 TS(SP)
1/A +1 - 3A/4 5
- 1/2+ A 3 - A2 )
(2.14)
(2.15)TS(SP)
Note in particular that when A = 1 as in the linear case, the bounds of Theorem
2.6 reduce to those of Theorem 2.5.
Proof. The proof method is similar to that of the linear case. We only sketch the
proof here, highlighting the main differences with the previous proof.
At a Nash equilibrium solution, the optimization problem that a single firm faces
is now:
max di -Pi(d) - cidi
s.t. di E Ki
The variational inequality satisfied at the oligopoly solution is:
{-P(dop) 
- Jdiagp(dop) dop + c}
Similarly, the monopoly problem is:
max d-P(d) -cd
di
s.t. d E K
The corresponding variational inequality is:
{-P(dm ) - JP(dm ) dm + c} (d - dm ) > 0 Vd c K
Finally, optimizing total surplus corresponds to:
max
di
U(d) - c d
s.t. d E K
The corresponding variational inequality is:
Vd E K
The key idea to connect the variational inequality to TS(d) is to realize that:
P(d) - c = VTS(d). Using integration by parts, this leads to:
d
TS(d) =0 (P(q) - c)T -dq = (P(d) - c)T -d - I dq -JP(q) -dq
Since P(d) is a gradient field (the gradient of U(d)), the integrals above are
independent of the path chosen between 0 and d. Using the parametrization q = A t
(d - dop) 0 Vd c K
{-P(dsp) + c}T (d - d m ) > 0
with t E [0, T], we can rewrite the total surplus as:
TS(d) =U1(d) - I d
Making use of the matrix similarity property:
i d d d
A T (-JP(d)) - - <
we can bound TS(d) with the profit P(d)
11(d) - d -JP(d) . d2A
A
< TS(d) < 11(d) - -d -JP(d) -d
2
Thanks to the concavity of the functions pi (Assumption 9), we can also compare
the price vectors at different demands:
P(d) < P(d) + JP(d) - (d - d)
Combining these results with the positive definiteness of -JP(d) (Assumption
8) and carrying out the same steps as in the previous proof, leads to the desired
bounds. n
2.4.2 Loss of firms profit
Theorem 2.7. For gross substitute products, under Assumptions 1, 14 - 15:
U(OP)/H(MP) > max{ 2 3
- 2+ r - (nm -- 1)'4 4+ r - (nm - 1)
where r is the market power, n is the number of firms, and m is the number of
products.
The bound is composed of two parts (see Figure 2-3). The first part dominates









< A -. (-JP(d)) -
This bound as well as the tight profit bound of Section 2.3 are decreasing with
n, m and r. Therefore, when more firms or more products participate in the market,
the outcome of selfish behavior becomes less efficient in terms of total profit. With
r = 1, the profit ratio converges to 0 as nm goes to oc, meaning the loss of profit due
to competition can become arbitrarily bad when the number of firms or the number
of products is large. On the contrary, in the monopoly setting of a single firm selling
a single product nm = 1, the profit ratio is one because there is no loss of profit.
Similarly when r equals 0, every firm is operating as a monopolist because the price
set by one firm does not affect the demand of its competitors. Hence there is no
inefficiency in terms of profits and the profit ratio is one. As competition intensifies
(r gets closer to 1), the oligopoly solution becomes more "inefficient".
value
Figure 2-3: Bounds on the profit ratio H(OP)/171(MP) for markets with simple
capacity constraints (green) and general convex constraints (red).
In order to prove the previous theorem, we will need to use an intermediate
To shorten notations, we denote by Id|2 = dT Bd,
dT BBdiagd, Id |r = dT Id.
Lemma 2.2. For a symmetric inverse M-matrix B and a vector d with all component
positive, the following inequality holds:
I|dII <; (1 + r - (nm - 1)) |dI|Bdiag
where r is the market power.
The proof of this lemma can be found in appendix A.4. We are now ready to
prove the main theorem:
Proof. The variational inequality satisfied at the oligopoly solution is:
{-p + B - dop + BBdiag .do? } (d - dOP) > 0 Vd c K (2.16)
Since by definition the monopoly solution must be feasible as well (i.e. d" E K),
the first order optimality conditions for the monopoly, become equivalent to:
{-p + B - do + BBdiag - dop}T (dm - dop) > 0
Denoting by H = d - {p - B d} the profit, we get:
fl(OP) - lld ||2B'diag pT dMP ± (dp)TBdMP + (doP)TBBdiagd"p > 0
By adding and substracting (dMP )TBdMP, we obtain:
H(OP) - H(MP) + (dOP )TBdmP - Idm p||2 - ||d ||2Bdiag + (dP)TBBdiaggMP 0
(2.17)




Since both B and BBdiag are positive definite matrices we can use the following
bounds:
" (do )TBdMP < 1/3||d 1||2 + 3/4||d m 12
* (do )TBBdiagdMP O d0 p 12Bding + 1/4||d" iag
Introducing these bounds into the variational inequality:
fl(OP) - J(MP) + 1/3||d 1||2 -1/4||d MP 12 Bdiag _ 0
-1/4|d"'IBBOffdiag 0
Since we assumed 0 E K, we can plug the feasible point 0 into the variational
inequality (B.1) to get:
FJ(OP) |d 0 BBdiag
Using Lemma B.1 to upper bound ||d 0 I 1, we finally get:
17(OP) - H(MP) + 1/3(1 + r - (nm - 1)) |d 1 Bdiag




This inequality is equivalent to:
H(OP) 3
fl(MP) - 4+ r - (nm -1)
Part 2: Let's now prove the first part of the bound U(OP)/IU(MP) > 2+. -1.
Using symmetry of the matrix B, we can rewrite equation (B.2) as follow:
U(OP) - F(MP) + (dP )TBBdiag (dmP - d) - (dMP )TB(dmP - dop) > 0
We can decompose this expression in two different ways:
- H(OP) - H(MP) + (dop - dMP)TBBdiag(dMP - dop) -(dMP)TBBOffdiag(dMP - dp) > 0
<0
(2.19)
- F(OP) - H(MP) + (dop - dMP )TB(dMP - dop) -(do )TBBOffdiag (dMP - dOP) 0
(2.20)
Combining these two expressions (1/2 Inequality(B.4) + 1/2 Inequality(B.5)) and
leaving out the non-positive terms, we get:
fl(OP) - 17(MP) - 1/2(dM P + doP)T BBOffdiag M(dP - dp) > 0
F(OP) - 17(MP) -1/2 (dmp)TBBOffdiagdMP +1/2 (do )TBBOffdiagdoP > 0
<0
Using Lemma B.1, we can write:
j0P 121212 oP.7 12d BOffdiag =jd 0pB - BBdia_ r ' (n - 1)1 d BBdiag
With inequality (B.3), we finally obtain:
rI(OP) - H(MP) + 1/2 r - (nm - 1)H(OP) > 0
This leads to:
1I(OP) 2
1U(MP) - 2+ r - (nm - 1)
Here as well the result extends to the non-linear case. The bound is actually
the same for linear and non-linear demand. Since the profit bound does not entail
calculations of total surplus, we do not even need the similarity property and as a
consequence A does not appear in the bound.
Theorem 2.8. For gross substitute products, under Assumptions 1, 14, 6 - 9:
II(OP)/II(MP) > max ;_(2 + r - (nm - 1)' 4+ r - (nm - 1)
where r is the market power, n is the number of firms, and m is the number of
products.
Proof. Again, the proof method is similar to that of the linear case. We do not need
the similarity property.
We make use of the concavity assumption of pi (Assumption 9) to write:
P(d m ) < P(do") + JP(dop) - (d m" - dop)
We also take advantage of the positive definiteness of -JP(d) (Assumption 8).
Carrying out similar steps as in the linear case, we obtain the desired result. 0
2.5 Conclusion
We studied the effects of competition in a market where firms compete by deciding
production quantities. We looked at the loss of surplus for society and the loss of
firms' profit. For the case of single-product firms facing simple capacity constraints,
we derived tight bounds for the worst-case losses as a function of the number of firms
n and the intensity of competition as measured by r. As it turns out, the maximum
loss of surplus is 25% independently of n or r. The maximum loss of profit on the
other hand, is a decreasing function of n and r. Even when competition is fierce
(r = 1), if the number of competing firms is small, our bound guarantees a small loss
of profit (e.g. for 2 firms, the loss of profit never exceeds 13%). Moreover, even for
an arbitrarily large number of firms, if r < 1, our bound still provides a significant
guarantee (see Figure 2-3). We then extended our model to multi-product firms
facing general convex production constraints. For this general case, we were able to
produce total surplus and profit bounds with a flavor similar to the previous ones.
We guarantee a loss of surplus smaller than 44% and we exhibit a bound for the loss
of profit as a function of n, the number of product m, and r. Although tightness is
not shown, together, the simple capacity bounds and the general constraint bounds
provide a range where the maximum loss of surplus and profit lie.
Chapter 3
Enforcing a joint energy
consumption target on companies
with multiple subsidiaries: a
decentralized incentive mechanism
and its social impact
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
In response to increasing social pressure, more and more companies, especially large
corporations, are committed to energy consumption reduction goals as part of their
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiative. PepsiCo, for instance, has pledged
to cut water consumption by 20 percent, electricity by 20 percent and fuel by 25
percent by 2015. P&G also announced plans to cut energy and water use by 20
percent by 2012 (see [108]).
In the long run, these consumption reduction targets encourage technology inno-
vation, and ultimately increase energy efficiency. In the short run, however, since
output level is often directly linked to energy consumption, the limitations in energy
consumption effectively place a cap on the output level. This is often then trans-
lated into a series of production quotas for subsidiaries or divisions within the parent
company. This gives rise to the typical 'principal-agent' problem where divisional
managers deliberately overlook their assigned quotas in order to achieve a higher di-
visional profit, especially when the burden of over-consumption is not borne by each
individual division or subsidiary.
Since company-wide coordination is often operationally impossible or too costly,
it is necessary for the parent company to design alternative mechanisms to induce
the 'optimal' behavior of its divisional managers. That is, a total consumption level
under the promised energy reduction goal, and a distribution among divisions that
maximizes total profit for the company. One common approach to align the differ-
ent incentives is to use financial compensation. For example, since 2008, Intel has
established an employee engagement mechanism where a portion of each employee's
variable compensation is dependent upon the company achieving its environmental
sustainability goals [70]. Similarly, Hilton Hotels successfully met its goal of 5 percent
reduction in energy consumption by tying the hotel general managers' annual bonuses
to the energy performance at each property [59].
This chapter models a company attempting to reduce its global energy consump-
tion across multiple subsidiaries. The subsidiaries behave like Cournot players, who
independently decide their production quantity to optimize individual profit. Cournot
competition (see [33]) is often a good model of competition in industries where output
level cannot be easily adjusted in the short-run (the manufacturing industry for ex-
ample). In a Cournot market, decisions on output quantities are made first and prices
are determined subsequently to clear the market. In this competitive setting, the de-
mand of a particular division is adversely affected by the output of other divisions;
this could happen when divisions sell the same or slightly differentiated products in
the same market, (i.e. different brands of shampoo from P&G). In the absence of any
coordination mechanism, the subsidiaries compete as Cournot players subject to the
joint energy target constraint. Each subsidiary is conscious of the combined energy
constraint the parent company must satisfy: it chooses its output to maximize profit
subject to the satisfaction of the energy constraint while taking the production quan-
tities of its competitors as given. We call this situation the decentralized scenario;
equilibrium is reached when no subsidiary can increase its profit by unilaterally chang-
ing its output quantity. Compared to problems with disjoint constraints, where the
feasible set of each subsidiary is independent of the decisions of its competitors, the
equilibrium behavior is more complicated under joint constraints since subsidiaries
influence each other through both their objective function and their feasible strategy
space; in particular, such a game possesses multiple equilibria. Another option for the
company is to coordinate the efforts of its subsidiaries by subsidizing reduced energy
consumption. Under such a subsidy system, each subsidiary is free to decide its
output quantity without worrying about the energy constraint. It is up to the parent
company to choose an appropriate level of subsidies so that it is optimal for the sub-
sidiaries to consume less than the energy target. Finally, the company also has the
option to centrally determine the optimal production and energy consumption levels
of its subsidiaries and to then impose these levels on them. This chapter proposes an
implementation of a reward mechanism (a subsidy system) for the parent com-
pany to coordinate its subsidiaries. It then compares the subsidy system with the
fully decentralized Cournot scenario and the centrally-controlled scenario in terms of
company profit and social welfare. The chapter shows that there always exist an
optimal subsidy system that is able to fully coordinate the subsidiaries and achieve
maximum company profit. It also describes an operationally simpler subsidy sys-
tem that achieves close-to-optimal company profit in a number of situations. The
chapter finally studies the impact of the joint energy target. This constraint makes
the analysis much harder because the Cournot Nash equilibria are now the solutions
of QVI's (quasi variational inequalities, see [11]) instead of variational inequalities.
The joint energy constraint radically affects the Cournot model. Without the joint
constraint, the Cournot model admits a unique equilibrium solution and the loss of
profit and social welfare resulting from free competition are bounded. In the presence
of a joint constraint, there exists a set of Nash equilibria (no more uniqueness) and
the loss of profit and social welfare resulting from Cournot competition can, in gen-
eral, be arbitrarily bad. The chapter analyzes how the joint energy constraint affects
these losses.
3.1.2 Literature review
As President Nixon put it in his 1970 State of the Union Address: "We can no longer
afford to consider air and water common property, free to be abused by anyone with-
out regard to the consequences. Instead, we should begin now to treat them as
scarce resources which we are no more free to contaminate than we are free to throw
garbage into our neighbors yard." Over the last thirty years, governments and inter-
national organizations have been drafting regulations to limit the amount of pollution
generated by industrial activities. As a consequence, lawmakers and environmental
economists alike have been studying a variety of regulation tools to efficiently limit
pollution without impacting the economy more than necessary. Four main types of
policy instruments have emerged in the literature: i) quotas, ii) Pigouvian taxes, iii)
ambient taxes and iv) pollution permits. The most direct way to limit pollution is the
use of quotas which determine the maximum amount of pollutant a given industry,
region or factory is allowed to emit. Another way to reduce pollution is to tax the
polluting activity. In an ideal world with perfect competition, perfect information
of the regulator and no pre-existing taxes, quotas and taxes are substitutable tools.
In practice however, taxes are usually preferable to quotas because they allow the
regulator to achieve a socially optimal configuration even under asymmetric infor-
mation between the polluters and the regulator (Weitzman [137], Hoel & Karp [65])
or with preexisting distortionary taxes (Parry [100]). There are in fact two kinds of
taxes used as regulatory instruments. The well known Pigouvian tax considers the
damage generated by pollution as an externality, not accounted for by the polluting
companies, and recommends taxing it at a rate equal to the marginal social damage
caused by pollution. This procedure forces firms to internalize the cost of their pol-
luting activity and is hence able to achieve Pareto efficiency (Wellisz [138], Wright
[141]). This tax assumes that the regulator is able to monitor and charge each firm
on the basis of its individual emission. This kind of tax is called a point-tax, as op-
posed to an ambient tax which taxes firms in an industry on the basis of their global
emission (the sum of their emissions). Under an ambient tax, each firm pays the
same amount based on the total emission of the industry. A major drawback of such
a tax is its potential to cause large transfers of wealth between firms. Yet, in many
cases where the pollution of each firm cannot be measured individually, the ambient
tax provides an implementable policy. Moreover, Karp [73] shows that in an oligopoly
industry, each firm might end up paying less taxes under an ambient tax than under
a point tax: this is because, under an ambient tax, each firm realizes its impact on
the global pollution level. The last tool available to the regulator is to issue a limited
amount of tradable pollution permits to the firms. A firm can only pollute up to
the amount of pollution licenses it owns; this limits the global pollution level to the
amount of permits issued by the regulator. The regulator can either allocate them for
free (grandfather them) at the beginning of the period or auction them. Montgomery
[87] demonstrates that markets in licenses achieve maximum profit for the firms and
Nagurney & Dhanda [91] show that markets in licenses have a well-defined, unique
and easily computable equilibrium. Papers on markets in pollution licenses (includ-
ing the two papers above) all share a common limitation though. To reflect reality,
they model industry as an oligopoly of firms, yet they assume the market in pollution
licenses to be perfectly competitive. The underlying reason for this limitation is that
when firms are price takers for the pollution permits, their joint pollution constraint
decouples allowing the market to be modeled through a variational inequality instead
of the much harder quasi variational inequality framework. There is no fundamental
justification though why firms in an oligopoly market would be price takers of the
pollution rights.
In this context, we propose a new regulation instrument that avoids the drawbacks
of existing policies. Since current models of tax systems outperform both quotas and
permits by providing a simpler, more practical and more flexible tool, our instrument
is based on taxes. The main limitation of the Pigouvian literature is the assumption
that the social damage of pollution is easily evaluated in financial terms. What is
the exact monetary cost of green house gas emissions or water pollution? Instead
our model sets a global energy consumption (or pollution) standard, a limit based on
environmental considerations, and then puts in place a system of taxes to reach the
standard while minimizing the loss of social welfare for firms and consumers. In fact,
the idea of such a system has been toyed with before in the environmental literature.
Baumol & Oates [10] point out several limitations of Pigouvian taxes and suggests
the use of what they call "standards and prices". However, they do not develop a
mathematical model of the tool or analyze its financial implications. This is probably
because of the complexity of the quasi-variational inequality framework. The goal of
this chapter is precisely to develop the mathematical analysis of the standards and
price model, to compute optimal taxes and to bound the loss of efficiency resulting
from alternative simpler tax rules.
In a broader sense, our model is an attempt to coordinate a horizontal supply chain
under a joint capacity constraint through the use of taxes set by a regulator. As such,
this chapter is part of the supply chain coordination literature. Excellent reviews on
the topic can be found in, for example, Lariviere [81], Tsay et al. [129] and Cachon
[24]. A large part of this literature is devoted to coordinating a vertical supply chain
composed of one supplier and one retailer under wholesale-price, buy-back, revenue-
sharing and other types of contracts (Pasternack [101], Bernstein & Federgruen [14],
Lariviere & Porteus [82], Cachon & Lariviere [25]). Closer to our model, contracts
to coordinate a supply chain with one supplier and multiple competing retailers have
been studied in a number of papers (Padmanabhan & Png [97], Deneckere et al. [109],
Cachon & Lariviere [25], Bernstein & Federgruen [15]). However, the supply chain
they analyze differs from ours in several aspects. First, our model does not focus on
supply chain coordination between a supplier and its retailers. Moreover, our measure
of efficiency accounts for consumer surplus. We are not only interested in the profit
of the supply chain; we are looking for a regulation that is socially efficient. There
are some papers studying the loss of social welfare or "price of anarchy" (a term first
used in Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou [77]) under horizontal competition without a
supplier (see also Bernstein & Federgruen [12], Guo & Yang [60], Farahat & Perakis
[46], Kluberg & Perakis [76]). The crucial difference between those papers and this
one is the presence of a joint energy consumption target decided by the regulator (see
previous paragraph for its justification). This energy target places a hard constraint
on the joint productions of the subsidiaries. While competition in the unconstrained
(or uncoupled constrained) models leads to a unique Nash equilibrium (where no firm
can improve its profit by unilaterally changing its strategy), competition under 'joint'
or 'coupled' constraints belongs to the class of generalized Nash equilibrium problems
(GNEPs). Our improved regulation instrument comes at the price of a more complex
analysis.
The concept of generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) (often referred to as pseudo-
game or abstract economy) was first formally introduced in Debreu [39]. It is a
generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept where the choice of an action by one
player affects both the pay-off and the domain of action of other players. Unlike the
class of Nash equilibrium problems, uniqueness of solution is rare for GNEPs. Rosen
[113] introduced the notion of the normalized Nash equilibrium as a special kind of
generalized Nash equilibrium and provided conditions on its existence and uniqueness.
We will define and analyze the properties of the normalized Nash equilibrium in our
environmental game. GNEPs have a wide application in modeling problems where
a common resource is shared by players. Pang & Fukushima [98] explore GNEPs in
multi-leader follower games; they focus on existence and solution algorithms. Pang
et al. [99] study an application to power allocation problems in telecommunications,
and Adida & Perakis [1] investigate a model in dynamic pricing and inventory man-
agement. We refer the reader to Facchinei & Kanzow [45] for a comprehensive survey
on GNEPs.
A few papers apply the framework of generalized Nash equilibria to environmen-
tal problems. Haurie & Krawczyk [61] analyze a river pollution problem with a mix
of oligopolistic and price taking participants. The chapter exhibits a normalized
Nash equilibrium of the game and a system of taxes to enforce it. Contrary to ours,
their paper does not worry about the multiplicity of normalized Nash equilibria (and
corresponding taxes) or about the performance of the equilibrium in terms of firms
profit and social welfare. More recently, Krawczyk [78] presents a model with a global
pollution standard and establishes conditions for existence and uniqueness of an equi-
librium (normalized Nash equilibrium). The author acknowledges the importance of
charging optimal taxes to the producers to achieve social efficiency but does not de-
rive these charges in closed form. Instead, their analysis is limited to computational
experiments. The chapter most closely related to ours is Tidball and Zaccour [127].
They study an environmental game under three different scenarios: a Nash equi-
librium under separable constraints for each firm, normalized equilibria under joint
constraints tying all firms together and a fully cooperative solution. The scenarios
are compared in terms of firms profit and total emission level. The chapter focuses
mainly on a two-player game. In contrast, this chapter studies an n-player game.
It evaluates the scenarios in terms of the welfare of society (including consumers'
surplus), provides bounds on the loss of social welfare and firm's profit (rather than
simply stating which scenario performs best), and analyzes equilibrium prices and
quantities.
3.1.3 Main contributions and chapter outline
This chapter brings three main contributions to the environmental regulation litera-
ture.
First, it quantifies the losses of profit and social welfare due to the lack of co-
ordination between subsidiaries of a company subject to a joint energy target. It
compares the performance of Cournot decentralized competition, the subsidy system
and the centrally-controlled scenario. Since equilibrium strategies are not unique un-
der a constrained Cournot game, we focus on two special equilibria: the worst Nash
equilibrium and the uniform Nash equilibrium (to be described in the next section).
The losses of profit and social welfare are evaluated as functions of various market
characteristics (i.e., number of subsidiaries, intensity of competition and asymmetry
between subsidiaries). In addition, the chapter examines the equilibrium strategies
themselves and explains the underlying rationale behind the discrepancies in price
and quantity.
Second, the chapter proposes a decentralized reward-based mechanism for a com-
pany to coordinate the energy reduction effort of its subsidiaries. The chapter shows
that an appropriate system of subsidies can fully coordinate the subsidiaries and
achieve maximum company profit. In the process, we demonstrate that every equilib-
rium of the constrained Cournot game can be obtained as the Nash equilibrium of an
unconstrained game under the right set of subsidies. The chapter also illustrates that
an operationally simple (uniform) reward scheme is able to achieve close-to-optimal
company profit when the subsidiaries exhibit a certain degree of symmetry.
Third, the chapter analyzes the impact of the joint energy target constraint on
Cournot competition. When the energy constraint is not active, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium solution, the profit loss due to deregulation is bounded and the loss
of social welfare cannot exceed 1/4. When the joint constraint is tight, on the other
hand, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria (instead of a unique one) and the loss
of profit and social welfare can become arbitrarily large even when the company only
has two subsidiaries.
The chapter is structured as follows. We first introduce the notations and as-
sumptions. We then present the mathematical formulation of a reward-based incen-
tive mechanism and demonstrate its equivalence to the general model of Cournot
competition under a joint constraint. In Section 3.3, we show how the presence of a
joint constraint magnifies the loss of profit and social welfare. Sections 3.4 and 3.5
present special cases of the problem with various market characteristics. Section 3.4
considers a market consisting of many symmetric subsidiaries: subsidiaries have the
same price potential and are uniform in their ability to influence their own selling
price as well as the prices of their competitors. We then relax this assumption to
consider subsidiaries with only symmetric price potential in Section 3.5. Section 3.6
analyzes the loss of profit and social welfare for both the worst Nash equilibrium and
the uniform Nash equilibrium without any restrictions on the market characteristics.
We conclude with some insights on the practical implications of these policies.
3.2 Model Description
Consider a company with n subsidiaries committed to reducing its global energy
consumption to a level C.
Assumption 10. The subsidiaries sell differentiated substitute products to the market.
Since we are interested in the effects of competition within the company, we will
assume the state of the economy outside the company as given. In particular, the
quantities and prices set by producers of similar products outside the company are
viewed as fixed. Within the company, the subsidiaries compete by deciding their
production (and selling) quantities as in the Cournot model. The subsidiary managers
choose their output level di simultaneously and independently with the objective of
maximizing their division's profit. Vector d = (di, .., d,) denotes the subsidiaries'
output levels.
As is traditional in the literature (see [135] Chap. 6), we model customers of
this market via a representative consumer. This consumer values the possession of
quantities d of products according to the quadratic utility function:
U(d) = (p)T d - 1/2 dTB d
For now, vector P and matrix B are just parameters of the utility function.
The consumer has to balance the utility he gets from owning these products against
the money he spends to buy them. Therefore, for a fixed price vector p, we define
the consumer surplus as:
CS(d) = U(d) - p - d
To decide the quantities to buy, the consumer maximizes his surplus: maxd CS(d).
Hence for a fixed p, this consumer buys quantities d of products satisfying: p =
- B - d. This, in turn, gives rise to the affine, invertible demand function:
di PI
M 1 1 -M 1 2 ...- Min
d(p)=d-M-p= dA -
-Mni ..- M,(n_1) Mn
in ) Pn
where matrix B is the inverse of matrix M.
The subsidiaries aim to sell their entire production output; they set prices to clear
the market. The resulting vector of prices pi(di, d-j) is simply:
p(d) = - B - d
F denotes the diagonal matrix containing the diagonal elements of B. # = B d
is called the price potential since it represents the maximum market prices of the
products. The corresponding vector d is the demand potential.
We denote by ci(di) the vector of unit production costs for subsidiary i and we
assume that it only depends on the subsidiaries' own production. The profit of the
company can be expressed as:
H(d) = p(d)Td - c(d)Td = dT(p - Bd - c(d))
Another quantity of interest is total surplus which measures the benefit of a market
for society as a whole. Total surplus is defined by aggregating the consumer surplus
and the firm's profit:
TS(d) = CS(d) + 1(d) = U(d) - p(d) -d + [p(d) - c(d)] -d
=[ - c(d)]T - d - 1/2 dTB d
Assumption 11. We assume that the energy consumption level is linked directly to
the output quantities. As a result, the target energy level is modeled as a constraint
on the company's output:
eT d < C.
This assumption makes sense as in the short term company cannot drastically
improve their pollution efficiency, so that the only way to reduce pollution is to
decrease production output.
Assumption 12. The demand function is affine: d(p) = d - M p, with M positive
definite, diag(M) > 0, and offdiag(M) < 0.
As is typical in the literature, function U(d) is strictly concave, which translates
into its Hessian matrix B being positive definite. This leads to diag(M) > 0. The
subsidiaries of the company sell substitute products which means that as more con-
sumers purchase from one subsidiary, less purchase from the others. This implies
offdiag(M) < 0
Assumption 13. M is a symmetric, diagonally-dominant matrix.
Symmetry is a consequence of the representative consumer utility assumption. M
is strictly diagonally-dominant means: Mij > E'>i Mij for all i = 1, 2 . ... , n. This
assumption is applicable to markets where total demand is decreasing with prices.
Under these assumptions, matrix M belongs to the class of M-matrices. We refer the
reader to Horn and Johnson [68] for the definition and properties of M-matrices.
The diversion ratio (see [20] for reference) is defined as:
r = 7Mi E [0,1), Vi = 1,2,...,n, and r =maxri (3.1)
Mii 2
r measures the intensity of competition since when r - 0, M is a diagonal matrix,
and the strategy of a particular subsidiary has little influence on the strategy of other
subsidiaries; when r -+ 1, the total demand in the market remains constant regardless
of the market prices, suggesting a highly competitive market where the customers
lost by a particular subsidiary following a price increase are captured entirely by its
competitors.
Assumption 14. We restrict attention to constant per unit production costs c.
Modulo some small technical assumptions, the results of the chapter still hold true
for linear per unit costs but it makes notations more complex. We simplify notations
by combining unit prices and unit production costs into a unit profit. We denote by
P the constant term of the price function p(d) - B d and by p = - c the
constant term of the per-unit profit function ir(d) p - B -d. The profit of the
subsidiaries is thus: d - (p - B d), their production quantities times their unit profit.
Similarly, we introduce d M - j and d = M - p.
Assumption 15. We assume d d(c) > 0.
This assumption means that every subsidiary can make a non-negative profit by
charging just above its production cost.
In the rest of this section, we describe the different approaches available to the
company to achieve its reduced energy consumption target. (i) In a completely de-
centralized approach the company can let its subsidiaries compete freely subject to
the satisfaction of the energy target. This leads to Cournot competition subject to a
joint production constraint. Due to the presence of the joint constraint, the solutions
of this game are generalized Nash equilibria. (ii) The company can also use financial
subsidies as an incentive for the subsidiaries to reduce their energy consumption. We
show next that every generalized Nash equilibrium of the constrained Cournot game
can be achieved in a decentralized manner by the subsidiaries under the right set of
subsidies. (iii) We finally define the fully centralized, company optimal and socially
optimal, solutions.
3.2.1 Cournot competition under a joint constraint
In the absence of a coordination mechanism, each subsidiary i = 1, ... , n chooses an
output level do' that maximizes its profit subject to the satisfaction of the global
energy consumption target assuming the other subsidiaries set their output levels to
d". This target places a constraint on the total output:
d" = argmaxdII(di, d_") (3.2)
s.t. di + E d? <; C
j:Ai
di > 0
A simultaneous solution to all the subsidiaries' optimizations is called a generalized
Nash equilibrium. At this point, no subsidiary can improve its profit by unilaterally
changing its strategy within the feasible strategy space defined by the strategies of
the other subsidiaries. For the rest of the chapter, we refer to problem (3.2) as the
oligopoly problem (OP), and use S = {d" } to denote the set of equilibria. Existence
of generalized Nash equilibria under very broad assumptions satisfied for the model
in this chapter, is established by Debreu [39].
The KKT conditions of the problem are:
P - (B + F)d 0' - p + A = 0
eT - dop < C
iti(C - eT - do') = 0 (3.3)
Ai do' = 0 Vi = 1, 2, ... , n
Ai > 0, si > 0, do' > 0
The solution to the oligopoly problem is not unique since the n multipliers pui are
all associated (through complementarity) to one production constraint. The KKT
system is underdetermined: if the production constraint is active, all the pi's are free
and there are 3n unknowns (d, A, p) for only 2n + 1 equations (n zero-lagrangian
equations, n zero-complementarity equations on d, and 1 equation for the active
production constraint).
For this reason, one can restrict attention to a subset of the generalized Nash
equilibria called normalized Nash equilibria.
Definition 3.1. For a given vector of weights w = (w 1, w 2 ,... , wn) > 0, a n-tuple
(d, A, p) is a normalized Nash equilibrium of our production game with respect to
w, if it satisfies the KKT conditions (3.3) and if there exists a common scalar 1 > 0
such that:
Pi = P wi, for all i =1,...,n
Compared to generalized Nash equilibria, a normalized Nash equilibrium has its
multipliers pi proportional to each other through the weights w. These weights specify
the relative importance of the subsidiaries' contribution to the overall company profit.
If wi is small compared to the other wj's, then pi will be small compared to the yj's.
This means that more leniency is given to subsidiary i in terms of satisfying the
energy target. Subsidiary i is allowed to produce more to optimize its profit. On the
other hand, a large pi forces subsidiary i to reduce its production by a large amount
to satisfy the energy target. Rosen in [113] provides a rigorous proof of the existence
and uniqueness of a normalized Nash equiibrium for every given positive weight vector
w.
In particular, we will analyze the special case where vector w is uniform (wi
W2 = --- = Wn):
Definition 3.2. The normalized Nash equilibrium corresponding to the uniform vec-
tor of weights w = (w, w, ... , w) is called the uniform Nash equilibrium.
3.2.2 Reward-based incentive mechanism
It is common practice in industry (see [96]) that a company establishes an environmen-
tal conservation committee to ensure compliance with a committed energy reduction
target. This independently funded committee offers a financial reward to each sub-
sidiary for a company-level energy consumption below the target. We assume that the
committee first ranks the subsidiaries according to the fraction of the energy reduc-
tion burden each of them should bear (or alternatively, according to the importance
for the company of each subsidiary's sales level). To this end, the committee uses
a weight allocation vector w = (wI, ... , w) (wi > 0 and E wi = 1) that determines
the portion of the reward each subsidiary gets. A large wi results (see below (3.5))
in subsidiary i getting paid a lot per unit of energy saved. Subsidiary i will thus be
willing to significantly reduce its energy consumption because its loss of profit due to
reduced production is offset by the financial reward it gets for saving energy. Since
the wi's are normalized (E wi = 1), a large wi indicates that the parent company
wants to reduce the energy consumption (or the production) of subsidiary i more
than the consumption of the other subsidiaries. The parent company might choose a
large weight wi because subsidiary i uses a lot of energy so that the company feels its
important to cut that subsidiary's energy consumption. The parent company might
also choose the weights w for strategic reasons. If a certain subsidiary manufactures
a product that is more crucial to the company (for example, that subsidiary is the
star/luxury brand that reflects the company image), the company might not want to
reduce that subsidiary's production too much and will give it a small reward weight
wi. Once this allocation vector is chosen, it is viewed as a fixed set of parameters for
the rest of the problem.
The committee then needs to decide the reward y per unit of energy consump-
tion below the target C; each subsidiary will receive a subsidy P wi per unit. The
committee chooses the level y of subsidy and announces it to the subsidiaries. The
subsidiaries then choose their production levels to maximize their profit from sales
and subsidies. The committee must choose a sufficiently high subsidy level to guar-
antee that the subsidiaries will satisfy the energy consumption target. At the same
time, since the environmental conservation committee is usually also responsible for
monitoring other energy reduction activities within the company, it is of its interest
to minimize the actual payout of the reward.
Figure 3-1: Stackelberg subsidy game: w's are set parameters, y and d are the
decision variables.
This gives rise to a Stackelberg game between the committee and the subsidiaries.
The committee is the leader of the game and anticipates each subsidiary's output
as a function of the unit reward pt. Given a predetermined allocation vector w, the
committee chooses y to minimize actual payments of the reward.
= argmin p (C - (p1 d'( ))
s.t. n d*(p) < C
S;> 0
(3.4)
For subsidiary i, the problem is to choose a strategy d* that maximizes its profit
(from sales and subsidy) given the reward scheme (w, u) and the strategies of the
other subsidiaries d*i(p)l:
n n
di(p) = argmax di (pi - ZBijdjp) - Bridi) + wi p (C - E dj(p) - di)+ (3.5)
di >0 j
sales compliance reward
The committee must decide the reward p by solving (3.4) while anticipating that
the production of the subsidiaries will solve optimization (3.5). Replacing each sub-
sidiary's optimization (3.5) by it's KKT conditions, the problem of the committee thus
becomes an MPEC (maximization problem with equilibrium constraints). MPECs
are in general hard to solve, see [?].
Note that one can define a subsidy game for every weight allocation vector w in
the simplex {wi > 0, E wi = 1}. In particular,
Definition 3.3. The allocation vector w1 = w2 = ... = = Zs called the uniform
reward allocation scheme.
3.2.3 Equivalence of the models
Theorem 3.1. Every generalized Nash equilibrium of the environmental problem
(3.2) can be obtained through a reward based incentive mechanism for an appropriate
weight allocation vector w. In particular, the uniform reward scheme (w1
wn = -1) gives rise to the uniform Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Given a reward-allocation scheme w (and given the output quantities dj([L)
of the other subsidiaries j # i) , the output quantity d* (p) of each subsidiary i is a
function of the unit reward y given by (3.5), i.e.:
d* (/t) = argmax di (pi - E Bij dj(p) - Bijdi) + wi p (C - djp) -di)+
die o o ai bgl m
id-i to denotes the vector obtained by removing the ith element from vector d.
As we will discuss below, the committee will always ensure that the energy target is
met, i.e.: eTd* (pL, w) < C. Without loss of generality, we can thus omit the positive
part (function (.)+) in the last term above: wt (C - dj(p) di)+.
The KKT conditions of the above problem are:
p E- n Bjdj - 02Bid-wip+Ai=0j=A1  0 *> -P(B+F)d* - pw+A=0
Ai d = 0
4+ Ai d* =0
Ai >01 d > 0Ai >20, d* > 0
where w and A are n-dimensional vectors.
In particular, the total output level can be expressed as:
e d* = e (B + F) 1 (P - pw +A)
eT(B + F)-'(p + A) - eT(B + F) wp
Hence eTd* is a continuous and decreasing function of p 2. Given a fixed consumption
target C, the committee can always ensure compliance by using a sufficiently large
unit reward p.
The problem of the environmental conservation committee is, as given by (3.4), to
minimize subsidy payments while satisfying the energy target:
min y (C - eTd*(p, w))
s.t. eTd*(p, w) < C
y > 0
The previous discussion establishes that there exists a large enough pt that satisfies
constraint eTd*(p, w) < C. Hence, the subsidy payment is always non-negative for a
2 This follows since eT(B + )- 1 = eTB-1 B (B + F)-1 > 0
>0 >0
feasible p.
* If eTd(0, w)) _< C, then y = 0 is optimal since it results in zero payment;
" If e'd(0, w)) > C, since eTd(p, w) is continuously decreasing in y, there exists
a strictly positive p* satisfying eTd(p*, w) = C. p* is optimal since it also
results in zero payments.
Summarizing the above discussion, the
by the following optimality conditions:
p- (B+F)d* -p*w+A=





solution for the bi-level game is characterized
p -(B +F)d* - pI*w + A=0
p*wi (C - eT d*) = 0
eT d* <C
A>0
A, df= 0, d > 0
pt* _>0
(3.6)
since mi > 0 for i = 1, 2, .. , n.
Comparing these equations to the KKT conditions of the generalized Nash equi-
librium (3.3) and replacing pi by p wi, it is clear that the two systems of equations
are equivalent. In particular, when w 1 = -.. = wn, we have p1 = -= p,, which by
definition, is the uniform Nash-Equilibrium solution. D
3.2.4 Company and social objective
If company-wide coordination is possible, the optimal output level is the one that
maximizes the sum of all subsidiaries' profits under the committed energy consump-
tion level. We call the corresponding optimization problem the centrally coordinated
problem (CP) and use dC" to denote its solution.
dc = argmax dT(p - B d)
d
s.t. eT d < C (3.7)
d>0
From the society's perspective, (that is, considering also the consumers' utility)
the optimal production quantity solves the following problem:
dS"X = argmax CS(d) + 11(d) = dT(p - !Bd)
d
s.t. eT d < C (3.8)
d > 0
In the rest of the chapter, we will use this setting as a benchmark to evaluate the
performance of the different solutions to the environmental problem (worst-case Nash,
uniform Nash, coordinated solution) in terms of social welfare. We refer to the above
problem as the SMAX problem and use d"X to denote the corresponding optimal
solution.
The price-quantity relationship is modeled through a linear demand function and
matrix B is the inverse of an M-matrix (see [68] for a reference on M-matrices), so
that social surplus and company profit are concave functions of the output quantity
d. Hence both the SMAX problem and the centrally coordinated problem are max-
imization problems of a concave function over a simplex constraint. Existence and
uniqueness of an optimal solution follows easily.
3.3 The Need for Coordination
In this section, we look at the problem from the perspective of the parent company
but also from the perspective of society. To highlight the effect of the joint energy
constraint, we compare the performance of free competition in the presence of a joint
constraint and without it.
As one would expect, free competition between the subsidiaries induces a loss of
profit for the company compared to the centrally coordinated scenario. Less intuitive
though is the fact that the scale of this loss of profit is much larger in the presence
of a joint constraint than without it. The next two theorems show that while the
loss of profit due to free competition is bounded in the unconstrained case, it can be
arbitrarily bad in the presence of a joint constraint.
Theorem 3.2. In the absence of constraints, the loss of profit resulting from free
competition between subsidiaries of a company is bounded by:
II(OP)/II(CP) > max (2 + r jn - 1)' 4+ r -n - 1)
where r is the diversion ratio defined in (3.1), n is the number of subsidiaries.
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.1.
In particular, if the company only has two subsidiaries, the loss of profit can be
at most 1/3 (using the left side of the bound for a very competitive market r = 1,
see (3.1)). On the other hand,
Theorem 3.3. In the presence of a joint constraint, free competition between a finite
number of subsidiaries can result in an arbitrarily large loss of profit for the company.
This result can be shown through the following example of duopoly competition:
e N=2
1a #2 -aF B= , for any#31 > 2 >a>0 M- =
- FdoSd = for any do > 0 1=( 1 + a)do > (#2 + a)do =p 2
do
For a small enough value of the contsrtaint C (namely, C < min ),
th (p -a) 
t he optimal solution to the SMAX problem and the centrally coordinated problem
coincide. It is given by (see Appendix B. 1 for the derivation):
c
d SMAX = dcp =
0
On the other hand, consider a particular equilibrium for the oligopoly problem:
0
dworst = . The most inefficient subsidiary produces the entire production.
c
It is an equilibrium since both subsidiaries want to produce more but cannot because
of the capacity constraint.
Noting that r1 = a/# 2 and r2 = a/01, we have
r 2  #2 I(dworst ) # 2 (do - C)+ ado r 2  (ri + 1)do - C
- -- (3.9)
r1 #1 ~ I(CP) 1(do - C) + ado ri (r2 +1)do - C
Hence even for two subsidiaries, the loss of profit 1 - n goes up to 100% as
r 2 -- 0.
For the rest of the section, we adopt the viewpoint of a regulator, and examine
the effect of the joint constraint on social welfare. This includes the firm's profit as
well as the consumers' surplus. We compare the unconstrained and the constrained
settings.
Theorem 3.4. In the absence of a joint constraint, the loss of social surplus resulting
from free competition between subsidiaries of a company is at most 1/4: TS(OP) >
TS(CP) = !TS(SMAX). Equality is achieved when subsidiaries are independent.
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.1. E
Without the energy constraint, the maximum loss of social surplus is bounded by
a constant (25%) independent of the number of subsidiaries. The bound is achieved
when the subsidiaries sell to independent markets, i.e. when they have no influence
over the price of their competitiors. In this case, the oligopoly strategy coincides
with the centrally coordinated strategy so that the subsidiaries are able to extract
the maxmium profit from consumers even in the decentralized setting.
In the presence of a joint constraint, there are multiple oligopoly strategies when
the constraint is active. The worst-case loss of social welfare can be arbitrarily bad and
the consumers might be better off when the subsidiaries collude to achieve maximum
profit than when they compete freely. In this case, colluding induces a more efficient
allocation of the scarce resource among subsidiaries which benefits both the firm and
society.
Theorem 3.5. In the presence of a joint constraint, free competition between the
subsidiaries can result in an arbitrarily large loss of welfare for society.
This result is shown using the same duopoly example as above. Using the same
notations and parameters, we can write:
r 2  #32 TS(dworst) 32 (do - 1/2 C) + ado r2 (ri + 1)do - 1/2 C
-= - < = -- = --- (3-10)r - TS(SMAX) 31(do - 1/2 C) + ado r1  (r 2 + 1)do - 1/2 C (
Even with two subsidiaries, the loss of welfare 1 - T st goes up to 100% astwo V - ~~~TS(SMAX))geupt10%a
r 2 -+ 0-
When the capacity constraint is extremely restrictive, both the centrally coor-
dinated solution and the SMAX solution allocate all available capacity to the most
efficient subsidiary. In this extreme case, the set of oligopoly solutions on the other
hand encompasses all feasible solutions. The maximum loss occurs when all the ca-
pacity is allocated to the least efficient subsidiary.
We now turn to companies with specific characteristics and establish bounds on
the loss of profit and social welfare under additional assumptions. In particular, we
consider companies with fully symmetric subsidiaries and subsidiaries with symmetric
price potentials (defined later). We analyze the impact of the joint energy target on
the loss of profit and welfare for such companies.
3.4 Many Symmetric Subsidiaries
We start the analysis of the performance of deregulated Cournot competition and of
the subsidy system by focusing first on the case of fully symmetric subsidiaries. In this
section, we consider the situation where the firm's subsidiaries are fully symmetric.
By symmetry, we mean that the subsidiaries have the same demand potential and
are identical in their abilities to influence each other's demand.
3.4.1 Assumptions and closed-form solutions
" All the subsidiaries face the same demand potential: d = do e, for some do > 0.
e The subsidiaries are identical in their ability to influence each other's price (or
demand). With our linear price demand relationship, the assumption translates
into matrix B being uniform. The sensitivity of the subsidiaries' demand to
their own price is identical across subsidiaries B11 = B 2 2 = ... = Bn = # for
some # > 0. Similarly, the cross sensitivities, the sensitivity of subsidiaries'
demand to competitors' prices, are also uniform Bj = a, for all j # i for some
0<a<#.
# a ... a M -m ... -m
a ... a /# -m ... -m M
for some M > (n - 1) m > 0.
] p = Bd = poe, wherepo = (#3+ (n - 1) a) do;
* the diversion ratio becomes: r (n-) m (n-) aM (n-2) a+f
The closed-form solutions are summarized as follows (refer to Appendix B for a
proof ):
dCP mi #0Pmin -D 2(#3+(n-1)a)
d "^*= mm { P +(=-1)a V=1, 2,- ,n.
dIN n mm {,2(n -)Q}dU" NiE C NO0
n e 2++(n-1)a
d = -e, when 2 - < C.
{d 10 < di < PO_c di = C} ,otherwise.
When capacity is restrictive, the centrally coordinated solution, SMAX solution
and uniform Nash equilibrium coincide: d = 2e. When C P, the set of oligopoly
equilibria, on the other hand, encompasses all possible production repartition between
the subsidiaries in which total production reaches capacity.
3.4.2 Loss of profit and welfare
We first look at the loss of profit resulting from free competition.
Theorem 3.6. For symmetric subsidiaries facing a single joint capacity constraint,
the fraction of profit achieved under free competition compared to the maximum com-
pany profit is at least:
" When the capacity constraint is not active for both the centrally coordinated
problem and the oligopoly problem (i.e., when C > ), then:
fl(OP) 4n
=n± <bir n) > (3.11)HI(CP) -(n +1)2
" When the capacity constraint is active for both problems (i.e., when C <
a) ), then:2+ _
H(OP) 1
riO)> <D2(r, n) > -(3.12)
Hi(CP) - 2
* When the constraint is active for the oligopoly problem but inactive for the
centrally coordinated problem, the profit ratio lies between the unconstrained
bound (3.11) and the constrained bound (3.12).
Figure 3-2 and 3-3 illustrate the bounds provided by I and 12.
Proof. The derivation of the bounds as well as the expressions of 41(r, n) and D2(r, n)
can be found in Appendix B.2. D
When the capacity constraint is inactive, the loss of profit is bounded and (3.11)
describes how this loss of profit varies with the number of subsidiaries n. When the
constraint is tight on the other hand, inequality (3.9) shows that for general markets
(with io specific characteristics) the loss of firm profit resulting from free competi-
tion between the subsidiaries can be arbitrarily large even with only two subsidiaries.
In contrast, (3.12) establishes that when the constraint is tight, if the subsidiaries
are fully symmetric, the profit loss cannot exceed 1/2 no matter the number of sub-
sidiaries, the intensity of competition or the value of the active constraint. If the
subsidiaries are similar enough, the company needs to compare the cost of imple-
menting a subsidy system to coordinate its subsidiaries with the potential loss of half
their profit.
Figure 3-2 plots the profit loss (1 - 4 1 (r, n)) for the worst oligopoly equilibrium in
the unconstrained case as a function of the number of subsidiaries n for various valus
of r. The loss of profit increases with the number of subsidiaries and the intensity of
competition. As competition intensifies, the profit loss becomes more sensitive to the
increase in n. In case of fierce competition (r close to 1), the profit loss is 12% with
two subsidiaries and 67% with 10 subsidiaries. These trends are intuitive as the more
subsidiaries there are and the more intense competition is, the bigger the unaccounted
for externality each subsidiary inflicts on the others. The function 1 - 4 1 depicted
in Figure 3-2 is the exact value of the worst-case profit loss with unlimited capacity
4nand the ratio (n± 1), is a tight bound reached under fierce competition (r -- 1).
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Figure 3-2: Profit loss (1 - 1(r, n)) for free competition under unlimited resources
Figure 3-3 plots the profit loss (1 - 42(r, n)) for the worst oligopoly equilibrium
in the tightly constrained case (i.e., when C = L ) as a function of the number
of subsidiaries n for various values of r. The loss of profit again increases with the
number of subsidiaries but it now decreases with the intensity of competition. We will
explain this seemingly counterintuitive trend at the end of the section when analyzing
the actual worst case production vector of the subsidiaries.
The bound 1 - 4 2(r, n) is tight for a discrete set of capacity values. To visualize
this, we compare in Figure 3-4, 1 -12 and the actual worst-case profit loss as functions
of capacity when n = 10 and r = 0.1. The bound is tight at every value of the capacity
where the two curves meet. As expected, the bound 42 stays below 50%; that is the
loss of profit never exceeds a half. The profit loss is highly non-monotonic as a function
of capacity. Although for larger values of the capacity, the profit loss globally decreases
at the same rate as the bound, within each tightness interval (C E _ ,POj)
k k+1_
the profit loss remains non-monotonic.
In order to understand the effect of a joint constraint, Figure 3-5 compares the
worst case loss of profit in the constrained case with the loss of profit in the uncon-
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Figure 3-4: Profit loss for the worst equilibrium
damaging value of capacity and the squared curve represents the unconstrained loss
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number of competing subsidiaries n. The general insight is that the profit loss is
generally much larger in the constrained case. Coordinating the subsidiaries through
a subsidy system is even more valuable in the presence of an energy consumption
constraint. In the presence of intense competition (r - 1) however, this relationship
is reversed: the profit loss is larger in the unconstrained case. As will become clearer
at the end of the section, while competition between subsidiaries causes mainly neg-
ative externalities in the unconstrained case, it induces some positive externalities in
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Figure 3-5: Effect of the joint constraint on the loss of profit
Next, we evaluate the benefit of free competition for society by measuring social
welfare. We benchmark the total surplus under free competition against the maximum
achievable total surplus.
Theorem 3.7. For symmetric subsidiaries facing a single joint capacity constraint,
the fraction of social welfare achieved under free competition compared to the maxi-
mum achievable welfare is at least 75%:
* When the capacity constraint is not active for both the oligopoly problem and
the SMAX problem (i.e., when C ;> ), then:
TS(OP) 43(r, n) > -3 (3.13)
TS(SMAX) - 4'
" When the constraint is active for both problems (i.e., when C < ,
then:
TS(OP) > 4 4 (r, n) > - (3.14)
TS(SMAX) - 4
* When the constraint is active for the SMAX problem but not for the
oligopoly problem the social welfare ratio lies above the unconstrained bound
(3.13).
Figure 3-6 illustrates the bound provided by (D4.
Proof. The derivation of the bounds as well as the expressions <)3(r, n) and 4 4 (r, n)
can be found in Appendix B.2. E
Whereas without any further assumption on the market characteristics, the loss
of social welfare resulting from free competition between the subsidiaries can be ar-
bitrarily large (see (3.10)), Theorem 3.7 shows that this loss is bounded by 3/4 if
the subsidiaries are symmetric regardless of the number of subsidiaries or the inten-
sity of competition. From the point of view of a regulator (or society), letting the
subsidiaries compete is a good option.
Figure 3-6 plots the maximum loss of social welfare (1 - 4 4 (r, n)) in the extremely
constrained case (i.e., when C = g) as a function of the number of subsidiaries n for
different diversion ratios r. The loss of social welfare increases with the number of
subsidiaries but decreases with the intensity of competition. It follows similar trends
as the constrained loss of profit; we explain these trends at the end of the section.
Function (3 is the exact value of the worst-case social welfare loss with unlimited
capacity and the ratio 3 is a tight bound reached when the subsidiaries are indepen-
dent (i.e., r -+ 0). The constrained loss of social welfare bound <)4 (r, n) is tight on the
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Figure 3-6: Maximum loss of social welfare (1 - <b4(r, n)) under free competition
with limited resources
same discrete set of capacity values as the constrained loss of profit bound <b2 (r, n).
The maximum loss of 25% is achieved when the market consists of numerous inde-
pendent subsidiaries (i.e., r -+ 0, n -+ oo).
We highlight the effect of the joint constraint by comparing in Figure 3-7 the
worst loss of social welfare in the constrained case, with the loss of social welfare
in the unconstrained case. The dotted line represents the constrained loss of social
welfare under the most damaging value of capacity and the squared curve represents
the unconstrained loss of social welfare. These losses are plotted as functions of the
diversion ratio r for various number of competing subsidiaries n. While the worst loss
of social welfare in the constrained case is larger than the unconstrained loss when
the number of competing subsidiaries is large, competition under limited resources is
more efficient when the firm only has a few subsidiaries regardless of the intensity of
competition.
In summary, when the capacity constraint is active, free competition induces a
loss of profit for the company of no more than 1/2 and a loss of social welfare of no
more than 1/4. How does the simple uniform reward scheme perform in this setting?
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Figure 3-7: Effect of the joint constraint on the loss of social welfare
Does it improve company profit? Does it hurt consumers?
Theorem 3.8. When the capacity constraint is active for the SMAX, the cen-
trally coordinated and the oligopoly problems, the uniform Nash equilibrium is the
best oligopoly equilibrium. Moreover, it achieves maximum possible profit and social
welfare:
TS(UNE)_ and H(UN E)-
=-1 andC =)TS(SMAX) U(CP)
C
n




Not surprisingly, if the subsidiaries are similar enough, enticing them to split
production evenly through the uniform reward scheme is the optimal strategy for the
firm. This behavior is also optimal for society; the regulator (who cares about social
welfare) does not need to worry about consumers getting hurt and is happy to see
the company coordinating its subsidiaries.
3.4.3 Underlying production strategies
In the absence of constraints, the loss of social welfare under free competition is
caused by underproduction compared to the SMAX solution and the loss of profit is
caused by overproduction compared to the centrally coordinated solution: d?"X >
d" > d". In these three solutions, the subsidiaries split production evenly since
the market is symmetric. When the subsidiaries sell to independent markets (r = 0),
free competition achieves optimal profit; the production quantity that is individually
optimal for each subsidiary is optimal for the firm as a whole. When the subsidiaries
are not independent but compete in the same market (r # 0), however, the sales
of one subsidiary negatively impact the sales of the others. In this case, the output
quantity individually chosen by a subsidiary is "too much" from the point of view
of the firm because the subsidiary does not account for the reduction in demand it
causes to the other subsidiaries. The loss of profit, in this competitive setting, is due
to the subsidiaries overproducing.
As the capacity constraint (energy target) becomes restrictive, these different
solutions all produce the same total quantity: the parent company as a whole produces
at capacity. Under free competition however, there is no longer a unique equilibrium
strategy. Among the set of equilibria, the subsidiaries produce evenly only under the
uniform Nash equilibrium. Since the total production quantity is constant when the
constraint is active, the profit of the parent company depends on the average market
price:
n
HI(d) = dipi(d) = C yu,
where y= Idp p (d) is the average market price. Since the subsidiaries are sym-
metric and price is a concave decreasing function of quantity, the average market
price is maximized when each subsidiary sells an equal portion of the total quantity:
!. The average market price is minimized when all the products are sold through a
single subsidiary. As a result, the uniform Nash equilibrium is the best equilibrium
in terms of profit; it actually coincides with the centrally coordinated solution. The
worst equilibrium is the one with the least number of producing subsidiaries. The
consumer on the other hand, would prefer to purchase from fewer subsidiaries with
a lower price. Hence the worst equilibrium in terms of profit is actually the best
in terms of consumer surplus. As competition increases (r increases), the market
price decreases and it decreases faster when all the subsidiaries produce evenly than
when only a few subsidiaries split production. This causes the optimal profit (under
uniform production) to decrease faster than the worst-case profit. The loss of profit
(= 1 i ) decreases with r as a result. The SMAX problem is a trade off be-
tween the parent company's preference for higher market price and the consumers'
preference for lower market price. The socially optimal solution coincides with the
centrally coordinated solution. It indicates that the loss of firm profit resulting from
lower market price is far more significant than the surplus gained by consumers. The
loss of social welfare follows the same trends as the loss of profit; it decreases with r
for the reasons discussed above.
3.5 Many Subsidiaries with Symmetric Price Po-
tentials
In this section, we partially relax the uniformity assumption imposed in the previous
section to consider subsidiaries with only uniform price potentials: p = B d = e P0,
for some po > 0. However matrix B (where p(d) = j - B -d) is no longer uniform,
i.e. subsidiaries no longer have the same price sensitivities. It is still the inverse of
a symmetric M-matrix but its diagonal coefficients are free to differ from each other
and so do its off-diagonal coefficients. This means that consumers derive the same
utility from buying the first unit of any of these products but that their marginal
utility decreases faster for further units of certain products than of others.
3.5.1 Closed-form solutions
The closed-form solutions for the SMAX, centrally coordinated and uniform Nash
equilibrium are given by:
Lemma 3.1.
d"SMAX = min eT B-
' eTB-l e
I e
dc" = min {poB-1e'
eTB- 1eBle
dUN = min { po(B + T) e, 2 (B +eT(B + F)-le
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.3 for a proof. 3
3.5.2 Loss of profit and welfare
We examine the loss of profit and welfare under the relaxed assumption of symmetric
price potentials but asymmetric price sensitivities.
Theorem 3.9. When the subsidiaries have symmetric price potentials and the ca-
pacity constraint is active for all problems, the losses of profit and welfare for the
worst oligopoly equilibrium are characterized by:
]7(OP) 1 1
[I(CP) - 2 2 (2 BMM (3.15)(er-le) - 1)
TS(OP) 3 3 1 3
> - > -(3.16)
TS(SMAX) - 4 4(4BMMe T -le - 1) 4
where BMM = maxi { Bi, }.
With uniform price potentials only (non uniform sensitivities), the worst case loss
of profit is still 1/2 and the worst case loss of welfare is still 1/4 as in the previous
section (see also (3.12) and (3.14)). Hence, dropping the assumption of symmetric
price sensitivities does not hurt the worst case losses. Tightness for both bounds is
achieved when capacity is tight, i.e., when C < 2' Regardless of the number of
_ BMM
F) -'e
firm subsidiaries n or the diversion ratio r, the maximum loss of profit and welfare
occur when the self sensitivity of one subsidiary BM is significantly larger than the
self sensitivity of the others. This translates into having one diagonal element of
matrix B (the M-th diagonal element) much larger than the other diagonal elements
of B. It represents a market where the consumers of subsidiary M are very sensitive
to price (to product M's price), while the consumers of other subsidiaries aren't as
sensitive to the price set by their subsidiary.
In this context, how does the uniform reward allocation scheme perform? We first
study the value for the firm of implementing this reward scheme and then evaluate
its impact on social welfare.
Theorem 3.10. When the joint constraint is active and the price potentials are sym-
metric across subsidiaries, the loss of company profit at the uniform Nash equilibrium
compared with the centrally coordinated solution is no more than 1/3:
(UNE)> 2 - 26 + -62 > 2 (3.17)
H(CP) - 4 - 3'
where 6 satisfies: 0 < 2 - r < 6 < 2. Tightness of the bound is achieved when r = 0.
Without the assumption of symmetric price sensitivity, the uniform Nash equilib-
rium is no longer an optimal solution for the firm (in contrast with Theorem 3.8).
However, under the uniform reward scheme the worst loss of profit is 1/3 whereas
under free competition between the subsidiaries, this loss can go up to 1/2. The firm
must hence decide if this improvement in profit is worth the cost of implementing the
reward system.
Figure 3-8 compares the derived lower bound of the ratio rl(UNE) with simulations.
The simulations represent the smallest ratio ( )out of 1000 randomly generated
examples for each n and r. The loss of profit under the uniform Nash equilibrium is
independent of the number of subsidiaries. The loss worsens as competition intensifies
(r increases) and it is a nondecreasing function of capacity. The maximum loss occurs
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Figure 3-8: Loss of profit for the uniform Nash equilibrium
We now discuss the regulator's perspective by analyzing social welfare.
Theorem 3.11. When the joint constraint is active and the price potentials are sym-
metric across subsidiaries, the loss of social welfare at the uniform Nash equilibrium
compared with the centrally coordinated solution is no more than 1/4:
TS(UNE) >mx2 +2 3 (2 -r)2 >3 (-8
TS(SMAX) - 3 3(2+ r(n - 1))'8 1- r - 4(
The first bound dominates when n is small while the second bound dominates when n
is large.
Without the assumption of symmetric price sensitivity, the uniform Nash equilib-
rium solution is no longer socially optimal (in contrast with Theorem 3.8). However,
compared to free competition, the uniform reward scheme improves the total profit
of the firm without deteriorating the social welfare performance. The regulator has
no basis to argue against the implementation of the reward system since it does not
hurt society.
Figures 3-9, 3-10 and 3-11 compare the derived lower bound of the ratio TS(UNE)
with the actual simulated ratios. The loss of social welfare decreases with the number
of subsidiaries n and the intensity of competition r. Although the bound is only tight
when r = 0, the simulated curves follow the same trends as the bounds. The loss of
social welfare is also a nondecreasing function of capacity; the maximum loss occurs
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Figure 3-9: Loss of social welfare for the uniform Nash equilibrium: n=2
3.5.3 Underlying production strategies
Under the assumption of symmetric price potentials but asymmetric price sensitivi-
ties, the SMAX solution still coincides with the centrally coordinated solution when
capacity is restrictive. However, the uniform Nash equilibrium is no longer the best
equilibrium except for 2 special cases:
1. when the subsidiaries sell to independent markets, so that dCP = dUNE, the
production allocation under uniform reward coincides with the centralized allo-
cation;
2. when the price influence (matrix B) is uniform, so that the market is fully
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Figure 3-10: Loss of social welfare for the uniform Nash equilibrium: n=5
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Figure 3-11: Loss of social welfare for the uniform Nash equilibrium: n=10
Similar to the fully symmetric market, while both the centrally coordinated and
the SMAX problem try to maximize the average market price, the worst oligopoly
equilibrium is the one that results in the minimum market price. With symmetric
price potentials, the selling price is given by
n
p(d) = o-Z( Bijd
j=1
so that the smallest possible market price to sell quantity C is pmin = Po - BMM C,
where BMM = max {Bri}. In this case, all products are sold through subsidiary
M. Subsidiary M is the least efficient one in the market in the sense that if all the
subsidiaries operate in their own niche market, the market price of subsidiary M's
product is lower than the market price of other subsidiaries' product for the same
output level due to possibly inferior quality or other factors that decrease customers'
perceived value for the product.
3.6 Extension to General Price Potentials
We now drop the assumption of symmetric price potentials. Under this general case,
we extend our previous bounds on the loss of company profit and social welfare by
introducing an additional measure 0 =Imin/#max of the asymmetry of the price poten-
tials. We also establish some positive results on the centrally coordinated approach.
Section 3.3 showed that in the presence of an active joint constraint the loss of
company profit and social welfare resulting from competition between subsidiaries can
be arbitrarily large even for a fixed number of subsidiaries. When the subsidiaries
have symmetric price potentials, on the other hand, Section 3.5 demonstrated that
the loss of profit and social welfare, resulting from free competition, are bounded
by 1/2 and 3/4 respectively. We define 0 = pmin/max to measure the asymmetry
between the price potentials of the subsidiaries. 0 -+ 0 is the most asymmetric case
(either fmin = 0 or P-max is much larger than imin); 0 -+ 1 represents the case of
symmetric price potentials (as in Section 3.5). Using 0, we generalize Theorem 3.9
and bound the loss of profit and social welfare in the general case.
Theorem 3.12. When the capacity constraint is active, the losses of profit and welfare





Pmin - BMMC 1
Pmax 2
> Pmin - 1/2BMMC >
Pmax
for imax < 2 pmin
for Pmax Apmin
where BMM = max {Bij}.
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.4 for a proof.
These bounds coincide with results (3.15) and (3.16) of the previous section, when
the price potentials are symmetric (i.e. 0 = 1). These bounds are also tight: the
following duopoly example reaches the bound.
Take two subsidiaries with price potentials pmin and gmax respectively, and with
a demand sensitivity matrix B = . We assume pmax > Pmin> 2 b C and
(0 e
c < 1. Attributing all the production to subsidiary 1 is the worst oligopoly. The
centralized and the socially optimal solution, on the other hand, is to have subsidiary
2 produce the entire production quantity C. The profit ratio is:







(Since Prnax > 2 b C)
Similarly, the total surplus ratio is:
TS(OP)
TS(SMAX)
C(Piin - 1/2 b C)
C(pmax - 1/2 c C)
P-in -1/2 b C
Pmax
> 0 - - (since Pmax > 2 b C)
In light of these theorems, when the subsidiaries have very asymmetric price po-
tentials (pimin/Pmax small), free competition performs poorly in terms of both profit






as well as for society is to centrally coordinate the subsidiaries. However, such co-
ordination is not always possible (due to regulations or practical considerations) and
when it is, it is often extremely costly for the parent company. We demonstrate next
that the subsidy system can solve this problem by leading the subsidiaries to adopt
provably good solutions in a decentralized manner.
As noted in Section 3.2, every oligopoly solution can be attained with a subsidy
system by giving appropriate relative weights to the subsidiaries. We now show that
the centrally coordinated solution belongs to the set of oligopoly equilibria. It is
hence implementable through a subsidy system.
Theorem 3.13. When the constraint is active for the centrally coordinated solution
(edc - C), dCP belongs to the set of equilibrium strategies of the oligopoly problem.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we first show that when the constraint is active for the
centrally coordinated problem, it must be active for the oligopoly problem as well.
This follows since in the unconstrained case, d0 P = (B +F) -B d and d"' -- 2
e Tdop = eT(B + F)- 1 B d
= -e (B + r)-(2B)a
2
1T




Since the oligopoly problem is convex (each subsidiary maximizes a concave objective
over a convex set) dop is an oligopoly solution if and only if it satisfies the following
quasi-variational inequality (see Bensoussan [11]):
(-p + (B + F), dop) (di - d?") > 0 Vdi E K(d"j) Vi = 1, . . . , n (3.21)
where K(d") is the feasible strategy space for subsidiary i given the strategy d'p of
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the other subsidiaries. Since the constraint is active for every oligopoly equilibrium,
the feasible strategy space is simply K(d ') = {di di+ T idop < C di 0=
{d| 0 < di < d'}
In view of the feasible set K(dop), d" is an oligopoly solution if and only if for
all i such that dop > 0:
-pj + (B + F)d 0 P < 0
On the other hand, dC" satisfies the following KKT conditions for problem (3.7):
-P + 2B dCP + P e - A 0
y (C - e'dC) = 0
SeT dCP < C
pI > 0
Ai dcP = 0, A> 0, Vi = .. , n
For every i such that d7' > 0, -A5 + 2BidcP + y = A = 0.





When the energy consumption constraint is active for the centrally coordinated
solution, with a carefully chosen allocation scheme w, the reward-based incentive
mechanism is able to induce the optimal subsidiary strategy for the company. In
order to determine the weight allocation w, the company can compute the optimal
solution dCP using problem (3.7), solve the KKT conditions of the oligopoly problem
(3.3) at dC' and use the normalized Lagrange multipliers A of problem (3.3) for the
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weights. The company can thus coordinate the subsidiaries to achieve optimal profit
using a decentralized method.
The question that remains is to understand the performance of this policy in terms
of social welfare. How much does this policy hurt consumers? Will the regulator
have an incentive to sue the company for monopolistic behavior? The answer is no.
Compared to other oligopoly solutions this coordinated solution guarantees a decent
social welfare.
Theorem 3.14. When the joint capacity constraint is active for the centrally coor-
dinated solution, the loss of social welfare is bounded by:
TS(CP) > -T S(SMAX)
3
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.4.
The loss of welfare in this case is at most 1/3 compared to the maximum loss of
1/4 in the unconstrained case (see Theorem 3.4).
As we just discussed (two paragraphs above), computing the appropriate weight
allocation vector w requires the company to go through a complex optimization pro-
cedure. Moreover, the parent company needs to know the exact production costs
and market characteristics of the subsidiaries to obtain the optimal weights. The
subsidiaries have an incentive to distort the truth and not reveal their true parame-
ters to obtain a bigger share of the profit. Collecting the accurate information might
turn out difficult for the parent company. The subsidiaries may also complain that
being subsidized at different rates is unfair. A simple and intuitive alternative for the
parent company is to subsidize all the subsidiaries at the same rate. We next look at
how this operationally simple procedure performs in terms of profit and welfare.
Theorem 3.15. When the joint capacity constraint is active for the oligopoly problem,
the loss of profit and social welfare under the uniform Nash equilibrium are bounded
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by:
II(UNE) > max 2 3 II(CP)
TS(UNE) 6TS(CP)
TS(UNE) > TS(SMAX)
where r is the diversion ratio, n is the number of subsidiaries.
Proof. These results follow similarly to Kluberg and Perakis [76] since the Variational
Inequality (VI) formulation for the uniform Nash equilibrium is the same as the VI
for the disjoint constraints. Refer to Appendix B.4.
Hence the uniform reward scheme leads to a limited loss of profit and welfare.
With two subsidiaries, the loss of profit cannot exceed 1/3 for example. The loss of
social welfare, on the other hand, is guaranteed to be below 44% independently of
the number of subsidiaries or the market characteristics. These results show that the
simple uniform reward scheme can extract a lot of the company profit in a decentral-
ized manner without hurting consumers too much in the process. Note that these
bounds originally established for oligopoly equilibria under general feasible convex
sets might not be tight in our case. The uniform reward scheme performs potentially
even better than the bounds.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter studies the problem facing a company with multiple subsidiaries each of
which needs to comply to a company-wide energy consumption target. While without
a joint energy constraint, free (Cournot) competition only causes a limited (bounded)
loss of company profit and loss of welfare, this chapter shows that in the presence of a
joint constraint, the losses of profit and welfare due to competition can be arbitrarily
bad even when the company only has two subsidiaries. The chapter then describes a
reward scheme to coordinate the company's subsidiaries and reduce the losses of profit
and welfare. It also points out particular company structures where the losses due
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to free Cournot competition are bounded. The company has several options in order
to enforce compliance with the joint energy constraint: it can let the subsidiaries
compete freely subject to the satisfaction of the constraint, it can offer a uniform
subsidy to the subsidiaries per unit of energy saving to ensure compliance or it can
offer a subsidiary specific energy subsidy with the goal to coordinate the production
allocation. The chapter gives a potentially practical way of devising both the uniform
and the subsidiary specific reward scheme. It shows the existence of a reward scheme
that maximizes companywide profit and compares the performance of the different
approaches in terms of companywide profit and in terms of social welfare: if a given
scheme is too detrimental for consumers, a government regulator might intervene to
prevent its implementation. Without any assumptions on the market characteristics,
we show that while free competition can lead to extremely detrimental outcomes for
the company as well as for society in general, the uniform reward scheme can ensure
limited losses of profit and welfare. We then specialize the results to particular market
structures. When the subsidiaries are fully symmetric, the uniform reward scheme is
optimal from the point of view of the company as well as from the point of view of
society. In this case, the uniform reward scheme should definitely be implemented.
When the subsidiaries only present the same price potentials, the uniform reward
scheme guarantees a loss of profit below 33.3% whereas free competition can take
away up to 50% of the profit. In terms of social welfare, the uniform reward scheme
does not hurt society compared to free competition, so the regulator will not try to
prevent the company from implementing such a scheme. A possible next step in this
research that goes beyond the scope of this chapter is to study these different schemes




Loss of efficiency in deregulated
electricity markets:




The United States electricity market is a fascinating area for applied research. To
begin with, its mere size is impressive. In 2009, the total US net electricity generation
was roughly 4 billion Megawatthours (MWh). At an average retail price of 9.82
cents/kWh, the retail sale of electricity to consumers generated revenues of $353.28
billion (see [132] for more details). These huge numbers highlight the tremendous
impact, improvements in the electricity market can have. Reducing the electricity bill
by 1% (by reducing energy consumption, by limiting electrical transmission losses or
by driving electricity prices down for example) translates in savings of over $3.5 billion.
Another specificity of the electricity market, in contrast with other financial markets,
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is the complexity of its supply chain. The supply of electricity from producers to
consumers is a four step process. It starts with the generating companies producing
electricity and selling it in the wholesale market. Electricity is then transmitted
at a high voltage (a few 100 Volts) from the generating locations to consumption
areas. After being transformed to a much lower voltage (order of 10 Volts), it is
then distributed to primary electricity customers (such as factories) and electricity
distributors (such as NSTAR). Electricity is finally dispatched to individual consumers
who purchase their electricity from the distributors. The electricity supply chain
thus involves many intermediaries which raises the issues of coordinating them and
allocating profits fairly among them. Moreover, electricity is not a storable good, so
the generation and consumption of electricity must be balanced at every instant in
time. Compared to a traditional supply chain, the service level here must be a 100%,
all consumption must be satisfied, and excess electricity generation cannot be carried
over as inventory. The electricity market finally differs from other financial markets
by the absence of substitute to electricity and the necessity for a physical network to
transport it. The electrical grid must satisfy a number of technical constraints. For
example, lines in the grid have thermal capacities limiting the amount of electricity
that can flow through them. Due to these specificities, the electricity market requires
oversight: it cannot be settled via market processes only. In the United States, this
oversight is provided by independent system operators (ISOs) which are independent
organizations responsible for managing regional wholesale electricity markets and
dispatching generators to insure a safe, feasible and reliable flow of electricity through
the electrical grid. As an example, the New England ISO is responsible for the
transmission of electricity in New England. It controls a transmission network of
8000 miles of high voltage lines and manages a generation capacity of approximately
31,000 MW. This generation capacity is distributed among more than 300 generators
but the 20 largest generating companies own 27,000 MW out of the 31,000 MW (87%).
The New England electricity market is thus a perfect example of the oligopoly nature
of most US regional electricity markets.
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This chapter is an attempt to understand the effects of free competition in such
oligopolies. Since the 1890s, the production and dispatch of electricity has been
a state controlled service. Under this regulated system, electricity was generated
by large public utilities charging their marginal costs and it was dispatched by a
State organization that had full control over the utilities. This regulated system
had a single mission: keeping the lights on while "keeping costs down". As the
Department of Energy puts it: "energy efficiency was a marginal consideration at
best because energy was too cheap to be monitored". Starting around 1980 however,
the deregulation process began with the PURPA act of 1978 and the EPA act of 1992.
These policies put in question the necessity for a publicly run electricity system.
They encouraged the proliferation of private generating companies and gave them
access to the transmission network to allow them to compete with traditional utilities.
Free competition between private generating companies is the basis of a deregulated
market. After the California electricity crisis of 2000 though, a number of regions in
the United States pulled the breaks on the deregulation process. Today, less than a
third of the states in the US run a fully deregulated market. Legislators go back and
forth, regulating and deregulating the electricity market. The problem is that they do
not have a clear idea of the impact of deregulation because there is no rigorous and
exhaustive study of the benefits and drawbacks of having a competitive electricity
market.
In many areas, the electricity market is undergoing changes. Regulators, recog-
nizing the need to modernize the power grid, initiated a redesign effort called Smart
Grid. A Smart Grid is a grid applying "technologies, tools and techniques available
now to bring knowledge to power, knowledge capable of making the grid work far
more efficiently..." (DOE handbook on Smart Grid). With Smart Grid's recent ad-
vances, including the creation of demand response programs empowering consumers
to curtail their consumption when electricity is too expensive, now is potentially a
good time to move forward with deregulation.
This chapter provides a rigorous framework for the analysis of the deregulation
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process in electricity markets. Drawing on supply function equilibrium concepts, this
chapter builds an improved model of competition in electricity markets. Compared
to prior works (see next Section for references), our model reflects more accurately
the role of the system operator and allows the formulation of network constraints. It
enables the theoretical study and the simulation of the impact of deregulation on any
given electricity market. Moreover, this chapter carries out a systematic analysis of
the costs and benefits of deregulation for consumers, for generators and for society.
In accordance with the actual objective of the system operator but in contrast with
most of the literature (see next Section for references), this chapter uses social welfare
as the central metric to evaluate the impact of deregulation. Under this metric, we
compare a deregulated market with its regulated counterpart to give guidelines as to
whether deregulation is beneficial or not.
4.1.2 Literature review
There is a large amount of research devoted to electricity markets. Broadly speaking,
the literature can be split into four main categories. A number of papers focus on the
decision problems facing generation companies such as whether to turn on or off their
units (unit commitment problem, [130], [106], [126]), how to optimize their medium
term electricity production scheduling ([105], [54], [51]) or how to plan for capacity
expansion ([90], [53], [18]). A second stream of the literature attempts to forecast
electricity demand (load forecasting, [23], [58]) or electricity prices ([9], [41], [55])
through statistical models. A third theme in the electricity literature is to model the
security-constrained optimal dispatch problem solved by the system operator. While
a number of papers represent the objective of the system operator as minimizing the
cost of dispatch ([95], [88]), some papers recognize demand valuation for electricity
and describe the goal of the system operator as to maximize social welfare ([4], [139],
[22]). Maximizing social welfare is a fairer objective, as it values consumers' and
generators' benefits equally, instead of focusing only on minimizing the price paid
by consumers. In this chapter, we model the system operator as a maximizer of
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social welfare. In contrast to this chapter though, the literature modeling the system
operator dispatch problem does not represent competition between the generators:
it assumes the production costs of the generators known to the system operator and
investigates the optimal dispatch given these costs. The last area of concentration
in the literature is precisely devoted to understanding and designing competition
in electricity markets. In this area, some papers model generators as competing
through quantities (Cournot competition, [19], [21], [62], [63], [71]). The quantity
competition model has the advantage that its equilibrium conditions are easier to
establish and analyze and that it is computationally more tractable. However, this
is an approximation, as in reality, demand for electricity is uncertain and generators
must bid before knowing the demand. Yet, under the Cournot framework, generators'
optimal quantity bids depend on the demand realization. To solve this dilemma, in
practice each generator bids a menu of quantities and associated prices. To better
reflect this reality, this chapter represents generators competition through a supply
function equilibrium (SFE) model where each generator bids a function relating the
amount of electricity it is willing to supply to the electricity price.
The supply function equilibrium model was first described in 1989 in the seminal
paper by Klemperer and Meyer [75]. Since then, to better model the bidding process
of the generators, a few papers have applied SFE concepts to electricity markets
([56], [2], [3], [6], [116], [32]). However, due to the complexity of the SFE model, some
people claim these papers oversimplify the role of the system operator. They represent
it as simply finding a clearing price that equates aggregate supply with demand.
Unfortunately, this formulation is not flexible enough to include electrical network
constraints. The true market clearing mechanism results from the optimization run
by the system operator who looks for a dispatch that maximizes social welfare while
respecting network constraints. The electricity market modeling literature is thus
divided between Cournot models which imperfectly describe generators competition
and SFE models which typically omit network constraints. This chapter presents a
new supply function equilibrium formulation that explicitly represents the objective
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of the system operator and accounts for network constraints. The closest model to
ours can be found in Hu & Ralph [69], but the emphasis there is on establishing
conditions for existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium whereas the focus of this
chapter is on evaluating the performance of deregulated markets.
In the presence of electrical network constraints, the best response problem of each
generator to the supply function bids of its competitors is an MPEC (Mathematical
program with equilibrium constraints). MPECs are in general hard to solve, see
[83]. Finding a Nash equilibrium of supply functions for all the generators is thus an
EPEC (Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints). Some papers modeling
electricity markets through EPECS include [16] and [69].
After presenting the model, this chapter is devoted to evaluating the efficiency of
deregulated markets. While the concept of efficiency is at the heart of the Smart Grid
redesign plan, no precise definition of it exists in the electricity literature. Instead,
to determine the efficiency of a market, two proxies are often analyzed. The first is
the potential for market power, the ability of firms to manipulate equilibrium prices
away from the optimum, which is usually detected through concentration measures
(see FERC's reports [50], as well as [21], [66]). The second approach to measuring
market inefficiency, is to simulate the cost of dispatch resulting from competition
compared to the optimal, fully-regulated, cost of dispatch (see [56], [32]). While they
provide interesting insights on the quality of a market structure, these metrics are
incomplete representation of efficiency. Because they ignore the benefit consumers
derive from receiving electricity, these metrics aim at minimizing the profit of gen-
erating firms. While the goal of regulators shouldn't be to maximize firms' profit,
it shouldn't be to minimize it either. Both, consumers and producers are part of
society and regulators should try to maximize their combined surplus. The issue
is that electricity demand has traditionally been considered inelastic so it was hard
to estimate consumers' valuation for electricity. Fortunately, this flaw of electricity
markets is about to disappear. Indeed, one of the pillars of the Smart Grid project
is a Demand Response Program which enables consumers to tailor their energy con-
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sumption based on real-time prices. Allowing consumers to actively participate in
energy markets through demand response is essential to stabilizing prices and keep-
ing the grid reliable. Demand response also provides us with a way of determining
consumers' valuation of electricity (their willingness to pay). In contrast to the lit-
erature, this chapter uses social welfare (the sum of generators' profit and consumer
surplus) as the central metric to evaluate the performance of deregulation. [136] an-
alyzes the impact of SFE competition on social welfare but, unlike ours, this chapter
models generators facing private random production costs and deterministic demand
(instead of deterministic production costs and random demand) and does not include
network constraints. While this chapter focuses on how the market characteristics
(supply and demand elasticity, number of generators) affect social welfare, [136] is
concerned with the impact of the production costs' randomness.
We compare SFE competition with the fully regulated setting. The comparison
methodology adopted in this chapter draws on the concept of price of anarchy as
described in the seminal paper by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [77]. The idea
is to evaluate the ratio between the worst case equilibrium (here supply function
equilibrium) resulting from competition and the coordinated (or regulated) solution.
The idea of studying the loss of efficiency is common in the field of transportation
([31], [115]) and in the field of supply chain management ([29], [104]) for example. The
price of anarchy is also measured in the context of pure oligopolistic competition such
as Bertrand competition [48] or Cournot competition [60]. This chapter is the first
application of the price of anarchy methodology to the study of electricity markets
using the SFE model.
4.1.3 Contributions and Outline
This chapter brings a number of contributions to the literature. First, it general-
izes the SFE model in electricity markets to account explicitly for the role of the
system operator and to include network constraints. While traditional SFE models
of electricity markets are typically single level Nash games between the generators
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subject to the market rule of matching supply and demand, our model is a bi-level
Stackelberg game where each generator anticipates the dispatch of the system op-
erator while taking the bids of its competitors as given (i.e. solves a best response
problem) and where the system operator runs an optimization to determine the dis-
patch. Our model is not only a more accurate description of the bidding process,
but it also allows the SFE model to incorporate electrical network constraints (in the
optimization of the system operator) and it does not assume that the system operator
knows the exact production costs of the generators. Second, this chapter empha-
sizes the importance of social welfare as a metric to include in the objective
function of the system operator dispatch and also as an evaluation tool to measure
the performance of deregulation in a given market. To model SFE competition, we
come up with a proxy of social welfare ProxyTS(.) that allows the system operator
to optimize dispatch without knowing the production costs of the generators. With
this model, this chapter carries a systematic analysis of the costs and benefits
of deregulation for the generators (through profits), for the consumers (through
consumer surplus) and for society as a whole (through social welfare). To quantify
the performance of deregulation, this chapter introduces two new market met-
rics: the unit-less relative elasticity of demand versus supply (denoted by z) and
the number r of "significant" generators in a market where generators vary in size.
Finally, this chapter simulates competition on two realistic electrical networks (see
Section 4.5 for more details) and compares the performance of deregulation on
these systems to our theoretical bounds.
The chapter shows that the number of generators, or more exactly the number of
"significant" generators r, is a critical factor in determining whether deregulation is
beneficial or not. With only one generator supplying electricity, deregulation is cer-
tainly not advisable. In a deregulated market, the monopolistic generator can exercise
a lot of market power, drive its profit up while harming consumers and decreasing
overall social welfare. However, this chapter shows that this effect disappears quickly
as competing generators are introduced in the market. Even with only two generators,
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consumers can lose at most 32% of their surplus and the welfare of society cannot
decrease by more than 3% compared to the regulated setting. With three generators
or more competing, the loss of consumer surplus improves further and is bounded by
20% and that of social welfare by 1%. The numerical simulations carried out on our
two network systems corroborate these results: deregulated SFE competition is able
to extract 99.9% and 99.2% of the maximum social welfare in the 30-bus and 5-bus
system respectively.
We begin in Section 4.2 by defining the notion of social welfare and by using it
to introduce a new Stackelberg SFE model of electricity markets. We then show the
performance of this SFE competition on a market with symmetric and asymmetric
generators without network constraints in Section 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. We finally
simulate the performance of our model on two electricity test-systems, a 30-bus and
a 5-bus system, in Section 4.5. We compare our simulation results with the regulated
policy and with Cournot competition.
4.2 The supply function equilibrium (SFE) model
This chapter models and analyzes competition between generators supplying elec-
tricity to consumers through an electrical grid. We assume that n firms compete in
the market: i = 1,..., n. As is the case in practice, the number n of generators is
relatively small and the decisions of each of these generators can influence the final
price of electricity: these generators are atomic players in the market. In contrast
with other markets, the electricity market cannot be fully autonomous. The absence
of substitute to electricity for consumers and the necessity to maintain a safe, feasi-
ble and reliable flow through the electrical grid require the presence of a regulator.
This role is played throughout the United Stated by independent institutions called
independent system operators (ISO) in charge of administering the market and mon-
itoring the grid for a specific region. The wholesale market analyzed here serves large
consumers composed of electricity distributors (such as NSTAR in New England) and
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factories. A diagram of the electricity market is shown in Figure 4-1.
pGenerators
Consumers/Utilities
Figure 4-1: Electricity market diagram.
To run the market, the system operator traditionally used to forecast consump-
tion for every hour of the day and to take this forecast as fixed demand. It would
then accept bids from the generators, and would dispatch them to create a feasible
electricity flow satisfying demand at minimum cost. This process is evolving though
as a lot of emphasis is placed on demand response programs which allow consumers
to curtail their demand when electricity is expensive. Contrary to [2], [88] and [116]
for example, consumption is no longer viewed as a fixed quantity but as a function
of electricity price. Accordingly, we represent consumption in our market through
an aggregate demand curve D(p): demand is elastic. D(.) is taken to be a strictly
decreasing and concave function on its support (i.e. some interval (0, P), with P such
that D(P) = 0). In fact, while the generating firms bid once a day in the electricity
market, electricity demand fluctuates throughout the day. We represent this demand
variation by the uncertainty parameter e; demand is described through the function
D(p, c). We do not make any assumption on the distribution of uncertainty parameter
c except that it has a non-negative support. Our supply function equilibrium model
is well defined under this general demand form (see [75] for proof) but to simplify
calculations in this chapter, we consider a linear demand model: D(p, e) = -m p + 6.
e is the intercept, i.e. the maximum potential demand (at price 0), and m is the
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demand sensitivity to the electricity price p. Assuming a linear demand is common
in the literature, see for example [131], [56], [21], [6] and [30].
Generator i incurs a global production cost Ci(qi) to produce quantity qj. Cost
Ci(.) is assumed increasing and convex as generator i will first turn on its most efficient
(cheapest per unit) plants to produce electricity, resorting to using more and more
expensive plants as it reaches its total production capacity. These assumptions on
the production costs are enough for the supply function equilibrium model developed
below to be meaningful (see [75]) but in the following sections, we will restrict atten-
tion to quadratic production costs. As in [131], [56], and [57], each firm thus faces a
production cost: Ci(qi) = biqj + 1/2ciq2, i = 1,... , n. We do not model the constant
terms in the quadratic production costs (i.e. ai = 0 in Ci(qi) = ai + biqj + 1/2ciq2) as
such constants do not influence the pricing or production decisions of the generators
(these are fixed, sunk costs independent of the generators' decisions).
Our supply function equilibrium model builds on the seminal paper [75] by Klem-
perer and Meyer. Each generator submits a supply function Si : [0, P) -> (-oc, oo)
to the market with the goal to maximize its profit from selling electricity. Following
[75], most of the SFE literature on electricity (see Section 4.1.2 for references) defines
the market mechanism as simply matching supply with demand. Under this market
mechanism, after all the firms choose their supply functions, an equilibrium price p* is
established such that D(p*, c) = Et Si(p*) and generators supply q* = Si(p*) (p* is
a scalar denoting the price of electricity which is a homogeneous good). If firm i knew
the supply functions submitted by its competitors, it would then aim at maximizing
its profit (over the scalar p) given its residual demand Si (p) = D (p, E) - 4 Sj (p)
(i.e. solve the best response problem):
max p [D(p,E) - E Sj(p)] -C(D(p,c) -Z S(p))
This optimization leads to a point (p,, q.) for each e, with qi, = D(p*, e) -
Ejo Sj (p*). The supply function Si (p) is an optimal response to the supply function
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of its competitors if it passes through all these optimal points, namely q*, = Si(p*),
for all e.
However, this model has two major drawbacks. For one, it forgets about the role
played by the independent system operator (ISO) whose actual goal is not only to
match supply with demand but also to maximize efficiency (in terms of social welfare).
Moreover, under the simple market mechanism that matches supply with demand, it
is not possible to integrate the electrical network constraints into the model. This
limits the model to a high level economic abstraction of actual electricity markets.
Network effects play a major role in the electricity price and dispatch decisions of the
system operator. In order to address these drawbacks, we, as a result, define a new
market mechanism which, combined with the supply function equilibrium framework,
provides a complete representation of electricity markets.
In an abstract manner, the market can be represented as a process which takes
the supply functions Si(.) of all the generators as input and outputs the equilibrium
price p* and the generation quantities qi$ for all the generators. We denote this
process by: (p*, q*) = Market(Si(.), ... , S,(.)) where q* is the vector of generation
quantities q*'s. One possible implementation of this market mechanism is simply to
match supply and demand as described above. We will show below a more realistic
implementation of Market(.). Given the market price p* and the dispatch quantity
q, generator i receives a profit of: p* q; -Ci(qf). In a general sense, a supply function
equilibrium is characterized by each generator i solving a best response problem and
deciding its supply bid Si(.) through the optimization:
max p* -ql* - Ci (q* )
Si. ) (4.1)
s.t. (p*, q*) = Market(Si(.), Si(.))
taking the supply functions of the competitors S-i(.) as given.
In contrast to [75], our model represents the market mechanism
(p* q*) = Market (Si(.), . . . , S,(.)) as the result of an optimization run by the ISO.
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As explained above, the goal of the system operator is to maximize the welfare of
society (denoted by TS for total surplus) while respecting the bids of the generators
and maintaining a feasible electricity flow on the grid. The system operator first
observes the realization of demand uncertainty E. It then solves:
(p, q*) = argmax TS,(p, q)
p,q j= 1 qi = D(p, e) (Supply = Demand)
s.t. 0 < qi < Si(p) (Supply bids)
<Dq < A (Net. Const. - DC Approx)
(4.2)
We use the traditional DC approximation of electricity flows which allows us to model
grid constraints as linear constraints. See [74] for references.
Under our concave (linear) demand assumption, our convex (quadratic) produc-
tion costs and some mild continuity and monotonicity assumptions on the set of
supply functions, problem (4.2) has a unique solution for every realization of the un-
certainty c (see [69] for a proof). Let us denote problem (4.2) by the optimal dispatch
function: (q*, p*) = OPTIDISP,(S(.),.. .S
In this model, the sequence of events is as follows. The generators i = 1,..., n
submit their supply functions Si(.) first, then demand is realized and finally the ISO
dispatches the generators according to OPTIDISP,(.).
Aware that the ISO dispatches according to (4.2) and taking the bids S-i(.) of
the competitors as given, each generator aims at maximizing its profit across all
realizations of the demand. For ease of exposition, we assume in this chapter that all
demand scenarios are uniformly likely to occur. Each generator i hence chooses its
bid to maximize:
max E. p* qE - Ci(q*,)
Si.) (4.3)
s.t. (p,, q,*) = OPTIDISP,(Si(.), S_(.)) VE
The model easily extends to non-uniform probability distributions of the stochastic
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demand. In that case, the profit under each demand realization must be multiplied by
the probability of realization p(c) of that demand scenario in the objective function
of (4.3). To keep exposition simple, this chapter presents only the case of uniform
demand distribution but the insights are similar under any distribution.
To determine the optimization of the system operator (4.2), we need to define
the measure of social welfare: TS(p, q). The idea of social welfare is to aggregate
the benefit of the generating companies with the benefit of consumers to produce a
solution that is fair and rewards all market participants. We have already described
the benefit of the generating companies in this market. Together the generating
companies make a profit:
n
Profit(p, q) = [p qi - Ci(qi)] (4.4)
i=1
To evaluate the benefit of consumers, we precisely use the newly adopted framework of
demand response. As described above, demand is modeled through a demand function
D(p, e) = -m p + E. We draw upon the classical economic notion of consumer utility
(see [135] Chap, 6 for reference), which states that the demand function D(p, 6) is in
fact derived from consumers having an aggregate utility function: Ue(d) = d - d2
m 2m~
This utility function represents the benefit (evaluated in $) for the consumers of using
d MW of electricity. Consumer surplus is then defined as the difference between the
utility derived by consumers from their electricity use and the price paid by consumers
to purchase this electricity:
CS,(p,d) = Ue(d) - p d (4.5)
Social welfare is then simply defined as the sum of the generators' profit and the
consumer surplus:
TSe(p, q) = CS (p, qi) + Ei p qi - Ci(qi) (46)
= Ue( q) - Ei Ci gi)
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At this stage, our model still has one major problem. The system operator is
supposed to solve problem (4.2), where the objective function TS is defined in (4.6).
In particular to calculate TS, the system operator needs to know the production
costs Ci(.), i = 1,...,n of all the generators. However, in a deregulated market,
one of the key issues is that the system operator precisely does not know these costs.
Indeed, the very basis of a deregulated market is that an efficient electricity price is
achieved by letting generators compete to supply electricity and not by controlling
them. While under the regulated system, the State monitors the actual production
costs of its utilities, in the deregulated market the generators are private companies
and their production costs are private, unknown to the system operator. Under a
deregulated market, the only information the system operator has on generators is
their bids Si(.). It must rely on these bids to make dispatch decisions.
To resolve this difficulty, we assume that the system operator precisely uses gen-
erators' bids Si(p) to infer a proxy of their production costs. Given a fixed electricity
price p, a generator with production cost C(q) would decide its supply quantity q by
solving:
q = argmax p 4 - C(q)q>0
Under convex production costs, the optimality conditions lead the generator to choose
a production quantity q satisfying: p = C'(q). The supply function submitted by the
generator, on the other hand, requires him to produce a quantity q = S(p) at price p.
Inverting this relation gives p = S- 1(q) = C'(q). The function C(q) = f_ S-1 (u)du
is therefore a meaningful proxy of the production cost of the generator. In fact, C(q)
exactly matches the production cost of the generator, when he is fully rational, has
unlimited capacity and considers himself a price-taker. We denote the social welfare
that uses this proxy for costs as described above by:
ProxyTS(p,q) = U ( qi - (5 (qi)
To summarize, our supply function equilibrium model is defined by the generators
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simultaneously solving problem (4.3), in which OPTIDISP, is the outcome of opti-
mization problem (4.2) where the objective of the system operator is ProxyTS(p, q)
instead of TS(p, q). This is actually close to what is happening in practice. The gen-
erators are bidding supply functions and the system operator chooses the electricity
dispatch by solving problem (4.3). Yet, while our model reflects current practice, it
is not commonly adopted in the literature due to its complexity (see Section 4.1.2 for
references). Existence and uniqueness of a solution to such a bi-level supply function
model are shown in [69].
To keep computations tractable and the presentation of the chapter clear, we
adopt a linear supply function equilibrium model. That is, we consider generators
bidding linear supply functions of the form: Si(p) = #i (p - a), i = 1, ... n, . In
problem (4.1), each generator i needs to determine the coefficients ai and /3i of its
bid Si(.). Restricting attention to the space of linear functions is common in the
SFE literature ([75], [131]), particularly in modeling electricity markets ([56], [57]).
Baldick et al. [6] provide a detailed discussion on the choice of linear supply functions
for electricity markets. [7] justifies to concentrate attention on linear supply function
equilibria because other equilibria are unstable.
Generalizing the supply function equilibrium model from its original formulation
by Klemperer and Meyer [75] to a model that reflects the actual objective of the sys-
tem operator and accounts for electrical network constraints is the first contribution
of this chapter. We reformulated the dispatch of the ISO as an optimization problem
that accounts for network constraints. We defined a proxy of social welfare that is
used by the system operator to choose the optimal dispatch. This is accomplished
above. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to evaluating the performance of
the SFE model in comparison with the centrally regulated setting and the quantity
(Cournot) competition model.
Under the traditional regulated utility model, the system operator monitors the
production costs of the participating generators and dispatches them in order to
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maximize the welfare of society. In contrast with the SFE model, under the regulated
setting, the generators do not bid, but rather, the ISO can directly use TS(p, q) in
its optimization because it knows the generators' production costs. The optimization
of the ISO can therefore be described as:
(j,) = argmax TS, (p, q)
p,q
j= qj = D(p, c) (47)
s.t. 0 < qj
<bq < A
We study the performance of the supply function equilibrium model from the per-
spective of consumers (as measured by consumer surplus (4.5)), from the perspective
of generators (as measured by aggregate profit (4.4)) and from the perspective of
the ISO (as measured by social welfare (4.6)). The value of the SFE model for the
different market participants (Profit (Dereg.), CS(Dereg.) and TS(Dereg.)) varies
widely depending on the market structure (such as the number of participating gen-
erators) and the configuration of the electrical grid. So instead of looking at these
absolute valuation measures, the SFE performances are benchmarked against the
performances of the centrally regulated system. We therefore compute the ratios
Profit(Dereg.) CS(Dereg.) and TS(Dereg The goal of the following sections is to eval-
'Profit(Centr.) 7 CS(Centr.) TS(Centr.)~ folwn*v 1
uate these ratios on various market structures and electrical networks, in order to
show how consumers, generators and society are affected by the deregulation pro-
cess (the transition from a centralized system to SFE competition). Sections 4.3 and
4.4 investigate markets with respectively symmetric and asymmetric generating firms
and no electrical constraints. Section 4.5 simulates SFE competition on two realistic
electrical grids with network constraints.
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4.3 Unconstrained symmetric generators
We begin the analysis by considering a market without electrical network constraints.
A good discussion on the meaning and the formulation of electrical network con-
straints can be found [74]. Due to the already complex analysis of the SFE model by
itself, most of the economics literature, including the electricity market literature ([2],
[6], [56], [57], [131]), has avoided to include constraints in its models. Such models
represent networks where the thermal (flow) capacity of the electrical lines are not a
major bottleneck and do not influence the dispatch decisions of the system operator.
This is obviously a limiting assumption but it is a good first cut assumption that
helps the understanding of the SFE model. While the SFE model without network
constraints has been the subject of previous papers (cited above), our analysis is new
for two reasons. It is the first paper to carry a systematic comparison between SFE
competition and the centrally regulated system from the perspective of consumers
and generators. It is also the first paper to focus on social welfare (TS as defined in
(4.6)) to evaluate the performance of deregulation. In contrast, the electricity market
literature, has been investigating electricity prices, generators' profit and the exercise
of market power in order to assess deregulated models. Nevertheless, one may argue
that these measures are not fair to the generators as we discussed in the introduction.
Even without network constraints, equilibria in supply functions are not trivial to
compute as is shown in Section 4.4. We analyze in this section an oligopoly market of
n symmetric generating firms. The firms all face the same quadratic production costs:
C(q) = bq + 1/2 c q2 . b is the constant unit cost, c represents the increase in marginal
production cost due to machine capacities: that is, the most cost-effective machines
are used first, then the more expensive ones. The firms being symmetric, or identical,
they compete with each other on an equal basis. As derived in Appendix C.1, SFE
competition is partially truth revealing as it forces generators to bid a reservation
price a (the supply bids are Si(p) = 4i(p - a2 )) equal to the linear coefficient b
of their production costs. This property is known as incentive compatibility in the
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economics literature, see [6]. Under our symmetry assumption, all the generators will
bid oi = b and it can easily be shown that there is no loss of generality in setting
b = 0. Section 4.3 follows this convention.
We investigate next the effects of deregulation on CS, Profit and TS, for a
monopoly market, a duopoly market and a general oligopoly market. Under our
assumptions, all the relevant ratios (Profit(Dereg) CS(Dereg) and TS(Dereg)) are inde-Profit(Centr.)'I CS(Centr.) TS(Centr.)
pendent of the realization of the demand uncertainty e. The uncertainty level e affects
the regulated and the deregulated settings in a proportional way, and as a result, it
does not affect the ratios . Moreover, remarkably enough, these ratios depend on the
parameter m of the demand function and the parameter c of the production costs
only through a single unit-less parameter z (see Appendix C.1 for proof).
We define the parameter z = m c as the relative elasticity of demand versus
supply. z -+ 0 when m -+ 0 which means demand is inelastic compared to supply
(D (p) = e). Conversely, z tends to infinity with m when demand is extremely elastic.
Since C'(q) = c q and as established in the previous section, generators want to
produce at marginal cost S(p) ~ (C')- 1 (p) = p, the coefficient z can be interpreted
as the ratio of demand elasticity m and supply elasticity 1. It makes sense that zC
is the meaningful measure of elasticity, as demand is only elastic in comparison with
supply.
Before getting into the analysis of the performance ratios and the effect of the
number of competing generators on these ratios, we examine the impact of deregula-
tion on electricity price and quantity. No matter the number of generators, electricity
price is higher and production quantity is lower under the deregulated setting than
under central regulation.
Proposition 4.1. When symmetric generators compete through a supply function
bidding mechanism, they always achieve a greater combined profit than under the
centrally regulated solution. They charge a higher electricity price and produce less
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electricity.
p*(Dereg) > p*(Centr.), q(Dereg.) < q(Centr.), Profit(Dereg.) > Profit(Centr.)
Proof. See Appendix C.1. El
The idea is pretty intuitive. In the absence of regulation, generators compete freely
and they can exercise some market power by submitting supply bids that understate
the amount of electricity they can produce profitably at a given price. Doing so, the
generators will be dispatched to produce less electricity, they will drive electricity
prices up and derive higher profits.
4.3.1 The case of a monopolistic generator
Even with a single generator supplying electricity, deregulation has a significant im-
pact on the market participants. In fact, as this section shows, deregulation has the
biggest impact in the case of a monopolistic generator. Whereas under the regulated
utility model the system operator knows the generator's costs and optimizes the dis-
patch to benefit society as a whole, under free competition the generator can exercise
a lot of market power by bidding to supply low levels of electricity as a function of
price. Since there are no other generators to supply electricity in its place, the mo-
nopolistic generator can limit supply, push the electricity price up and drive its profit
higher.
While the increase in price under deregulation might be expected because of the
lack of vertical coordination, it is not a consequence of the well documented double-
marginalization process that occurs in a decentralized vertical supply chain (see [121]).
In contrast to traditional vertical supply chains, in this chapter, the intermediary, the
system operator, does not have as objective to maximize its own profit. Rather, it
seeks to maximize social welfare (including the generators profit). This chapter shows
that even when the intermediary's goal is to coordinate the whole system, the lack of
coordination due to generators competition still pushes the electricity price up.
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In Figure 4-2, we plot the various performance ratios (consumer surplus, profit
and social welfare) that are derived in closed form in Appendix C. 1 as functions of the
unit-less relative elasticity z. The top curve in Figure 4-2 represents the profit ratio
Profit(Dereg.) Notice that the curve stays above 1, signaling that the generator is alwaysProfit(Centr.)*
better off in the deregulated setting than under central regulation. Even though in
the deregulated market there is a vertical game between the generator and the system
operator, the generator is better off because there is no double-marginalization effect
here. While the generator and the system operator have divergent objectives, these
do not directly compete with each other. When demand is very inelastic (z = 0), a
monopolistic generator can exercise a lot of market power and it can make infinitely
more profit under the deregulated setting than under central regulation. For example,
when demand and production have the same price elasticity (z = 1), a monopolistic
generator makes 40% more profit in the absence of regulation.
We now look at the performance of the SFE model in terms of social welfare.
Theorem 4.1. When a single generator is free to bid its supply function to the
system operator, society can lose at most 25% (100-75%) of its welfare compared to
the situation where the market is centrally regulated.
TS(Dereg.) > 75%
TS(Centr.) -
Proof. See Appendix C.1. E
Under the regulated setting, the system operator controls all the generators and
dispatches quantities precisely with the goal to maximize social welfare. It is thus
clear that the regulated setting is optimal in terms of social welfare and that the
social welfare ratio TS(Dereg.) is less than 1. The goal in analyzing the social welfareTS(Centr.)
ratio is to measure how large the loss of social welfare caused by deregulation is.
If this loss is not too large, it might be offset by the savings made in allowing a
free competitive market as opposed to paying the system operator to monitor the
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production costs of the generating companies. Even with a single generating firm,
Theorem 4.1 establishes that the loss of social welfare due to deregulation cannot be
greater than 25%. The middle curve in Figure 4-2 represents the social welfare ratio
as a function of the unit-less parameter z. When demand and production have the
same price elasticity (z = 1), the loss of social welfare is only 10%.
We finally adopt the perspective of consumers.
Theorem 4.2. When a single generator is free to bid its supply function to the
system operator, consumers lose up to 75% (100-25%) of their surplus compared to
the situation where the market is centrally regulated.
CS(Dereg.) > 25%
CS(Centr.) -
Proof. See Appendix C.1. D
The bottom curve in Figure 4-2 represents the consumer surplus ratio as a function
of the unit-less parameter z. While bounded (it can be no more than 75%), the loss
of consumer surplus here is large independently of z. The reason is that with only
a single generator and price-taking consumers, the generator is able to draw a lot of
the social wealth towards its own profit, leaving very little benefit for the consumers.
A fairness argument would suggest not to deregulate in such a market. Although the
loss of social welfare is reasonable, there is a huge, unjustified, transfer of wealth from
the consumers to the generator. This is precisely the behavior, market power studies
are aimed to detect and prevent.
4.3.2 The case of two generators
As in [131] and [56], we consider the duopoly case separately. The reason we examine
it separately here is to point out the remarkable performance improvement for con-
sumers in going from a monopoly to a duopoly market. Here too, deregulation allows
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Figure 4-2: Welfare, surplus and profit ratios for a monopolistic generator
as functions of the unit-less cost parameter z.
that understate the amount of electricity they could produce profitably at a given
price. While the two generators are competing with each other, they are still able to
limit supply, push the electricity price up and increase their profit.
In Figure 4-3, we plot the performance ratios (surplus, profit and welfare) derived
in Appendix C.1 in closed form, as functions of the relative elasticity z. The top
curve in Figure 4-3 represents the ratio of global profit Proflt(Dereg.) The curve staysProfit(Centr.)~
above 1, signaling that the generators are always better off in the deregulated setting
than under central regulation. For example, when demand and production have the
same price elasticity (z = 1), a generator in a duopolistic market makes 60% more
profit in the absence of regulation.
Theorem 4.3. With two symmetric generators competing through a supply function
bidding mechanism, society can lose at most 3% (100-97%) of its welfare and con-
sumers can lose at most 32% (100-68%) of their surplus compared to the centrally
regulated solution.
TS(Dereg.) CS(Dereg.)
> 97% > 68%
TS(Centr.) -CS(Centr.) -
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Proof. See Appendix C.1. E
The loss of welfare (similarly profit and consumer surplus) is defined as 1 minus
the minimum welfare (or profit or surplus) ratio. The addition of a only one generator
to a monopolistic market almost eliminates the entire loss of welfare, reducing it from
25% to 3%. The middle curve in Figure 4-3 represents the social welfare ratio as a
function of the unit-less parameter z.
The bottom curve in Figure 4-3 represents the consumer surplus ratio as a function
of the unit-less parameter z. There is a net improvement for consumers in going from
a monopolistic to a duopolistic market. The two generators are still able to draw
a substantial amount of social wealth towards their profit. Consumers can still be
deprived of a lot of surplus, up to 32%, but that is a lot less than the 75% potential
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Figure 4-3: Welfare, surplus and profit ratios for two symmetric generators
as functions of the unit-less cost parameter z.
4.3.3 The case of many generators
The insights derived in the monopoly and duopoly cases still hold with many gener-
ators. Competing generators are still better off under free competition than under
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central regulation. While the generators are competing with each other, they are still
able to exercise market power and drive profits higher.
Figure 4-4 represents the ratio of generators' profit Proit(Dereg. for markets with
various number of generators. The curves all stay above 1, as generators are always
better off in the absence of regulation. The profit ratio is monotonically decreasing
as a function of the demand elasticity z (z increases as demand becomes more price
sensitive relative to supply). The intuition behind this monotonicity is that when
demand is inelastic, the generators have more power relative to consumers to drive
prices and profit up by limiting supply. However, these curves do not exhibit any
monotonicity pattern as a function of the number of generators. When demand is
inelastic (z small), a small number of generators can extract more profit than can
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Figure 4-4: Profit ratios for n symmetric generators (n ranging from 2 to 7)
as functions of the unit-less cost parameter z.
The next theorem examines the impact of deregulation on social welfare for sym-
metric oligopoly markets.
Theorem 4.4. With n symmetric generators (n > 3) competing through a supply
function bidding mechanism, society can lose at most 1% of its welfare compared to
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the centrally regulated solution.
TS(Dereg.) > 4 1 (n) > 99% for n > 3
TS(Centr.) ~
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Figure 4-5 depicts the social welfare ratio TS(Dereg.) as a function of the demandTS(Centr.)asafntooftedm d
elasticity z for oligopoly markets with various number of generators. As explained
at the beginning of the section, our performance ratios only depend on the demand
function and the production costs through the unit-less parameter z = m c. Let us
denote the curves of Figure 4-5 by 41 (n, z). These functions are obtained in closed
form in Appendix C.1 by calculating the social welfare under SFE competition and
under the regulated model. Observe that the loss of social welfare is decreasing with
the number of generators uniformly across all values of the market parameter z. This
means that the adverse effect of deregulation on the welfare of society becomes small
when many generators participate in the market. This coincides with the common
intuition that deregulation is only beneficial when the market structure is competitive
enough. Moreover, the functions 41 (n, z) are unimodal and admit a minimium at
z = -n + 2 Vn 2 - n. The bound ( 1 (n) that appears in Theorem 4.4 is simply
the worst-case scenario across supply and demand parameters of the social welfare
ratio: 41(n) = minz>o 4 1 (n, z). The bound of 99% is reached for n = 3 and z =
-n+ 2 Vn 2 - n.
Turning now to consumer surplus,
Theorem 4.5. With n symmetric generators (n > 3) competing through a supply
function bidding mechanism, consumers lose at most 32% of their surplus compared
to the centrally regulated solution.
CS(Dereg.) > 4)2(n) > 80% for n > 3
CS(Centr.) -
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Figure 4-5: Welfare ratios for n symmetric generators (n ranging from 2 to 7)
as functions of the unit-less cost parameter z.
Figure 4-6 depicts the social welfare ratio CS(Cer) as a function of the demand
elasticity z for oligopoly markets with various number of generators. We denote
the curves of Figure 4-6 by (2 (n, z). Again, these functions are increasing with the
number of generators uniformly across the market parameter z. The adverse effect
of deregulation on consumers is less significant when the market has a large number
of generators competing. The functions (2(n, z) are also unimodal and surprisingly
enough, they reach their minimum at the same point as the minimum of the social
welfare ratios: z = -n + 2 /n2 - n. The bound 4 2 (n) that appears in Theorem 4.5
is simply the worst-case scenario across supply and demand parameters of the social
welfare ratio: 4 2(n) = minz>o 2 (n, z). The bound of 80% is reached for n = 3 and
z -- -n +2 /n 2 - n. The bounds presented in Section 4.3 are all tight since they are
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Figure 4-6: Consumer surplus ratios for n symmetric generators (n ranging from 2
to 7)
as functions of the unit-less cost parameter z.
4.4 Unconstrained asymmetric generators
4.4.1 The model
In this section, we assume that generators are heterogeneous, that is, they have
different production costs. Since electricity is a homogeneous good (D(p, E) = -m p+
E), the generators with the cheapest production costs dominate the market. Since they
can produce cheaply, they can not only undercut competition and sell more electricity
but they can also exercise a lot of market power by pricing their electricity up to the
level of the more expensive generators. In describing an asymmetric market, it is no
longer enough to simply count the number of generators, as these generators might be
very different from each other. If, for example, one generator has production costs that
are way more expensive than its competitors, it will probably not be competitive and
it will not produce any electricity. In such a case, this generator is not significant and
it should not be counted among the competing generators. As described in Section 4.2,
the generators face quadratic production costs Ci(qi) = biqj + 1/2ciq2, i = 1,... , n.
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The generators place bids to the system operator by submitting affine supply
functions: qi(p) = #i(p - ai), i = 1,.. . , n. For every possible realization of the
demand uncertainty c, generator i attempts to maximize its profit (taking the supply
bids of the competitors as given) by selecting p, and qi., such that
VC > 0, pE, q,E = argmax p qi - Ci(qi)
s.t. qi + Ej, qj (p) = D(p, c),
Hence, for every realization of E, generator i chooses a point (p *, q* ) that maxi-
mizes the objective p[D(p, 6) - q(p)] - Ci (D(p, e) - Eo qj(p)) (since qi is the
residual demand qi = D (p, c) - Ego qj (p)). Setting the derivative (with respect to
p) to zero leads to
dD dqj 8q = p - Cig(,)] ( + (4. )
Generator i chooses the pair (ai, #i) of its supply bid Si(p) = /3i(p - aoi) before
knowing the realization of demand. The bid forces generator i to produce qi,, =
#i(p, - ai) while optimality condition (4.8) must be satisfied for all realizations of E.
The two conditions can be combined into:
#i(pe -ai)= pe- b - ci~i(pE -ai)] m +E2 j VE > 0 (4.9)
Since supply must match demand E' #3 pE - E 3 a2 = -mpe + e, it is clear
that the equilibrium price pc varies with uncertainty 6. The only way optimality
condition (4.9) can be satisfied VE, is that generator i chooses the pair (ai, #i) so that
the polynomials (in terms of p.) on both sides of equation (4.9) are equal. We must
have:




ai i = (bi - ci /i3 c) (m + # 3), Vi (4.11)
fr/i
Multiplying equation (4.10) by ai and subtracting equation (4.11), we obtain:
(a - aii3ci)(m + #/0) = (bi - aii ci)(m + #0), Vi
>ai = b, Vi
Proposition 4.2. The equilibrium for supply bids functions Si(p) = #i(p - ai) is
characterized by the system of equations:
ai =bi
i 1, . .. ,In
#i ( -ci~i)(mn + Eji #j)
This system of equations has a unique solution vector (a,,).
Proof. We just derived the system of equations before the proposition. See [116] for
a proof of existence and uniqueness.
4.4.2 Market insights
In the remainder of Section 4.4, the goal is to derive some market insights and to eval-
uate the impact of deregulation on profit, consumer surplus and welfare ratios when
suppliers are asymmetric. The task is complicated though due to the fact that the
system of quadratic equations #i = (1 - ci/i)(m + #o /3), i = 1, ... , n, described
in Proposition 4.2 does not lead to a closed form solution of the #i's as functions of
the parameter m of the demand and the costs parameters ci's. Unfortunately, there
is no simple parametric solution #i = WTi'(m, c1 , ... , ca). This makes calculating and
bounding the performance ratios very difficult. To overcome this, we first reformulate
the problem and establish bounds on the bid parameters #i themselves before inves-
tigating the performance ratios. Introducing the unit-less bid parameters # M =
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we remark though that the system of equations defining the #i's only depends on m
and ci's through the unit-less parameters zi = mci. That is, the following system of
equations emerges:
= (1 - zO)(1 + Z! i), i = 1, ... ,n (4.12)
izxi
This is a unit-less reformulation of the supply function equilibrium. Since Si(p) =
#i(p - ai), generator i offers less electricity for a given price when #i decreases.
Alternatively, generator i charges more when #i decreases. Equation (4.12) tells us
that when its competitors charge more for electricity (Eoi# decreases), generator
i also charges more (#3 decreases). Similarly, when its production cost ci (and hence
zi) increases, generator i increases its electricity price (#i decreases).
In fact, an even stronger relationship exists between supply bids and marginal
costs. The marginal cost of generator i is: Cl(qi) = bi + ciqi. On the other hand,
the supply function provided by the generator is equivalent to a marginal price of:
pi(qi) = ! + a charged per unit of production. Even without solving for the /j's, we
can already establish that no generator will bid at a loss in this competitive setting.
Theorem 4.6. Under free competition (supply function equilibrium), generators al-
ways bid a marginal price above their marginal production cost.
Proof. Since ai = bi, it is enough to prove that } > ci or equivalently #3 < y. This
is shown in Appendix C.2.
In the rest of the section, we consider the case of generators facing purely quadratic
production costs, that is Ci(qi) = 1/2ciql (i.e. bi = 0 and hence oi = bi = 0
from Proposition 4.2). Given the supply functions submitted by the generators, the




The consumer surplus and the generators' profit can be expressed as (see Appendix
CS(Dereg.) - - 2 _
E1 [2m 1 + E
Profit(Dereg.) = # (1-
m (1 + E pn)2 [
We compare the deregulated setting to a centrally coordinated setting, where the
system operator decides and dispatches the production quantities of the generators
in order to maximize social welfare. In the absence of production constraints the
system operator will dispatch the generators so that the equilibrium price paid to the
generators exactly equals their marginal cost.
As discussed earlier, the marginal cost of generator i is: Cl(qi) = bi + ciqi. As
a result, we can denote the inverse marginal cost by: (Cl) -(p) = P-b. The systemci
operator must find a price such that generators produce at marginal costs and supply
matches demand. Under the assumption ai =bi = 0, this can be written as:
Z(CWiP) = + 6 P 1 + E/n 1/zi
Under the centrally coordinated scenario, the consumer surplus and the genera-
tors' profit are (as derived in Appendix C.2):
C - 2
CS(Centr.) = - 1 - +2m 1
e2 n IProfit(Centr.) = 
-
En 2 12m (1 + E" y2 zi
As expected, free competition allows the generators to exercise some market power.
They produce less electricity overall and charge a higher price.
Theorem 4.7. Electricity is more expensive under free competition than under the
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centrally coordinated scenario, i.e. p(Dereg.) > p(Centr.). As a result, consumers
consume less electricity overall, q(Dereg.) < q(Centr.)
Proof. As is established in Lemma 4.1 below, 3 < . This implies p* > jT and since
-zi
q = -m p + e, we also have q* <q.
As in the previous section, our goal is to study the ratios Profit(Dereg.) CS(Dereg.)Profit(Centr.) ' CS(Centr.)
and TS(Dereg.)TS(Centr.)
Theorem 4.8. The ratios of generators profit, consumer surplus and social welfare
under free competition compared to the centrally coordinated scenario
Profit(Cert.) CS(Centr.) TS(Cer.)) are independent of the demand stochasticity e.
Moreover, they depend on the input parameters m and ci only through the unit-less
variables zi = mci
.
Proof. We established in system (4.12) that the j's only depend on m and ci's
through the zi's. In the ratios below, only # 's and zi's appear, thus proving the
theorem.
Profit(Dereg.) _ (1+E ,)2 =1(1 - / )
Profit(Centr.) 1 [En ]





TS(Dereg.) _ (1+En 1  )2  2=1  + # ) + ( i(1 - zii))
TS(Centr.) ( /n [( 1/z2 ) 2 + (E" 1/z,)]
1 +[ 1 -z~i#)/ + EFn# 2
1 i 1 - 1 1/z,
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In the remainder of the section, we approximate the performance ratios above with
the goal to understand how the deregulation process affects consumers and generators
depending on the market structure (the number of generators and their production
costs). Since the #i's cannot be obtained in closed form (as function of zj's), the first
step is to bound them.
Lemma 4.1. The slopes of the supply function bids 3i's can be bounded above and
below with increasing degrees of accuracy. In particular, the following two bounds
hold:
< < and ' < 1 Zi<1+ z, z 1+ zi(1 + E : ) 1+ zi E g)
Proof. See Appendix C.2 for proof.
A useful notion, we now introduce is the equivalent number of generators measure
r = Zm . zmin is the unit-less (quadratic) production coefficient of the cheapest
generator denoted imin. The cheapest a generator is, the more pricing power it has
and the more energy it will provide to the market. When the other generators have
a much higher production coefficient than zmin r = Z1m+ i i -+ 1, pointing
to the fact that there is only 1 significant player. In contrast, when all the generators
have the same production coefficient zmin, r -+ n as there are n significant generators.
We can now use r to approximate the consumer surplus ratio.
Theorem 4.9. The ratio of consumer surplus under free competition compared to the
centrally coordinated scenario can be lower and upper bounded by simple functions of
the zi 's:
[______ cs 1En 1 nzu 1 En 1-I +E _i 1 1, -L 2=1[ - 2 CS(Dereg.) 1+ 1=-1i =1I- i - CS(Centr.) - 1
L +71 _i 1+E=1yz
(4.14)
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This ratio can be further lower bounded by a function of the minimum production cost
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1 + r + Zmin2
z2






Figure 4-8: Consumer surplus ratio for a duopoly (zi = 0.5, z2 varies) with
simplified lower bound.
Proof. Bound (4.14) is directly derived from the upper and lower bounds on ei as the
funciton 1 - is increasing with j 's. To prove bound (4.15), we observe that
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(4.15)
1 < Ji . Plugging this inequality into the lower bound (4.14) gives rise to:
1CS(Dereg.) [-1+Z=1 2i/2r1n2Z






Figure 4-7 illustrates the consumer surplus bounds in the case of a duopoly mar-
ket. The surfaces represent the consumer surplus ratio as a function of the market
parameters (zi, z2). The middle surface is the actual consumer surplus ratio, while
the top and bottom surfaces are the upper and lower bounds of (4.14) respectively.
Notice the proximity of the bounds to the exact consumer surplus ratio.
It is also worth noting that the ratio I - + / 1 _ 1 2 is the con-
sumer surplus ratio of a monopolistic generator with quadratic coefficient zi (see
Section 4.3.1). As a result, bound (4.15) above is the monopolistic bound modified
to account for the number of significant generators through measure r.
Bound (4.15) is illustrated in Figure 4-8 for a duopoly market. The top curve is
the consumer surplus ratio, the bottom curve is the bound. The bound is increasing
with the measure r of equivalent number of generators and with the lowest produc-
tion coefficient Zmin. In essence, the deregulation process becomes less and less costly
to the consumers as either (i) there are more generators in the market or (ii) as the
production costs of the generators increase. The reason is that in both cases, the
generators cannot exercise a lot of market power. When there are many generators,
competition prevents the exercise of extreme market power. Similarly, when produc-
tion costs are expensive, the generators don't have much room left to distort price
beyond the already expensive centrally coordinated price.
For example, when there are at least three equivalent generators (r > 3) and
Zmin > 1, the loss of consumer surplus due to deregulation cannot exceed 36%.
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Let us now focus on the analysis of the profit ratio.
Theorem 4.10. The generators are always better off in terms of total profit under
free competition than under central coordination. Moreover the ratio of generators'
profit under free competition, compared to the centrally coordinated setting, can be
upper bounded by a function of the zj's. That is,
1n 2+zi
Prop(Derg.) (1+En 1 ;)2 Ej=1 (1+zid21< PrftDrg)< -= + (4.16)
- Profit(Centr.) - 1 1) n .1_
(1+En 1y)2 [ =1zi
The ratio of generators' profit can be further upper bounded by a function of the
minimum production cost of the generators Zmin and a measure of the equivalent
number of generators r. That is,
Profit(Dereg.) (2 + zmin) (r + Zmin ) 2  (4.17)
Profit(Centr.) - zin (1 + r + zmin ) 2
z2 Z1
Figure 4-9: Profit ratio for a duopoly (as function of z1 , z2) with upper and lower
bounds (4.16).
Proof. See Appendix C.2 for proof.
Figure 4-9 illustrates the profit ratio for a duopoly market as a function of the
market parameters z 1 , z 2 . The middle surface is the actual profit ratio, while the top
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Figure 4-10: Profit ratio for a duopoly (zi = 1, z2 varies) with simplified upper
bound (4.17).
1. It is worth noticing the quality (i.e. the proximity) of our upper bound to the
actual profit ratio.
When r = 1, bound (4.17) reaches (+zn)n which is the profit ratio of a
Zmin(2+zmiin)
monopolistic generator with quadratic coefficient Zmin (see Section 4.3.1). As a result,
bound (4.17) can be viewed as the monopolistic bound modified to account for the
number of equivalent generators r.
Bound (4.17) is illustrated in Figure 4-10. The bottom curve is the actual profit
ratio, while the top curve is the upper bound. The bound decreases with zmin,
but increases with r. The intuition is that when zmin increases, the generators can
exercise less market power so that the profit gained under deregulation decreases.
When the number of significant generators r increases on the other hand, even though
each individual generator can exercise less market power, there are more generators
increasing their profit through deregulation. The global gain in generators' profit
from deregulation increases.
For example, when there are less than five significant generators (r < 5) and
zmin '> 5, generators taking advantage of deregulation can increase their profit by at
most 16%.
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We finally analyze the loss of welfare for society as a whole (generators and con-
sumers). Again, we can bound it by two simple functions of the zj's:
Theorem 4.11. The ratio of social welfare under free competition compared to the
social welfare under central coordination can be upper and lower bounded by:
1E/1+n 2 E_/in
1+E-= 1 1/(1+zj). + (1+Z=1/z)2 TS(Dereg.) < (4.18)
1- 1 - TS(Centr.) -1+E=1 1/zi
The ratio of social welfare can be further lower bounded by a function of the minimum
production cost of the generators Zmin and the measure r of equivalent number of
generators. That is,
Zmin + r (r + zmin) TS(Dereg.) < 1 (4.19)
r +zmin (1+r+zmin)2 - TS(Centr.) -
z2
Z1
Figure 4-11: Social welfare ratio for a duopoly (as function of z1 , z 2) with upper and
lower bounds.
Proof. See Appendix C.2 for proof.
Figure 4-11 illustrates the social welfare ratio for a duopoly market. The middle
surface is the actual welfare ratio, the bottom surface is the lower bound of (4.18)
and the top surface is the upper bound 1. Bound (4.19) is illustrated in Figure 4-
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Figure 4-12: Social welfare ratio for a duopoly (zi = 1, z2 varies) with simplified
upper and lower bounds.
generators is above 1 (i.e. zmin > 1), the loss of social welfare cannot exceed 30% and
when zmin > 5, the loss is bounded by 10%.
4.5 Performance under general network constraints
In this section, we test the supply function bidding mechanism by simulating it on
two electricity systems: the classical IEEE 30-Bus system [107] and a 5-bus system
modeling a subnetwork of the New England electricity grid. The challenge here is
to model competition between electricity generators in the presence of the physical
dispatch constraints of an electricity network. Even without the presence of physical
constraints, modeling supply function equilibria is challenging as shown in [75]. There
are only a handful of papers ([16], [64]) analyzing supply function competition in
the presence of constraints. While these papers are computationally oriented, our
focus in this chapter is on evaluating the performance of deregulation for the market
participants. We begin by describing the technical challenges that arise in simulating
our model and explain how we resolve them. We then discuss the performance of
deregulation in the 30-bus and the 5-bus systems. We compare the performance
ratios obtained on these systems to the bounds established in the previous sections.
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4.5.1 Simulation method
As described in the introduction, we model the electricity market as a bi-level (Stack-
elberg) game. The generators attempt to maximize their profit by submitting a
supply function to the system operator who in turn attempts to maximize the wel-
fare of society. The generators are the leaders of this Stackelberg game, the system
operator is the follower. Each generator solves a best response problem by choosing
its supply bid to maximize its profit taking the bids of the other generators as given
and anticipating the dispatch of the system operator. After collecting the bids of the
generators, the system operator indeed decides the electricity dispatch to maximize
social welfare while satisfying the electricity network constraints. We use the tradi-
tional DC linear approximation of electricity flows to model network constraints. See
[74] for references on the subject and a detailed description.
The optimization of the system operator can be represented as:
(p*, q*) = argmax ProxyTS(p, q)
q~p { _1qi = D(p) (Supply = Demand)
s.t. 0 < qj < #i(p - ai) (Supply bids)
<bq < A (Network constraints)
(4.20)
Notice that the optimal solution (p*, q*) depends on the supply bids (ai, #i). Un-
der our modeling assumptions of Section 4.2, there is a map that gives rise to a unique
dispatch (p*, q*) for each set of bids (a,3) (see [69] for proof). We will denote this
mapping by the optimal dispatch function OPTIDISP: (p*, q*) = OPTIDISP(a,,3).
Anticipating the optimization of the system operator, each generator i maximizes
its profit by solving:
max p* q* - Ci (q) (
siat. ((4.21)
s. t. (q*, p*) = OPTIDISP(aei, Oi, a- _IA-i)
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assuming the bids (ai, i-) of the other generators as fixed.
In order to simulate the game played between the generators, the first step is to be
able to simulate the optimal response of one of the generators to the bids of the other
generators. This alone is a difficult problem because it is a bi-level optimization: the
constraint of optimization (4.21) is itself the result of an optimization problem. The
entire game between the generators is therefore a bi-level game.
Our first step toward simulating this game is to reformulate the optimization
problem (4.20) of the system operator. Due to the concavity of the problem, the
problem is equivalent to its KKT conditions. We can represent the equations and
complementarity conditions of the KKT system through a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP) (see [42], [43], [27] for references):
0 L F,,_,, (z) 0 (4.22)
q)
We do not detail F ,_,(z) explicitly here but it is derived from the constraints
and the KKT optimality conditions of problem (4.20) in the standard way described
in [42]. Problem (4.22) is equivalent to problem (4.20) in the sense that the solutions
to the two problems are the same.
The bi-level optimization of generator i can now be reformulated into a single level
optimization problem:
max p* q* - Ci(q*)
s.t. 2> 0 _L Fea,aj,)_ > 0 
(4.23)
q )(q)
Nevertheless, this problem is still hard to solve, even though it has a single level,
since the constraints include complementarity conditions which are combinatorial in
nature. For this reason, this class of problems is called an MPEC (maximization
problem with equilibrium constraints) which in general is NP-hard to solve (see [83]).
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Going back to the equilibrium of the overall game, each generator needs to solve
this MPEC. We are looking for a quadruple (a,/, q, p*) which satisfies optimality
in problem (4.23) for all generators i = 1, . .. , n simultaneously. This in turn is an
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) (see [16] for reference).
In order to simulate competition (the simultaneous optimization of the genera-
tors), we use NIRA, a powerful tool to compute Nash equilibria in a constrained
multiplayer game. NIRA [79] was developed by Jacek Krawczyk and James Zuccollo
and combines the use of the Nikaido Isoda function and a relaxation algorithm. At
a high level, the algorithm is based on the ability to compute the best response of
one player to the bids of the other players and to iterate the process across players
a number of times in a particular fashion until convergence is reached and no player
wants to modify its bid. See [79] for further explanations.
Compared to NIRA though, our problem has an additional level of complexity.
NIRA is well suited to find equilibria of Nash games with simple coupling constraints
(equalities or inequalities) tying the players. However, the constraint tying the gen-
erators together in our game are complementarity constraints which are discrete in
nature. In order to converge, NIRA needs to be able to solve the best response prob-
lem (4.23) of a given generator quickly. After testing several methods to approximate
MPECs, we decided to use KNITRO [142]. KNITRO is a fast numerical solver for
large scale non-linear optimization problems. It offers an efficient MPEC solver that
we use to compute the generators' best responses.
We combine the use of NIRA and KNITRO in a MATLAB setting. NIRA is
directly available in MATLAB but KNITRO isn't. We call the KNITRO solver via
Tomlab [67]. We ran simulations using a Windows XP SP3 machine with an Intel
Core Duo 3.27 Ghz and 512 MB of RAM. We use MATLAB 7.7.0 (R2008b) and
NIRA version 3.
Let us now delve into the analysis of the simulations of the two electricity networks.
We begin with the 30-bus system.
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4.5.2 The 30-bus system
As mentioned, this example comes from the Power Systems Test Case Archive [107],
which is a set of electricity network models provided by the University of Washington
for the purpose of simulating and testing dispatch algorithms. The 30-bus system
in particular, has been the subject of a few electricity market studies. Maiorano
et al. [84] proposed a dynamic non-collusive Cournot model of electricity bidding
and simulated it on the 30-bus system. Later, Contreras et al. [30] analyzed static
Cournot equilibria in constrained electricity markets, also illustrating their model on
the 30-bus system.
We use here the same set of assumptions as in Contreras et al. [30] in order to
be able to compare the supply function bidding mechanism of this chapter to the
Cournot model. We show that the supply function bidding achieves better social
welfare than quantity (Cournot) bidding and that it is "almost" optimal in terms of
social welfare.
Figure 4-13 shows a diagram of the 30-bus system. It is assumed that the system
has six generators, split between three companies. The capacity of each generator and
each company is provided below in Table 4.1: each generator can produce between
Pm"n and Prna" and each company supplies between P "in and Peax.
company # generator # pmin pmaX pmin p axS g C C
[M_ [MW]
1 1 0 80 0 80
2 0 80
2 3 0 50 0 130
4 0 55
3 5 0 30 0 125
6 0 40
Table 4.1: IEEE 30-bus system market data.
The cost for company i to generate qi units is assumed quadratic of the form:
Ci(qi) = bi qi + 1/2ci q?. The production cost coefficients for each company are given
in Table 4.2. Demand is a strictly decreasing function of the price p. Consistent with
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Figure 4-13: 30-bus power system test case.
the assumption in this chapter and in [30], we consider a linear demand function:
D(p) = 250 - 0.5p.
Table 4.2: 30-bus system generating cost data.
Each generator bids a linear supply function Sj(p) = #4(p - oa) to the system
operator to maximize its profit. The system operator then decides the dispatch to
maximize the proxy of social welfare (also denoted TS for total surplus) taking into
account the capacity of the generating companies given in Table 4.1. The final bids,
the production quantities and the profit of each company under our supply function
equilibrium model are presented in Table 4.3. The social welfare achieved under the
supply function bidding mechanism is $61, 643.
We compare these results with the output of the Cournot model from [30]. Notice
that compared to Contreras et al. [30], we increased the demand from D(p) =
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Company # $ / IMW 2h] ai [$/Mwh] q [MwJ Profit [s]
# 0.0219 7.2612 80.0000 1,038
#2 0.1799 1.2648 85.1557 1,181
#3 0.1585 4A475 76.5529 1,000
Table 4.3: 30-bus system supply function equilibrium output.
189.2 - 0.5p to D(p) = 250 - 0.5p. We did this, because with the original demand
model, the capacity constraints of the generators are not active neither under the
Cournot model nor under the supply function equilibrium (SFE) model. We do not
show simulation results under the original demand model as this case is equivalent
to the unconstrained case which we addressed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Under the
increased demand, company 1 produces up to capacity (80 MW) under the SFE
model, making the presence of constraints meaningful. We only made this change to
make the problem more interesting. In order to compare our results with those of [30],
we thus had to re-implement their algorithm and simulate it under this new demand.
For consistency, we first checked that our implementation of their Cournot model
produced the outcome reported in their paper under the original demand scenario.
Below in Table 4.4, we present the outcome of the Cournot model under the increased
demand scenario. The companies all produce less eletricity. They make more profit
(approximately seven times more) but at the cost of reducing social welfare by 6%
(from $61, 643 to $57, 851).
Table 4.4: 30-bus system Cournot output.
We conclude the comparison by computing the quantities of interest also under
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the centrally coordinated setting, where the system operator knows the generators
costs and decides the dispatch to maximize social welfare. The outcome is described
in Table 4.5. The maximum achievable social welfare (reached under this setting) is
$61, 697. Under this setting however, generators make almost no profit.
Table 4.5: 30-bus system centrally coordinated output.
Our supply function equilibrium mechanism not only outperforms the Cournot
model in terms of social welfare but it produces 99.9% of the maximum social welfare
attained under the centralized scenario. The actual social welfare performance of the
deregulated system on the 30-bus system is definitely better than the lower bound
guarantee of equation (4.18) in Section 4.4. The bound only guarantees a welfare
performance above 56% for 3 unconstrained asymmetric generators with production
costs zj's as in Table 4.2. The actual performance of 99.9% is even better than the
99% guarantee of Theorem 4.4 for the case of 3 unconstrained symmetric generators.
Moreover, the SEE mechanism allows the generating companies to make a decent
profit of roughly $1000 each out of a total welfare of $61, 697 instead of a small profit
of roughly $100. This could help answer the daunting problem states face to create
a market process that encourages generators not only to produce electricity but also
to invest in new capacity. Finally, implementing a centrally coordinated dispatch
requires to monitor the production costs of the generators and this control comes at
some cost, not represented in our model. If we account for these monitoring costs in
the centrally coordinated setting (these costs reduce social welfare), the SEE mecha-
nism will undoubtedly turn out to be more efficient for society than the centralized
solution.
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4.5.3 The 5-bus system
The 30-bus system is interesting to simulate because it has been studied by a number
of other papers ([84], [30]). It allows us to compare the outcome of our supply function
equilibrium model with the classical Cournot model as described in these papers.
Yet, the representation of the 30-bus system in [30] does not include transmission
constraints tying the generators together. It only models capacity constraints at the
generators' level and at the companies' level.
In order to evaluate the full benefit of our supply function equilibrium model,
we need to consider a power system containing realistic electrical grid coupling con-
straints. We use a 5-bus system modeling part of the New England electrical grid. It
was provided to us courtesy of Andy Sun I who interned at the New England ISO.
The goal in carrying simulations on the 5-bus system is to show that the superiority
of the SFE model over the Cournot model and the quasi-optimality of the SFE model
in terms of social welfare demonstrated on the 30-bus system still hold in this more
complex/realistic setting.
A diagram of the 5-bus system is given in Figure 4-14. The system has five buses
(nodes) denoted A to E and six electric lines (AB, AE, BC, CD, AD, DE). There are
six generating companies supplying electricity to the network: Brighton, Alta, Park
City, Solitude 1 & 2 and Sundance. The demand (load) is concentrated at a single
bus, bus B. The diagram also shows the reactance xz of all the electric lines. The
reactance values are expressed in ohms and the % symbol does not refer to any ratio,
simply to 10-2.
Using the DC approximation model, we can represent the network constraints
with a linear system of inequalities: Anet q < dnet. q simply denotes the vector of
electricity generation (in MW) by the six generators. Anet is called the distribution
factor matrix and relates the electricity generated by the generators to the amount
of electricity flowing on the lines. It can be calculated with the information given in
Figure 4-14 (see [140] for details on the derivation). dnet is the thermal capacity of





Figure 4-14: 5-bus power system diagram.
the six lines, the maximum electricity that can flow through them
presented in Table 4.6 & 4.7 respectively.
Anet Atta Park Brighton Si S2 Sundance
FEA -0.0812 -0.0812 0.7988 0.0008 0.0008 0.2419
FED 0.0812 0.0812 0.2012 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.2419
FAB 0.8224 0.8224 0.7704 0.0018 0.0018 0.5293
FAD 0.0964 0.0964 0.0284 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.2873
F c 0.1776 -0.1776 -0.2296 -0.9982 -0.9982 -0.4707
-0.1776 -0.1776 -0.2296 0.0018 0.0018 -0.4707
Table 4.6: 5-bus distribution factor matrix.
Table








4.7: 5-bus line thermal
capacities.
The generators have quadratic production costs: Ci(qi) = bi qi + 1/2ci q?. The
production cost coefficients for each company are given in Table 4.8. Demand is a
strictly decreasing linear function of the price p: D(p) = e - 0.01 p. As discussed
in Sections 4.2 and 4.4, the SFE model is designed to handle intraday demand un-
certainty. To account for this uncertainty, we model demand as a discrete random
variable with three possible realizations: c = [2936,4404, 6606]. The demand can take













Table 4.8: 5-bus system generating cost data.
The supply bid parameters (a, 0) of the SFE model are independent of the real-
ization of demand uncertainty. This is due to the fact that the bids are chosen by the
generators before demand realization. The production quantities, generators' profit
and the welfare of society on the other hand, depend on the demand realization. For
simplicity, we present the results for the demand realization: 6 = 4404. The insights
derived hereafter hold true across all realizations though. The final bids, the produc-
tion quantities and the profit of each company under the supply function equilibrium
model we presented, can be found in Table 4.9. The total profit of all companies
is $64 Million and the social welfare is $954 Million. The global SFE production
quantity is 4217.55 MW.
Company Di [$/Mw2h] C1 [$/Mwh] q [Mw] Profit [$1
Alta 0 0 534.97 9616904
Park 0 0 534.97 9544822
Brighton 0 0 0 0
Si 0 33.49 554.97 9423076
S2 0 38.72 480.00 7334068
Sundance 1559.33 0 2112.65 28229609
Table 4.9: 5-bus supply function equilibrium dispatch.
We compare these results with the output of the Cournot model. Here genera-
tors simply bid generation quantities after the realization of the demand: e = 4404.
We present in Table 4.10 the outcome of the Cournot model. Generators produce
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significantly less electricity overall at 3740.66 MW, that is 11% less than under SFE
competition. They make a profit of $242 Million which is roughly 4 times the global
profit achieved under SFE competition. However, this profit increase under Cournot
competition comes at the cost of reducing the welfare of society by $12 Million or
1% compared to SFE competition (from $954 Million under SFE competition to $942
Million under Cournot competition). Under Cournot competition, generators still
have the ability to exercise consequent market power.







Table 4.10: 5-bus Cournot dispatch.
We conclude the comparison by computing the centrally coordinated scenario. The
outcome is described in Table 4.11. The maximum achievable social welfare (reached
under this scenario) is $961 Million. The overall profit of the generators under central
coordination is small at $21 Million. Generators produce 4335.03 MW which is fairly
close to the SFE production but 13% more than the Cournot production. Again,
SFE competition is able to prevent excessive exercise of market power on the part of
generators, something Cournot competition fails to achieve. Under SFE competition,
generators make more profit than under centralized dispatch but a lot less than under
Cournot competition. They produce almost as much electricity as under centralized
dispatch and achieve 99.2% of the optimal social welfare attained under centralized
dispatch. The social welfare of 99.2% is above the 73% guarantee of bound (4.18) in
Section 4.4 for the case of 6 asymmetric unconstrained generators with parameters zj's
as in Table 4.8. As mentioned in the previous section, our calculation of social welfare
under centralized dispatch did not take into account the practical costs involved in
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gathering the production costs of the generators and in insuring compliance with the
decided dispatch. If we also Integrate these costs in the centralized dispatch (these
costs reduce social welfare) then, SFE appears to be an even more efficient mechanism
to dispatch electricity.







Table 4.11: 5-bus centrally coordinated dispatch.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the costs and benefits of deregulating an electricity market. It
introduces a new model of competition between generating firms. Based on supply
function equilibrium concepts, our model provides a more accurate representation
of actual electricity markets. It describes explicitly the role of the system operator
as a maximizer of social welfare, and its bi-level formulation allows the modeling of
electrical network constraints. After introducing the model, the chapter investigates
the impact of deregulation on consumers, generators and society as a whole. The
chapter begins with the case of symmetric generators first, ignoring electrical con-
straints. This simplified scenario highlights the dependence between the performance
of a free market and the number of generators competing in the market. With a
monopolistic generator, deregulation is not advisable: it can reduce the welfare of
society by up to 25% and it can take away up to 75% of consumer surplus. Mov-
ing from a monopolistic to a duopolistic market drastically improves performance.
While generators still benefit from the deregulation process, the loss of social welfare
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is reduced to 3% and the loss of consumer surplus decreases from 75% to 32%. As
more generators enter the electricity market, the trend continues: the loss of social
welfare and consumer surplus become smaller. The chapter then turns to the case
of asymmetric generators. While the analysis is a lot more involved in this case, the
basic insights are consistent with the symmetric case. Generators always benefit from
the deregulation process. The amount of market power they can exercise (and the
profit they can extract) decreases as more generators compete to supply electricity.
On the other hand, consumers lose some surplus in the process .of deregulation (as
generators are able to drive prices up under free competition) but this loss decreases
rapidly as more "significant" generators participate in the market. To quantify this
phenomenon. this chapter defines a measure r of "equivalent players" to count the
number of significant generators. The chapter finally analyzes the impact of network
constraints on the performance of deregulation. Simulations are carried on two realis-
tic electricity transmission networks (bus systems). Our supply function equilibrium
model is compared to the regulated system but also to a Cournot market. Under
both networks, our supply function model performs well. It generates a social welfare
that is not only better than that of a Cournot market but that is also very close to
that of the regulated system. Our SFE market generates 99.9% and 99.2% of the
optimal social welfare in the 30-bus and 5-bus systems respectively. With such good
performance, deregulation is clearly cost effective as this small loss of social welfare is
far outweighed by the cost of maintaining a centrally regulated system. In conclusion,
this chapter shows that, done properly and under the appropriate market structure,




This thesis studies the effects of free competition in various market settings. It begins
with a general quantity (Cournot) competition model with oligopolistic suppliers fac-
ing independent constraints on their production sets. The thesis then investigates a
decentralized competitive mechanism to coordinate the subsidiaries of a parent com-
pany and keep their global energy consumption below a target level. The thesis finally
analyzes electricity markets. It proposes a new supply function equilibrium model to
represent competition and evaluates the impact of deregulation in this market. In
each setting, we compare free competition and a centrally regulated mechanism in
terms of market price and quantities of product sold. We also consider the perfor-
mance of free competition in terms of suppliers profit, consumers surplus and social
welfare. For each of these measures, we estimate the ratio of performance between
free competition and the regulated setting.
The paper shows how the market structure (number of suppliers, intensity of
competition, .. . ) affects the performance of free competition. In comparing Chapter
2 and 3, the thesis highlights how the presence of joint constraints tying suppliers
together radically changes the analysis of free competition. While deregulation is
never too costly when suppliers are not bound together by constraints, it can become
arbitrarily costly in the presence of a joint constraint. Similarly, Chapter 4 shows
that physical constraints such as those imposed by an electrical network have a sig-
nificant impact on the performance of deregulation. Through rigorous analysis of
complex market settings, the thesis thus contributes to deepen the understanding of
free competition and its impact on market participants. It provides useful knowledge
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Theorem A.1. In a market with differentiated substitute products, a single product
per firm and separate capacity constraints for each product, colluding firms always
sell less quantity of each product than if they compete freely: d mp dOp.
Proof. To prove this theorem we first formulate the oligopoly problem (OP) under






0 < di < C < d,
where Bi denotes the row of matrix B corresponding to firm i.
Using notation r = diag(B), the corresponding (OP) KKT conditions are:
p - Bdop - Fd0 p - AOP + p = 0
AOP(Ci - dop) = 0
AP > 0









The corresponding (MP) KKT conditions are:
(AMP)T(C - dm ) = 0





Step 1: We will prove that p0' = 0
Let us consider the problem that ignores the constraint d" > 0. This suggests we
ignore p t and the KKT conditions of problem (OP) become:
p - (B + F)d 0 p - A = 0 or d (B + r)-'(p - A ')
with B + F being an inverse M-Matrix (see [72]).
There are two cases to distinguish.
" Either A' > 0, in which case: djop= C 3 > 0
" Or Ay' = 0,
do = (B+ r)-(p- A )
i






Since M is an M-matrix, so is I + MU (see [72]). Hence (I + M) -1 has
non-negative elements, and the last inequality follows from d > 0.
Hence, it is always the case that d0" > 0 even without including this constraint (i.e.
the constraint that d" > 0). As a result, p" = 0.
Step 2: Similarly, we now show that pt" = 0
Following a similar thought process as before, we first consider the problem that
ignores p" (that is, ignores the constraint d"M > 0). Then the KKT conditions of
problem (MP) become:
p - 2B d" - A"' = 0 or d m" = 1/2 M(p - Ap)
" Either Am' > 0, in which case: dj' =C3 >0
" Or Am'= 0,
d = 1/2 M(p- Am )
=> 1/2 MP
pi - A
dj" ;> 1/2 d > 0 (A.1)
Step 3: Characterization of d"
Let K1  {Set of active constraints for the oligopoly problem}
= {i = 1, ... , n, Af' > 0}. We denote by K' the complement set of K 1 and
by HAB and UA the restrictions of matrix H and vector u to rows indexed by A and
columns indexed by B. Since K 1 is the set of active capacity constraints for problem
(OP), dO = K1 = .
do do
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Since y " = 0, the oligopoly KKT conditions become:
p - (B + F)dOP - A = 0
Restricting attention to the set Kc of inactive constraints (AO = 0) and noting that
1 disappears in off-diagonal block matrices:
PKJ BKK 1 CK1 -(B+ )KKc dKO
Using the relation PKc = BKc d, we get:
(B + F)KcKc dK = BKKi dKi + BKfK[ dK - BKfKi cKi
-> (B + F)KcKc d" = BK-K1 (dKi - CKI) + BKcKI dKc (A.2)
Clearly, on K 1 we have: d"' = CK1 > d". Hence, to prove the Theorem above, we
only need to show: d" > d".
Step 4: Characterization of d"'
Let {Set of active constraints for the monopoly problem}
= {i = 1,. , n, Amp > 0}. We denote by Kc the complement set of K 2. Since K 2
is the set of active capacity constraints for problem (MP), d" - CK2
dmp
Since p"' = 0, the monopoly KKT conditions become:
p - 2 B d"' - A"P =0
Restricting attention to the set Kc of inactive constraints (Ar = 0):
PKc - 2 BKc dm = 0 (A.3)
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Without loss of generality, we now assume K 2 C K1 (and hence K ;_ Kr). If there
were constraints in K 2 \ K 1 , we simply remove them. We show that without these
constraints d" < d" which proves that capacity constraints cannot be active on
dr as they are not active on d"j.
Restricting further (A.3) to K' (C Kc) and splitting variables according to K1 I K',
we get:
PK- - 2 BKK 1 ( cK 2d"pK1\K2
Using the relation PKc = BKc d, we get:
2 BKcKc dm = BKcK 1 dK1 + BKcKc dK - 2 BKcK 1
z 2 BKcKc dm = BKcK 1 (dK 1
2 cK 2
2 d*K1\K2
Step 5: dop > dMP
As shown in (A.1), for all j E Kc, d 'P 1/2 dj. In particurlar:
2 dMPK2  dK 1 \K2  CK 1\K2
2d > dK
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- 2 BKcKc dm = 01 1 K
CK2
d*KK1\K2
+ BK-K[ dKc (A.4)
(A.5)
(A.6)
On the other hand, combining (A.2) and (A.4), we have:
(B + r)K-Kc dop - BK'K 1 (dK 1 - CK1I) = 2 BKcKc dmp - BKcK 1 K1
dmp + BKcK1 2 CK2
2 d\K2
=> (B + F)KcKc dop
0 using (A.5)
> 2 BKrKc dm (A.7)
Finally, let's assume there exist i E Kc such that d?' < d"p. Denoting {si, , sf}
the indices of K', let's expand the i-th row of (A.7):




dMp bis1 - 0 - bis, + 2 bi, dmp
using (A.6)
Since all the coefficients bij are non-negative, this is a contradiction.
We just showed that dm' < do', leading to dm p < dop.
A.2 Proof of Step 1 for Theorem 2.3
Ignoring 'pS, the KKT conditions of problem (SP) become:
p - B ds - Asp = 0 or dsp = M (p - Asp)







=# (B+T )K-Kc dop = 2 BKcKc







A.3 Calculations for Theorem 2.4






1+a-na 0 ... 0
0 1+a AT
-. 0
0 ... 0 1+a
Inverting M, we get matrix B:
1 a
B = (I - H)-'
1+a 1+a
1 a a








= Mj (P - ASP)
This allows us to compute:
r = diag(B) 1 + 2 a - na(1 + a)(1 + a - na)




We are now able to compute the diverse component of the surplus ratio.
I+MT=A



















Let's call d the vector whose components are the eigenvectors of M, and [p, 2] the
two eigenvalues of: (I + FM)-1 r (I + M )-1 .
= _ (1+a)(1+2a-na)
P1 (2+3a-na) 2 (1+a-na)
= (1+a -na)(1+2a-no)
P2 (2+3a-2na)2(1+a)
The ratio of profits becomes:
11(OP)
lI(MP)
4 1i + 2 E 2








A.4 Proof of Lemma B.1
Lemma A.1. For a symmetric inverse M-matrix B and a vector d with all component
positive, the following inequality holds:
||di| < (1 + r - (nm - 1)) ||df|]Bdiag
where r is the market power.
Proof. Since B is an inverse M-matrix, Ostrowski shows in [94] that:
BH < rklB" and BY'= B r
Introducing r = maxkl rkl, we have: B 1 < r BB .




















We denote the diagonal matrix corresponding to the diagonal of matrix B by:
IT = diag(B",- ,B2n)
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We obtain:
Id||2 <r dT i
1 ... w1
il . :has two
1 .. 1)
2 . vf d+(1-r) dTFd
eigenvalues 0 and nm, we have dTHd < nm |d 1|2
Id||12 < r- nm dTFd+ (1 - r) dTId
(1 + r - (nm - 1)) |d|l|Bdiag
E
A.5 Derivation of oligopoly variational inequality
At a Nash equilibrium solution, the optimization problem facing a single firm is:







This problem is a maximization of a concave objective function over a convex set, it







with a concave objective F(x) is equivalent (see [85], [112]) to the variational inequal-
ity problem:
Find x 0 E K: -VF(xo) (x - xo) 2 0 Vx E K
Applying this to (A.8), we obtain for each firm i:
Find d" E Ki {-pi + Bi - do + B' - dop} (di - dop) > 0 Vdi E Ki
where B2 denotes the rows of matrix B corresponding to firm i.
Now, since the constraint set of each firm i is independent of the quantities chosen by
other firms, it is equivalent to satisfy every one of these variational inequalitites (for
firm i) or to satisfy the sum of these inequalities. Clearly, if d"' satisfies all these
inequalities it satisfies the sum of the inequalities. On the other hand if d"' satisfies
the sum of the inequalities, by choosing d = (di, do') for all di E Ki, it is easy to
check that it will satisfy every variational inequality separately as well. The sum of
these inequalities is exactly the variational inequality used in this chapter:




Proofs for Chapter 3
B.1 Calculations and proofs for Section 3.3
B.1.1 KKT conditions
The KKT conditions of the different problems are summarized as follows:
f3 - Bd S"^- pe + A = 0
eI dSAX C
p(c - eTd) = 0
Aid"^ =AX 0
Ai > 0, p > 0, ds" > 0
p - 2BdCP - ie + A = 0
eT dcp < C
p(c - e'd) = 0
Aidp = 0
Ai > 0, p > 0, dcp > 0




p - (B + F)d -pe A=
eTdUNE <c
p(c - e'd) = 0
Ai d UNE = 0
A > 0, p >, d NE >0
UNE:
Vi = 1,21... In
The set of oligopoly equilibria satisfies the following Cauchy variational inequality:
(-p + (B + F)jd 0 P) (di - dop) > 0
where K(d ') = {di di + Z>:i dj' < C, di 2  0}.
B.1.2 Proofs
Theorem B.1. In the absence of constraints, the loss of profit resulting from free
competition between subsidiaries of a company is bounded by:
T1(OP)/II(CP) > max23
f2 + r - (n - 1)'4 4+ r - (n - 1
where r is the diversion ratio, n is the number of subsidiaries.
The bound is composed of two parts. The first part dominates when r - (n - 1) < 2,
the second part dominates otherwise.
In order to prove the theorem, we need to use an intermediate inequality. To shorten
notations, we denote by ||dl112= dT Bd, and Idl|1 = dT Pd.
Lemma B.1. For a symmetric inverse M-matrix B and a vector d with all component
positive, the following inequality holds:
||dle r (1 + r - (n - 1)) |ed r
where r is the diversion ratio.
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Vdi E K(dop)
Proof. Since B is an inverse M-matrix, Ostrowski shows in [94] that:
Bij < rj Bi, and B j = B3 ri - i Bjj
Introducing r = maxi ri, we have: Bij < r R Bj.












(1 - r)Bn . . 0
... 1--- )B d
We denote the diagonal matrix corresponding to the diagonal of matrix B by:
F = diag(Bn, -. - , B,,)
We obtain:
||d 12 < r dTVN
1 ...
1 -.1:)
vF d + (1 - r) dTFd
1h... 1
i .: has two
1 ... 1




||d||' < r -n dTFd + (1 -r) dTFd
< (+ r - (n - 1)) ||d~l
We are now ready to prove Theorem B.1:
Proof. The variational inequality satisfied at the oligopoly solution is:
{-P + B -d + F -d'} (d - dop) 2 0
Since by definition the centrally coordinated solution must be feasible as well (i.e.
dc" E K), the first order optimality conditions evaluated at the centrally coordinated
solution are:
{-p+ B -do + F dop}T (dCP - dop) 0
Denoting by H = d - {p - B -d} the profit, we get:
[(OP) - ||d 0pI1 - PTdCP + (do )TBdcP + (dop)TFdCP > 0
By adding and substracting (dcP)TBdcp, we obtain:
H(OP) - H(CP) + (do )TBdCP - Idcp l - ||d 0 f + (do )TFdCP > 0 (B.2)
Part 1: Let's first prove the second part of the bound, namely H(OP)/(CP)
3
4+r-(n-1)
Since both B and F are positive definite matrices we can use the following bounds:
* (do )TBdcP < 1/3||dp 1|| + 3/4||dc0 12
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Vd e K (B.1)
* (do )TFdCP < jId 0 |fl + 1/41|dCP .
Introducing these bounds into the variational inequality:
17(OP) - fl(CP) + 1/31d 0 p 1 -1/4|ldcpll1 + 1/4|1dcP|| > 0
=-1/41|dcPI12 <0
Since we assumed 0 e K, we can plug the feasible point 0 into the variational in-
equality (B.1) to get:
(B.3)
Using Lemma B.1 to upper bound j|d' 1||. we finally get:
H(OP) - 1(CP) + 1/3(1 + r- (n - 1)) ||d 0 112f
U(OP) - U(CP) + 1/3(1 + r- (n - 1)) H(OP)
> 0
> 0
This inequality is equivalent to:
H(OP) > 3
U(CP) - 4+ r - (n -1)
Part 2: Let's now prove the first part of the bound 1(OP)/(CP) >2 .
Using symmetry of the matrix B, we can rewrite equation (B.2) as follow:
F(OP) - U(CP) + (do )Tr(dcP - dop) - (dcP)TB(dcP - do') > 0
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H(OP) > ||do 11|2
We can decompose this expression in two different ways:
H(OP) - H(CP) + (dop - dcP)TF(dcP - dOP) -(dcP)T(B - P)(dCP - dop) 2 0
(B.4)
UI(OP) - U(CP) + (dop - dcP)TB(dcP d0 ) -(do )T(B - F)(dCP - dop) 2 0
(B.5)
Combining these two expressions (1/2 Inequality(B.4) + 1/2 Inequality(B.5)) and
leaving out the non-positive terms, we get:
U(OP) - f(CP) - 1/2(dCp + do )T(B - F)(dcP - dop) > 0
H(OP) - F(CP),-1/2 (dcP)T(B - F)dcp +1/2 (do )T(B - F)dOP 2 0
Using Lemma B.1, we can write:
||d "|(B-) 3 - d r r* (n - I)Ijd 0 p r
With inequality (B.3), we finally obtain:





2+ r - (n-1)
Theorem B.2. In the absence of constraint, the loss of social surplus resulting
from free competition between subsidiaries of a company is at most 1/4: TS(OP) >




= (do )T (Bd - Bdop -
(a - dop + dcp )T B(dop - dCp)2
(Since dcp = 2-dl dop (B + F)-1 Bd)
-B(B+ )- B
2 /
- B(B + F)-1B)
B ((B +P)-'Bd - a)
(B + F)-B -1 d
(B +F)~1B - I
T(3B(B + F)- 1B - B(B + F)- 1 B(B + F)'B
1
+ B(B + F)~B d
T (2B(B + F)- 1 B - B(B + F)-1 B(B + F)~B - 3B)
1-T 3-
= dT(B(B + F)- 1 B + B(B + F)<(B + -)B -B)d2 4
= a (B - B(B + F)-l + B(B + 7F)-l(B + F)-'B - -B)a
2 4
= Ia( B - B(B + F)'+ + B(B + 17)'F(B + 1)- 1 B)d
2 4
(since d T B > d TId)
> d (-F - B(B + F)~'F +2 4 B(B + Fr)<(B + P)-
1 B)d
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let 2TJi = xT, and dTB(B + F)F = yT. We have
TS(OP) - TS(CP) ! IdT(l F - B(B + F)-F +2 4 B(B + F)~
1F(B + F)B)d
T Tx2 x -xy+yy)
( x - y) ( x - y)2 2 2
> 0
Equality holds when B = F and ix = y.
B.1.3 Calculations for the duopoly case
B =nr a cori1 2 #2 > a > 0
Centrally coordinated problem
e case 1: (constraint is not tight) dso
tion)
if e =dso (02-C)p1+(01-)2 < c
2(#102-O2r2) -








2c(# 1 - a) -j1 +2 >0 and 2c(# 2 - a) - P2+Pl > 0
and
A = -1 - 2ac - 2(#1 - a)di- 2-011+(1 -a2-2c0102 -2 > 0
#1+#2 -2a
* case 3: dso
c
0
ifA =pi - 2#31c 0 and f2 =i -f 2 + 2c(a - 1) > 0
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. case 4: dso _
0
c
if A = 2 - 2# 2 c > 0 and pi =P2 - p,+ 2c(a - #2) > 0
dso is unique as the above 4 cases are mutually exclusive.
Oligopoly problem
* case 1:(constraint is not tight)





if (22-ay)1+(2,3j-a)P2 < c40102 2-a 2
. case 2:(constraint is tight) dNE satisfies the following condition:
1. di + d2 = c;
2. -P1 + 2#1di + ad2 < 0; if di > 0
-P2 + 2# 2d2 + ad1 < 0; if d2 > 0
3. d1 > 0 and d2 > 0
Uniform Nash equilibrium
* case 1: dUNE d NEwhen constraint is not tight;
e case 2: (constraint is tight) dUNE _=
c(202 -a)-2+P1
2(01-+12-a)
c(201 -a) -Pi +2
2(01+02-a)
c(2#1 - a) - -I +P2 > 0 and c(2# 2 - a) - P2 + 1 > 0
and
A = 1 - ac - (2#1 - a)di = (21 2 -a)jl+(201-a)f2-c(431132-a 2 ) > 02(01+#2-a)
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* case 3: dUNE _
c
0
ifA =pi - 2#1c> 0 and P2 =P1 -g2+c(a-22 1) > 0
* case 4: dUNE _
0
c
if A =.P2 - 2#2c >0 and p1 = P2 -p1+ c(a - 232) > 0
TS(d) =d1 (p1i 1- #ld1 - 1 1-ad 2) + d2(P2 - 1#d22 2
=d1 1 + d2P 2 - 2 (#1 di - ad 2d1 + #2d2)




=P2c - 32c + di
K 1 1
i -P2 - 1 d1 + -ac\\Pi2
1 1 7
- -ad1 + #2c - #2di2 2 /
11(d) = d1 1i + d2P2 - (Old2 - ad2di + #2d )
B.2 Calculations and proofs for Section 3.4
B.2.1 Closed-form solutions
Under the assumption of symmetric market, we have p = Poe, and
# a ... a
B =
a ... a#
The closed-form solutions follow from the KKT conditions presented in Section B.1.1:
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Theorem B.3. For symmetric subsidiaries facing a single joint capacity constraint,
the fraction of profit achieved under free competition compared to the maximum com-
pany profit is at least:
" When the capacity constraint is not active for both the centrally coordinated
problem and the oligopoly problem (i.e., C > ), then:
U(OP) _ 4(1+ _ 1) 4n
1(CP) -1(r, n) = - 1 > 1 (B.6)Hi(CP) (2 + I ) 2 -(n + 1)2
" When the capacity constraint is active for both problems (i.e., C < ),
then:
1 1 --




1- > 1 when c < P
2' -1( 2
(B.7)
" When the constraint is active for the oligopoly problem but inactive for the
centrally coordinated problem, the profit ratio lies between the unconstrained
bound (B.6) and the constrained bound (B.7).
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nd'(- (#i3 + (n - 1)a)d?")
ndcp(po - (+ (n - 1)a)d?")
-
2(# + (n - 1)a) (jo - + (n
2# + (n - 1)a
4(Q + (n - 1)a)#
(20 + (n - 1)a)2
4(1+ )
(2 + _ 1 )2
(n +n1)2( when r 1)(n +1)
When 0 < c < P (constraint is restrictive for the OP problem),
ac2 - (P - oz) [ d2
* Case 1: c < 2 (4 50o > 2/3c)
0, otherwise.
-> 1(OP) > I(dw)




Ui(OP) = poc -
II(OP)
1I(CP)
( since 0 - 1 )
- (n-1)(~-1)





The worst case equilibrium in terms of profit is given by:
Vi = 12... k
i = k + 1
Vi= k + 2,...,n
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POc - ac 2 - (3 - a~c2
poc - c2 - (a)2
1-(#a)c2(1_)
P- ac 2 - (#3 - a)
= - (# a)c 2(1 _ )
2#c 2 - c2- (# -
=1 - (# (1
















>Poc -ac 2 _-
- oc - ac 2
poc-ac2 -





pioc - ac 2 - a)c 2
k j -a2 + (c - k c 2 # -Ca)
fioc - cc2 - - C2
Let x p-ac , ioc = ((2# - a)x + a) c 2 , < <1c (23 -a)' k+1 - - k
(kx 2c2 (c - kcx) 2 -) )
((2 -a)x + a) c2 ac 2 1(# a)c 2
=1 -
(k2 (1-kx)2 
- )( - a)
(2#3 - a) x - -(#3 - a)





-a k n i'
20-a 1 2 +2 +1 a
3-a k n n n /-a
(20-a 1- 1)2
/3-a k n








- 050-ac0, ) )
1
k + 1
k + k )2 _1)23-a
(k+1)2 + ( k+1 n #-a
(23-a 1 132
#-a k+I n





This suggests that f(x) is maximized at the boundary when x = r1












ii 1\IA 1 n\ 1 1
-k nZ'k±1 - 0) - kc+I n -,' D
(A - B)(A- 1  -B)
(I -!)(A 1 -B) -( 1 -1)(Aj-1 B)
(Aj- B)(A1 -B)
(-!A - B)({ - 1)
(Aj - B)(Ah -- B)
>0








4 (1+ 1i 1 1
r1+n-ry "
(2+ 1 1 )2 - (n+1)2
r_ 1+ --- T
1 1
(n-1)(1-1) k k n
12- 1 11- 1(_ 1+2__2n
when c > P0
when _, < c < P
k ak+I
for k = 1, 2, ...n -1
when c < PO23
Theorem B.4. For symmetric subsidiaries facing a single joint capacity constraint,
the fraction of social welfare achieved under free competition compared to the maxi-
mum achievable welfare is at least 75%:
e When the capacity constraint is not active for both the oligopoly problem and
the SMAX problem (C > P ), then:
TS(OP)

















#-a (n - 1(-1
1 _ 1
=1- 1 1n 2-
(n-1)(--1) k k n
1
> k(when r -+ 0)2-
r(OP) >
r(CP) -





* When the constraint is active for both problems (C < ), then:
1>n -1) (r n) k (ni( _ ) 4'
1 3
3(1+ n1 )(1+ )+1 4
n1 (n_1( 1
when P < C < P
k k+1
fork = 1,2,...n- 1
when c < PO
-20~
(B.9)
* When the constraint is active for the SMAX problem but not for the oligopoly
problem the social welfare ratio lies above the unconstrained bound (B.8).
Proof. For d with di = d2 = .... = dn,
1 1




= ndi(po - -(0 + (n - 1)a)di)
2




ndo?(po - 1(0 + (n - 1)a )dop)
nd M AX (A - '(0 + (n - 1)a)d M AX)
1 ++(n-1 )#+ (n - 1)a 1 - bg(-Ia
2# + (n - )a1 2
1 1 #3
(Since - 1 + - )r n - 1 (n - 1)ce'
i 1 1 - 1 -1+ +12 -111+ )+1r n-11r n-i
2-1± 1 ± +1 1
(3(i + ;-1) - 2)(1







When 0 < c < a (constraint is restrictive for the OP problem), we have a set of
equilibrium strategies satisfying
d = dl0 di = c< di <P 
- a
2T S(SM AX ) = p~oc - c2
1 2
= poc - -c22
TS(OP)=Ed NE=0-
12=poc- ac2-










Where d' is the equilibrium with the largest Euclidean norm.
* Case 1: c < P"peo (< po 23c)
d { c, i=1;
0 , otherwise.








TS(OP) POC 1 -ac 2 _ a)c2
TS(SMAX) ~poc - ac2 -- a)c2
!(1 -)([ - a)c2
p0c - }cC2 - (#-C - a)c 2
(Since -o > 23c)
>1 -( )(3 a)c2
- (2#c)c - Iac2 -a)c2
=1- - ( ) a)
2- - 11 - -L( - a)
1 1





#- a (n -1(-)
(n-1)( -1)+4-
1
3(1+- )(1+ _ + 1
1
>1 - 4 ( when r 1)
> 3( when n --- oo)4
* Case 2: < c <P" < c for some 1 < k < n- (1. PO < C < _ )nk+1 - 2/3-a k a+ 20a
k C' k +1
The worst case Oligopoly Equilibrium in terms of social welfare is given by:
fo-c Vi= 12,... k
2/3-a
d'= c-kP-a" i k+12/3-a
0 Vi = k + 2, ..., n
Because for any Z di = c, if there exist index i and j such that di > 0, dj > 0,






poc - lac2~12 - '(0 - a) (d 2
- jioc - {c2 _ l p _j a)c2
POC - ac2 - 2- a)(k ±- +
poC - lac2 _ ( a)c2
=1 -
fo -ac'(20-a ) / 2+ Ic-k io-c2/3-a )
poc - jac2 - -(# - a)c 2
Let x = ac , we have poc = ((2 - C)X + a) c2, I < < 1c(2-a)'Po k+- k
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di + d, k i
0 k =j
dk Vk #i, k #j
Zdi-E =di + d - 3










1 (kX2c2 + (c - kcz) 2 _ e2 - a)
1
2
((2 - a)z +a) C2 - lac2 - 1
(2# -a)x+ !a- (- )
kx 2 + (1 - kx) 2 _





(2kx - 2k (1 - kx)) (2 '3'x + 1) (kz2 + (1 - kx) 2  2,3-,
2#-a+ a 1
k((a 2 -- a 2n) 2
2k ((1 +k) - 1) (23x+i -1) - (k2 +(1-k2)2_
2#0-aX 1 a 1O-a 2 T-a 2 n)2
195
- aOc2
k 248-a 1 a 1 )
( -a 2#3-a 2) n
2#--a 1 a 1 1 23-a
#--a k #-a n n 3-a
2#-aX 1 1 2
+-a 2/3-a -n
2/3-a a 1 1 1 1
/3-a k /3-a n ___ n i /3-a
#-a 2 #--a 2n)
23-a1 a 1 /3
/3-a k /3-a n /-a







2#-ax + a#-a 2 #-a
1 20--a
n /-a
2#3-aL 1 a 12
O-ae 2#O-a 2 n)
<0
This suggests that f(x) is maximized at the boundary when x or .
Comparing the two function values:
f( )
1 1
24-a 1+ a 1
/3-a k 2 #-a 2 n
(k+1 n)
I1 +1 a
k+1 2 # a
B
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k1 2# -a 1
1
k+1
(I - ) ( I )k n k+1 n
Al+B A 1 +Bk k±1
' -)(A +B)-(4' -- L)(Aj+B)
(A.I+B)(A 1 +B)
(-! A+ B) (1 - -I)
(A. + B)(A 1 + B)
> 0
Hence f(x) is maximized at x = . It is interesting to notice that f is not a
























3(1+ )(1+ )+1 > ,
when c >
when P < C <
k
for k = 1, 2,...n - 1








B.3 Calculations and Proofs for Section 3.5
B.3.1 Closed-form solutions
The closed-form solutions when P = pioe follows from the KKT conditions presented
in Section B.1.1 : (d = B-1p = poB-e)
d"SMAX = min poB-'e,





dUNE = min io(B C+ F)-le, + 1(B
eT(B + F)-le
B.3.2 Proofs
Lemma B.2. (1 - r)F-1 e < B-'e < F-le
Proof. we have
Bjj Mj - Ek Bik Mki = 1
BijM3 - EZkj BikMkj = 0
Vi
Vj # i
By the definition of the diversion ratio r, we have
rMi2 _> Eji MiJVi
-rMi <- EZi Mij
(1 - r)Mi < Mi2 - E oi Mij
< (Mi - Ez3 i Mij ) B2
(1 - r _-< Mii - E i Mij
(1 - r)F-le < B-'e
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+ F)-e}
== 1 - r < (1 - r)MjjBjj
Theorem B.5. When the subsidiaries have symmetric price potentials and the ca-
pacity constraint is active, the losses of profit and welfare for the worst oligopoly
equilibrium are characterized by:
H(OP) 1 1 1 1SI + 11> - (B.10)
U(CP) ~ 2 2 (2 BMM (eTP-le) - 1) 2
TS(OP) 3 3 1 3
TS(SMAX) - 4 4 (4BMmeT ]- 1 e - 1) 4
where BMM = max { Bi }.
Proof. let iM = argmaxiBi, define dw as follows:
C for k = iM
di=
0 otherwise
1H(OP) ;> H(dw) = C(- Binm m C)
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H (OP) C(0 - BimumC)
n~c) cpo- cH7(CP) ~ C(P0 - eT|_1e)
f0 - BimmC
- C








1 + eT BTe
2 2 2Bmm- eTB-le
1
1 1 eTB-le
2 2 2BiMzlM eTBle
1 1 1
2 2 2BiMiM (eTB-le) - 1
-2 2 2BiMim (eTl)-1
1
-2












C BMiM - eTBle2>1-1-
2 2BjMjmC - 1 C
1 2  eTBle
= BMM - eTB e
S4 1
2 Bj~jVV eTB 
-ie
1








+ 44Bjmje T B- 1 e - 1
3 1
+ 4 4BimimeTF-le 
- 1
D
Theorem B.6. When the joint constraint is active and the price potentials are sym-
metric across subsidiaries, the loss of company profit at the uniform Nash equilibrium
compared with the centrally coordinated solution is no more than 1/3:
H(UNE) - 3 2( )> 2 - 26 + -62 > - (B.12)Ui(CP) ~ 4 - 3
where 2 - r < 6 < 2. Tightness of the bound is achieved when r = 0.
Proof. Let
eTB-1F xT
eT(B + F)-'F1p = y
ei 2i = zT
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(x - y)Tz =eT (B-' - (B + fl) Fr-e
=eT(B + F)- ((B + F)B- - I) e
=eT (B + r)~ 1FB 'e
XT
(N C - C2eT(B+F)lB(B+F)-le
U(UNE) ____-_(eT(B+F)-le) 2
H(CP) poC - eC2
eT(B+r)-lB(B+)-le 1
I- C (eT(B+F)~le) 2  eTB-le
P - eTB-le
(Since fio > 2C eTB e)
eT(B+r)~yB(B+r)-le 1




= 2 - eT(B + F)-'B(B + )-'e eTB-le
(eT(B + F)-le)2
2 + (-eT(B + F)-le + eT (B + F)-IF(B ±F)-le) eTB-le
(eT(B + r)~le)2
2 -yTz + yTy) xTz
2 + (yTZ)2
> 2+ z+xTy - xTx) xTz
- 2(yTZ)2
> 2+ (yTz + xTy - IXTz) xTz
-+ (YTZ)2
(yTz + (xTz - yTz) - xTz) xTz2 + (yTz)2
- 2+± (2yTz+ xTz) xTz
(yTZ)2
= 2 - 2J + 3624
202
By Lemma B.2, we have(1 - r)z < x < z.
XTz
SyTZ




yTz> 1+ (1- r
> 2 - r
Hence, 2 - r < 6 < 2. So NE) is minimized when 6 = with a minimum of 2. D1I(CP) 33
Theorem B.7. When the joint constraint is active and the price potentials are sym-
metric across subsidiaries, the loss of social welfare at the uniform Nash equilibrium
compared with the centrally coordinated solution is no more than 1/4:
TS(UNE) > 2 2 3 (2 - r)2 3
TS(SMAX) - 3 3(2+ r(n - 1))'8 - r -4 (B.13)




T U c C 2 e T (B+F)- 1B(B+F)-'e
TS(UNE) ~2 (eT(B+F)-le) 2
TS(SMAX) poC - 1 T_0 ~eTB-1e
eT(B+F)- 1 B(B+F)~le
C (eT(B+r)-le)2  eTB-le
=1 2 1 C
0 ~ eTB-le
(Since Po > C
eT(B + I')e
eT(B+F)-1 B(B+r)-'e -
C (eT(B+r)-le)2  eTB-le
> C 1 C
eT(B+r)-le 2 eTB-le
eT(B+F)-le-eT(B+F)-lF(B+F)~le








1 1 (eT(B+F)-le) 2  2 eTB-le
2 2 1 1 1
eT(B+)-le 2 eTB-le
1 1 IY±+Y(z
- 2 xTzxTy xT Z
+ yTz 2 xTz
2 2 1 Y T z
2 xT
xTz yTz- xTz yTz




TS(UNE) _1 1i(1 - )o - 1±+





f'() =---1-1 > since 6 c [1, 2]( 2 (6!2
Hence TS(UNE). > 3 (2-r)2 > 3.TS(SMAX) - 8 !-r 42 The second bound + 3(2+n -1)) follows from
||dI|2 < (1 + r(n - 1)) Id2 .(See Kluberg and Perakis [76]) E
B.4 Calculations and Proofs for Section 3.6
Theorem B.8. When the capacity constraint is active, the losses of profit and welfare
for the worst oligopoly equilibrium are characterized by:
U (O P) >in 
- BmmC >
UI(CP) - Pmax
TS(OP) pimn - 1/ 2 BMMC
TS(SMAX) - Pmax
> 0 - 14
for Pmax 2 imin
for Pmax 4 irnin
where BMM = max { Bij }.
Proof. Let iM = argmaxBij, and let dw be an equilibrium solution that achieves the
worst oligopoly profit Ul. We can bound H(OP) and U(CP) by:
H(OP) > H(d ) = (dw )T(p - B dw)
(d )T (pmn e - B d )
> C(Pmjn - BimimC)
H(CP) = max {d T (p -B d)
d
< max {d T (pmax e - B
d
= C (Pma
eT d < C d > 0}





with d" = C







Pmax -1 CTBx c
Pmain
Pmax
- B MuM 1/max
C pmin eTB-le




Pmax + pMax 2












Let d' be an equilibrium solution that achieves the worst social welfare TS. We can
bound TS(OP) and TS(SMAX) by:
TS(OP) > TS(dw) = (dw)T(p - 1/2B dw) with d" = C
> (dw) T (pmjn e - 1/2B dw)
1
S(Pmin 2BimiC)2
TS(SMAX)=max{d T (p- 1/2Bd) eT d< C,d > 0}
d
< max{d T (pmax e-1/2B d) eT d < C,d > 0}
d
1 C



















Pmax 2 2 B m,
Pmin [ 1 max + 1
Pmax 4min
Pmin 1 Pr
Pmax 4 4 Bii/M
Pmin -IBiM MC





1 _ 1 /fmaIC2 eTB-1e
v M _ 1/fimax
Tni eTB-le
M C 1 1/inax C
X ~2 eTBIeJ
1-Pmax






VPmax _ 4 imin
Theorem B.9. When the constraint is active for the oligopoly problem, the loss of





At a Nash equilibrium solution, the optimization problem that a single subsidiary
faces is:

















The variational inequality' satisfied at the uniform Nash equilibrium is:
{-p± + B -dUNE +FdUNE (d - dUNE) > 0
Since by definition the centrally coordinated solution must be feasible as well (i.e.
dC E K), we have:
{-P + B - dUNE + r. dUNET (dCP - dUNE) > 0
Developing all the terms and extracting TS(UNE) = (Bd)T dUNE _ (dUNE)TB dUNE
and TS(CP) = (Bd)T dCP - 1/2 (dcp)TB dcP, we obtain:
TS(UNE) - TS(CP) - 1/2 (dUNE)TBdUNE _ (dUNE)T FdUNE
-1/2 (dcP )TBdCP + (dc )TBdUNE + (dCP )T dUNE 0 (B.16)
Using positive definiteness of matrix B, we have:
" (dcP)T BdUNE < 1/2(dUNE)T BdUNE + 1/2(dcP )T BdCP
(1/2 (dUNE - dcP )T B(dUNE - dCP) 0)
* (dCP )T FdUNE < (dUNE)T FdUNE + 1/4(dcP )T FdCP
((dUNE 1dcP )T F(dUNE - C >0)







F(x*)T(x - x*) > 0, Vx E K}.
Hence, using these two inequalities in (B.16), we get:
TS(UNE) - TS(CP) + 1/4(dcp)T FdCP > 0 (B.17)
On the other hand, the variational inequality for the centrally coordinated solution
is:
{-P + B dcP + B . dcP} (d - dCP) > 0
Evaluating this variational inequality at the feasible vector 0 E K , we have:
p - dCP - 1/2 (dcP)T BdC' - 3/2 (dcP )T BdCP > 0
This leads to:
TS(CP) > 3/2 (dcP )T BdCP <-> 1/6 TS(CP) > 1/4 (dcP)T BdCP
For gross substitute products, matrix B is an inverse M-matrix with all coefficients
non negative so that: (dcP)TFdCp < (dcP)TBdCP. Using (B.18) and this inequality,
(B.17) becomes:
TS(UNE) - TS(CP) + 1/6 TS(CP) > 0
-> TS(UNE) > 5/6 TS(CP)
This establishes the desired relation between TS(UNE) and TS(CP). Let us now turn
to the study of TS(SMAX). The optimization of the social welfare corresponds to
the problem:
max p- d - 1/2 dTB dd
The optimal solution of this problem satisfies the variational inequality:
{-P + B - dSMAX}T (d - dsMAX) > 0 Vd E K
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Vd e K
Evaluating this variational inequality at the feasible point 0, we have:
TS(SMAX) > 1/2 (dSMAX)TBd SMAX (B.18)
On the other hand, the centrally coordinated variational inequality evaluated at the
feasible solution dS"^X gives:
{-p + B - dcP + B dcP }T (dSM AX - dc') 0
This leads to:
TS(CP)-3/2 (dcp)T BdcP-TS(SMAX )-1/2 (dSMAX)T BdSAX+2 (dSMAX)T BdcP > 0
(B.19)
By positive definiteness of matrix B, we have:
2 (dSMAX)TBdCP < 3/2 (dCp)T BdCP + 2/3 (dSMAX)TBd SMAX
Making use of this property in (B.19), we finally obtain:
TS(CP) - TS(SMAX) + 1/6 (d SMAX)T BdSMAX > 0
-> TS(CP) - TS(SMAX) + 1/3 TS(SMAX) > 0 (by (B.18))
=> TS(CP) > 2/3 TS(SMAX)
Finally, combining TS(UNE) > 5/6TS(CP) and TS(CP) > 2/3TS(SMAX), we




Proofs for Chapter 4
C.1 Derivations for unconstrained symmetric gen-
erators
C.1.1 Supply function equilibrium derivation
Under the symmetry assumption, the generators all experience the same quadratic
production costs: C(q) = bq + 1/2 c q2 . The generators place bids to the system
operator by submitting affine supply functions: qi(p) = #i(p - ai), i = 1, . . . , n.
In order to choose its bid, generator i attempts to maximize its profit (taking the
supply bids of the competitors as given) for all possible realizations of the demand
uncertainty E:
Ve > 0, p*, q*= argmax p q - C(q)
s.t. q + E, qj (p) = D(p, 6),
Hence, for every realization of c, generator i chooses a point (p*, qX) that maximizes
the objective p[D(p, E)-EZ2 # qj(p)]-C (D(p, e) - E qj(p)). Setting the derivative
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(with respect to p) to zero leads to :
q,= [p* - C'(q*)] dD (idq (C.I)
dp .dp
Generator i chooses the pair (aj,#3) of its supply bid before knowing the realization
of demand. The bid forces generator i to produce qi,, = #i(p* - ac) while optimality
condition (C.1) must be satisfied for all realizations of 6. The two conditions can be
combined into:
#3i (p*E - aj) = [p* - b - ci (p* - a)] m + # VE ;> 0 (C.2)
Since supply must match demand E'> j p* - #a = -mp* + e, it is clear
that the equilibrium price p* varies with the uncertainty c. The only way optimality
condition (C.2) can be satisfied Ve, is that generator i chooses the pair (ai, 3j) so that
the polynomials (in p*) on both sides of the equation are equal. We must have:
#3 = (1- cj)(m + E #) (C.3)
ai = (b - c,3 a)(m + E 0j) (C.4)
jii
After simplification (multiplying (C.3) by a and subtracting (C.4)), the linear supply
function equilibrium is thus characterized by the system of equations:
ai=b
#{ = (1 - c)(m + E i 0)
As shown in [75], this system of equations has a unique solution vector (a, ,6) and this
solution is symmetric, meaning ai = - = a, = b and #1 = - - - = #, = #. As stated
in the beginning of Section 4.3, the supply function bidding mechanism is partially
truth revealing as generators end up bidding the true linear part of their production
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costs b as the intercept a of their supply function bid: a = b.
Under our symmetry assumption, there is no loss of generality in setting b = 0
because, since ai = b for all i, this linear component of the generators' costs gets
directly reflected in the bids, in the production quantities and in all the relevant
measures of interest.
A monopolistic generator hence chooses 3 such that # = (1 - co) m or:
# = m (C.5)
1+ c m
Under the realization e of the demand uncertainty, it charges a price p* such that
#3 p,* = -m p* + e and produces a quantity q* =3 p*. This results in:
p 1 =;-c and q,* (C.6)m 1i+ 1 2 +cm
Similarly, multiple symmetric generators choose / such that # = (1-c#) [m+ (n- 1)#].
Solving this quadratic equation results in:
-m + n-2 + (-m + n-2)2 + 4m(n-1)
# n 1 (C.7)2(ni-1)
Under the realization 6 of the demand uncertainty, they charge a price p* such that
n #3 p* = -m p,* + e and produce a quantity q* = # p*. This leads to:
* = and q* = m (C.8)
n-2 n(n-2) n n-2)2 4m(n-1) n +
2(n-1) 2c(n-1) 2(n-1) c c 3
It is easy to check that # A j (in (C.5) and (C.7)) only depends on the parameter
m
m of the demand and the parameter c of the production costs through z = mc. This
result will be useful in the next subsection.
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C.1.2 Calculations of surplus, profit and welfare ratios
The first step in evaluating the performance ratios between the deregulated and the
regulated settings is to describe the regulated solution. As explained in Section 4.2,
under a centrally regulated setting, the system operator dispatches the generators to
maximize social welfare by solving the optimization:
= argmax TS, (p, q)
p,q
j=, q = D(p, e)
s.t. 0 < q
<bq < A
where TS, (p, q) is the sum of the generators profit and the consumer surplus (see
(4.6)).
It can easily be shown that in the absence of constraints, the optimal solution for
society is to force the generators to produce enough so that electricity price equals
the generators marginal production costs. Under our symmetry assumption, the
generators experience the same quadratic production costs: C(q) = bq + 1/2 c q2 and
we explained above that, without loss of generality, we take b = 0. The optimality
condition can thus be translated into C'(q) = cq = f. Matching supply with demand,
this leads to:
(C') (p) = -m + (C.9)
-> i= and q~=
It is easy to show that # given in (C.7) is always smaller than the inverse of c:
1
c
This results in p(Dereg.) = p* > p(Centr.) = T and in q(Dereg.) q(Centr.).
We now express the measures of interest (surplus, profit and welfare) as functions of
the price and the production quantity of each generator. We will then plug in these
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expressions the price and quantity of the deregulated and the centralized settings to
evaluate the performance ratios.
As defined in (4.5), the consumer surplus is the difference between the utility con-
sumers derive from using electricity and the price they pay for it: CSc(p, d) =
U, (d) -p d. Removing d from the equation through the demand relationship D(p, c) =
-m p + E, we have:
2 P 
CSc(p) = +Jp - -e2m (2 (C.10)
The generators profit on the other hand can simply be expressed as:
Profit(p, q) = n(p q - C(q)) (C.11)
Finally, the social welfare is the sum of the generators profit and the consumer surplus:
TS(p,q) =CSc(p) + n(p q - C(q)) (C.12)
= U.nq) - n C(q)







11+ 1n 1 - 1
where z = mc and p*, ) and # are defined in (C.6), (C.9) and (C.7) respectively.






1 nf3(1 - p3) (1±U)2
1 1 n
2 (1+ n)2 MC










It is seen from the expressions above that all these performance ratios are independent
of the realization of demand uncertainty e and they depend on the market parameters
m and c only through the unit-less parameter z = mc.
This allows us to plot the curves of Section 4.2 and to derive the corresponding
bounds by carrying some analysis to find the minimum of these ratios as functions of
z. The profit ratio is a decreasing function of z that tends to 1 at infinity. Therefore
the profit ratio always stays above 1: the generators are better off competing than
under central coordination. The consumer surplus and social welfare ratios, on the
other hand, are both unimodal and they achieve their minimum for the same value
of z = -n + 2 v/n2 _ n.
C.2 Derivations for unconstrained asymmetric gen-
erators
Let's first establish the expressions of the consumer surplus and the generators profit
for the case of unconstrained asymmetric generators. As established in Appendix C.1,
the surplus of consumers can be expressed as:
f 2 m pCSe(p)= +Ip - -62m (2
Using the electricity price of the deregulated setting (4.13) p* / and the
1+z#n
regulated setting (4.4.2) E= 1+ 1/z, we obtain:
2 -2
CS(Dereg.) = CS(p* ) = [ 1 -
and
CS(Centr.) = CS(p) =En2mn 1 = +
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Similarly, the expression of the generators profit is given in (4.4):
n
Profit(p, q) = [p qj - Ci(qj)]
i=1
For the deregulated case, we take the equilibrium price p* = t/m
the quantities q* = # p*. This leads to:
of (4.13) and
e2
Profit(Dereg.) = Profit(p*, 3P*) =
M(1 + En 1#i)2
And for the regulated case, we use the centralized price p = +E 1/2 of (4.4.2) and
the fact that generators price at marginal costs 4 = (Cl)~ 1 (p) = -. Substituting, we
1
Profit(Centr.) = Profit(, -
C p) =2 (I+ n 1 ) 22rn ~ ?, (1 i -)
The social welfare (total surplus) is then simply the sum of the consumer surplus and
the generators profit:
TS(Dereg.) = CS(Dereg.) + Profit(Dereg.)
and
TS(Centr.) = CS(Centr.) + Profit(Centr.)
We now prove the bounds on the supply bid coefficients # 's used in evaluating the
performance ratios.
Lemma C.1. The slopes of the supply function bids #i's can be bounded above and











Proof. Denoting by Xi Ejoi N and making use of equation (4.12), we can rewrite
as a function of zi and the #j's:
~ 1+ Ejoi #2 1 + Xj
#__=+(C.13)1 + zi(1 + Ejoi Ng) 1 + zj(1 + Xj)
It turns out that the derivative of the above ratio with respect to X, is non-negative:
OXi [1 + zi (I + Xi)]
As a first order approximation, we can plug the naive bound: 0 < Xi < oo into
(C.13). By monotonicity of #i with respect to Xj, we obtain:
1 ~ 1
1+zi~ -z
This in turns gives rise to the bound: < Xi < Ejg- L. Plugging this back
into (C.13), we get:
1+ zi(1E i 1 ) -- - 1+z Ei )
The procedure could be repeated again to improve accuracy but at the cost of in-
creasingly complex expressions.
Finally, we derive here bounds on the performance ratios under the deregulated setting
versus the centralized setting.
Theorem C.1. The generators are always better off in terms of total profit under
free competition than under central coordination. Moreover the ratio of generators'
profit under free competition, compared to the centrally coordinated setting, can be
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(1+ = 1 1 i=12 (1+zi)2
I. .
(1+En =1 ; .2 [E'=1 zi
The ratio of generators' profit can be further upper bounded by a function of the
minimum production cost of the generators Zmin and a measure of the equivalent
number of generators r. That is,
Profit(Dereg.)
Profit(Centr.)
< (2 + zmin)(r + Zmin) 2
Zmin(1 + r + Zmin ) 2
Proof. We denote by Profit(!1, ... i) = "1[ f(1
(C.15)
,the profit
of generators under the deregulated scenario as a function of the #'s. We study the
monotonicity of Profit(.) with respect to #3. Taking the partial derivative of Profit(.),
we get:
(1 - zi3i)(1 + En 1 #3 ) - 2 Enf3(1 - (#5)2
m
e2 (1 - zAfl) + (1 - z #3) #r/i /j + (1 - zi3i) # j - E #3(1 -z )
mn (1 + E_1#) 3
e2 (1 - zi3i) + (1 - zi#3) #j5 /3 - # - # - z_#E)
m~ (1 .\ - Eio .33I-zii
1+Zmin + 1+Zmin Z j$ j Z= 1 /3i - zij 1+Zmin + 42 /
(for +> Zi
2 1+mi - f E /i Zmin 1
1+zm Z 1+Zmin




(1 + n )3(1±Z g3) 3
(for /i > 1 )
-zi/zmin + zi
< 0 (since r > 1)






using the bounds on #i established in Lemma 4.1. Using the bound 1 < i < , we
obtain (C.14) and with the looser bound {# _ j/ | Vj}, we obtain (C.15). El
Theorem C.2. The ratio of social welfare under free competition compared to the
social welfare under central coordination can be upper and lower bounded by:
[ E~i l/(1+zi) 2 En 1/zi
L1+E1 1/(1+z)J + (1+E 1/zi)2 TS(Dereg.)
1 < 1 (C.16)1- i= 
- TS(Centr.) 
-1 +En 1z
The ratio of social welfare can be further lower bounded by a function of the minimum
production cost of the generators zmin and the measure r of equivalent number of
generators. That is,
Zmin + r (r + Zmin) TS(Dereg.) < (C.17)
r + zmin (1 + r + zmin )2 - TS(Centr.) -
Proof. The social welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus and the generators'
profit. Decomposing, we get:
-2 2 Z -
TS(Dereg.) = - 1 - ~ + #_(1 -A___)
2m _ 1+ En # /i (1 + E"n i) 2llncr.0- II
Increasing function of #i Decreasing function of #i
We thus replace the #3's by the appropriate bounds of Lemma 4.1 to obtain the lower
bound (C.16). The lower bound in (C.17) is derived using the looser bound {#3 >
1
zj/zmin+Z I Vj}. Since under the centrally coordinated setting, electricity is dispatched
by the system operator precisely to maximize social welfare, free competition cannot
achieve better social welfare. The social welfare ratio is thus upper bounded by 1. El
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